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NIEBUHR'S TRANSFORMATIONIST ETHICS.
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3"4.1.0. Ihe Development of Niebuhr's Sense of Responsibility
3.4. 1.1. Niebuhr's responsibilist ethics as related to his radical
monotheism.
3.4.1.2. Niebuhr's early interpretation of responsibilist ethics: waiting 
on God's action in history.
3.4.1.3. Niebuhr's war articles: God as the author of all actions and
events.
3.4.1.4. The change of emphasis in Niebuhr's ethical thought: acting in
response to God's action.
3.4. 1.5. The, need to interpret the nature of God's action in order to
respond to it. •
3.4.1.6. The emergence of Niebuhr's concept of responsibility.
3.4.1.7. Niebuhr's responsibilist definition of ethics.
3.4.2.0. The Subsequent Development of Niebuhr's Ethics.
3.4.2.1. Niebuhr's investigations into the conditions and processes of 
responding to God.
3.4.2.2. The coherence between Niebuhr's ethics and his radical 
monotheism.
3.4.2.3.■ The presence of all the elements of Niebuhr's responsibilist 
ethics in his early pieces on ethics, these were later developed 
in the Responsible Self.
3.4.2.4. Niebuhr's three models of ethics and the antecedents of his 
responsibility model.
3.4.2.5. The characteristics of Niebuhr's model of responsibility.
3.4.2.6. Niebuhr's ethics as an extension of his doctrine of God.
3. 4.2.7. Niebuhr's conception of faith and his Christology as crucial to
his ethics.
3.4.2.8. The trinitarian structure of Niebuhr's ethics as indicated in 
his lectures on ethics.
3.4.2.9. The vulnerability of Niebuhr's ethics to the same criticism as 
his theology, being part of the same system.
3.5.0. THE INTEGRATING THEME: TRANSFORMATION
3.5.1. The imperative of conversion or transformation as the background 
to both Niebuhr's theology and ethics.
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3.6.0. NIEBUHR'S ADVANCE ON TROELTSCH
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his own ontological relativism.
The relation of God to culture in Niebuhr's thought.
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Concludyg remarks on transformation: The positive results of
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THE RELATION OF NIEBUHR'S THEOLOGY AND ETHICS TO HIS TYPOLOGY OF
RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION.
The relation of Niebuhr's theology to his typology.
Troeltsch's us*! of his typology of religious orientation a
tool to analyse ethics.
Niebuhr's use of typologies similar to that of Troeltsch. 
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4.1.1. Outline of chapter four.
4.1.2. The general argument of chapter four: the pathological nature of
Niebuhr's typology.
4.2.0. WITHDRAWAL AND ENGAGEMENT
4-2.1.0. U i e — Implicit— Dynamic— of— Niebuhr's Typology of Religions 
Orientation.
4.2.1.1. Polarities in Niebuhr's approach to typologies of religious 
orientation.
4.2.1.2. Niebuhr's two fundamental types as the expression of his 
typology.
4" 2.2.0. Withdrawal— and— Engagement— as the Church's strategy for
Transforming Culture.
4.2.2.1. The early development of the wi thdrawal-engageraent theme in
Niebuhr's thought.
4.2.2.2. The need for the church to occasionally detach itself from the 
world to save itself from worldliness.
4.2.2.3. Niebuhr's argument that for the church of his time withdrawal 
was necessary.
4.2.2.4. The church's bondage and liberation.
4.2.2.5. The necessity of the dual strategy of withdrawal and engagement
for the church.
4.2.2.6. The full nature of Niebuhr's dualistic strategy.
4.2.2.7. Niebuhr's attempt to ground his dualistic strategy in history in 
Ih£...Kingdom of God in America.
4.2.2.8. Niebuhr's later qualification of his dualistic strategy.
4-2.2.9. Niebuhr's redefinition of the church's responsibility for the
world.
4.2.2.10. Niebuhr's identification of patterns of irresponsibility.
4.2.2.11. The irresponsibility of the 'worldly church'.
4.2.2.12. The irresponsibility of the 'isolationist church'.
4.2.2.13. The interdependence of the two forms of the irresponsible 
church,
4.2.2.14. The strategy of the responsible church.
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INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS.
0.1.1. Most recent thinking about social ethics and the relation of
Christianity to culture and society has been deeply Influenced by the
categories that Troeltsch and Niebuhr developed In their typologies of
religious orientation. (Long 1967;164-167). These categories have
largely determined how Christian social ethics have been approached in
Western Protestantism over the last fifty years, and while they have
produced many Insights they have also brought great difficulties In
their wake. John Howard Yoder describes the chief of these 
difficulties:
tradition of Ernst Troeltsch Western theological 
ethics assumes that the choice of options is fixed in logic 
and for all times and places by the way the Constantinian 
eritage dealt with the question of social ethics. Either 
one accepts,  ^without serious qualification, the 
responsi ity of politics, i.e. that of governing with 
w a ever means that takes, or one chooses a withdrawn 
position of either personal-monastic-vocational or sectarian 
character which is 'apolitical'. (Yoder 1972: 110),
0.1.2. Yoder adds that this dichotomous approach to ethics has gained 
such a following through the work of the Niebuhr brothers that it has 
become difficult for Protestant ethicists to the problem in other 
terms(1). H. R. Niebuhr's Christ and Culture presupposes it and his 
trinitarian language reinforces and propagates it. P. Ramsey's Basic
Chr i s t i an E th ic s , Yoder says, uses this formulation of the problem for
his outline. (Yoder 1972: 110).
0.1.3. This IS an undesirable situation as it narrows down and 
misrepresents the options for Christian approaches to social ethics. It 
implies that if the Church is to be socially responsible it must engage 
the world on the world's terms and leave the radical ethics of the 
Kingdom of God, the ethics of Jesus, behind. Whereas if it desires to 
seek a Kingdom lifestyle, then it condemns itself to social irrelevance.
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0, 1,4. The purpose of this thesis is to challenge this dichotomy by 
offering a rigorous critique of Troeltsch's and Niebuhr's typologies of 
religious orientation, and the theologies that lie behind them. These 
typologies and theologies propagate a dichotomous approach to Christian 
Ethics. Criticism of this approach will establish that the
possibilities for Christian social ethics are far more open and varied 
than Troeltsch and Niebuhr's typologies will allow.
0.1.5. It is not intended to develop an alternative approach to that of 
Troeltsch and Niebuhr in this thesis, but to demonstrate that such a 
dichotomous approach to Christian ethics is by no means necessary. In 
fact, it will be shown that it is destructive and obscurantist rather 
than liberating or illuminating. It is hoped that this will pave the 
way for a far more open ended approach to Christian ethics in which 
'unorthodox' or 'novel' options in Christian ethics will not be 
dogmatically excluded or dismissed by being defined out of existence by 
too strict a typological classification, or by being- misrepresented 
within the typology.
TYPOLOGIES AND IDEAL TYPES.
0.2.1. A type is merely a representation or depiction of a number of 
similar cases all of which have certain important features in conunon. 
Not all the cases may possess the common features in quite the same way 
but there will be sufficient resemblance between the cases to indicate 
that they are of the same general category. They are intellectual 
representations of reality. A typology is the organisation of such 
types along a logical continuum for the sake of comparison and analysis. 
Defined in these terras types and typologies have been in use in 
intellectual history from the time of Plato onwards as an important tool 
of rational investigation both in the human and natural sciences. There 
is thus nothing epistemologically novel about them; they are simply 
heuristic tools used to describe and order reality (Tiryakian 1968: 177- 
184).
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0.2.2. Troeltsch and Niebuhr's typologies attempt to express and 
clarify different religious orientations to culture and society. They 
Identify and classify such orientations in terras of their subject's 
response to culture, and the way in which they relate Christianity to 
culture. Their classification thus has two focal points: the subject's
understanding of Christianity, and their corresponding view of the 
world.(2)
0.2.3. Troeltsch and Niebuhr both use Weber's ideal type methodology
in the construction of their typologies. Weber developed his 'Ideal
Type' against tlks background of th^ discussion in his time of the
episteraology of the social sciences. There were, broadly speaking, two
schools of thought; firstly the subjectivists who held that the social
sciences dealt only with subjective human motives and meanings; secondly
the objectivists who held that the social sciences should adopt the
methodology of the natural sciences. Weber believed that the truth was
to be found in a synthesis of both approaches. This was , a belief he
shared with Windelbrant and Rickert who had already attempted such a
synthesis. Like most of the Neo-Kantians Weber believed that all
knowledge had to be conceptually abstracted from the "flux" of
experience, the distinction lay not in their subject matter between the
social and natural sciences but in their method. However Weber
disagreed with Rickert's definition of that method. Rickert had
argued that the social sciences had an individualising method, and that
both natural and social sciences were based on the scientist's selection
of the most common features of a particular group of subjects. Weber
disagreed with tbds cm two counts: firstly, the scientist's selection
of material was based on the scientist's interests rather than the
common features given in the subjects, and secondly, the social
scientist sought out those features which had a wide "cultural
significance". These were accentuated and formed into a synthesis by
being logically ordered - hence the ideal type (Hekman 1983: 18-26;
Hamilton 1974: 89-86).
0.2.4. In an early work on the methodology of sociology Weber 
described, in some detail, the nature of ideal types and the process by
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which they were formed (Weber 1904). For Weber ideal types were 
conceptual tools which were epistemologically necessary because of the 
nature of knowledge and experience. Knowledge had to be wrested from 
the flux of experience or phenomena by organising it into coherent and 
comprehensible patterns. These are formed by the investigator selecting 
the culturally significant or distinguishing features of the instances 
of social behaviour that he/she is investigating(S). He/she then 
exaggerates those features to their logical extremes and synthesises 
them by establishing logically coherent relationships between them. The 
result is what Weber calls a -utopia' or limiting case in which the 
tendencies of a type, such as a free market economy or a sect, are 
developed to their full logical conclusion. Here the idea is that the 
features of a type are most clearly seen when writ large or set in stark 
contrast. The type, thus defined, is then compared with social reality 
to see If there are any cases in which the traits of the ideal type m y  
be recognised. The type is also used in a comparative way alongside 
other types, as in typologies. As described here Weber's type is ideal 
in two senses: it expresses the utopian or ideal form of certain
patterns of social behaviour if allowed to develop to their fullest
extent, and secondly because no actual instance of social behaviour
ully conforms to it; the type itself is never totally expressed in 
reality. For this reason Weber maintains that the ideal type is not a 
ypothesis but is a tool to aid the development of a hypothesis. 
Accordingly it cannot be tested and falsified like a scientific 
hypothesis. The only ways in which an ideal type can be evaluated is a)
If it presents a plausible account of the motivation of social
behaviour, b> if it is 'objectively possible' in the sense that it could 
reality, and c) if it is adequate as an explanation of the 
motivational causes of social behaviour and organisation. Weber warns, 
owever, that these types are not to be m d e  into real objects or 
forces; they are only ideal constructs, not descriptions of reality, nor 
should there be any attempt to squeeze history into the strict 
categories of the ideal types. Most importantly they are not to be m d e  
the basis of moral evaluations of a particular form of behaviour of a 
particular society or culture. Ideal types are ideal in a logical sense 
only. Ideal types are merely necessary heuristic devices and should
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never be made more than that. (Weber 1904: 63-67; Andreskl 1964: 78-79;
1971: 426-455; Aron 1970: 202-207; Falldlng 1968: 501-506; Hekman 1983- 
26-38).
0.2.5. Weber worked with two kinds of ideal types in his sociological
investigations. The first was the Mstorlcal type which was formed
basically by the process described above, in which Weber would identify
and accentuate the features of an historically specific pattern of
social behaviour such as the Mediaeval city state, or early modern
capitalism. These types being historically unique are confined to one
culture. The second kind of ideal type has been termed by later
commentators as his 'general' type. Weber defines this type as the
attribution of a rational purpose to a hypothetical and real
individual's observable action. Weber called this attributive model a
■pure type': a whole abstract construct such as that of the 'Free
Harket' . This type is culturally transferable, especially as Weber
abandoned his accentuation of the feature of such rational, goal-centred
behaviour. Instead Weber prefered to examine the logic of ideal typical
behaviour in itself (Weber 1922: 129-131). The historical ideal type
belongs to Weber's early methodological reflections in The MethcHnicg.,
Q ^ the Social Sciences in 1904 while the second is exemplified in his
cross-cultural work on religion, economy, social structure and
bureaucracy, and is spelt out in his later work. The Theory of Social
and Economic Organisations (Weber 1922). (Andreski 1971: 455-456; Aron 
1970: 208-10; Watkins 1973: 82-93).
0.2.6. Weber's first type has been subjected to serious criticism by 
modern sociologists and social theorists. Its accentuated nature makes 
it more of a caricature than a representation of social behaviour, and 
as such there is no way that it can be tested as being viable let alone 
falsified (Rex 1961: 172-3). The fact that Weber's historical ideal
type cannot be tested or falsified has also, in the minds of many social 
philosophers and sociologists, undermined its value as a rational or 
scientific concept (Runclman 1972: 33-37). The historical ideal type is 
also based on a 'holistic' understanding of society which is quite at 
odds with Weber's own methodological assumptions and as such is
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confusing because it is not viable as a holistic type but only as a type 
which depicts individual motives for social behaviour (Watkins 1973: 82- 
92). Lastly Weber's historical ideal type is too specific for the work 
of comparative social analysis which was his real genius (14) (Lockwood 
1964: 312ff: Rex 1961: 172-3).
0.2.7. The evaluation of Weber's general type, however, is much more 
positive. It is not a caricature and so is open to falsification. It 
seeks to explain patterns of social behaviour in terms of individual 
motivation and is applicable cross-culturally. As such it is a usable 
tool in sociological investigation. (Andreski 1984: 41-50; Rex 1973
192-211; Watkins 1973: 92-3).
0.2.8.Troeltsch, writing in the nineteen hundreds, used Weber's 
historical type in the formation of his church-sect-mysticism typology 
and so ran into the difficulties of caricaturing and over-specificallity 
which were endemic to Weber's early type. Niebuhr, however, in his 
later work produced * something like Weber's general type on which he 
based his five-fold typology of Christ and culture. In doing this 
Niebuhr avoided many of the pitfalls into which Troeltsch had stumbled. 
However, both made the fundamental mistakes, against which Weber had 
warned; firstly of making their typologies into procrustean beds into 
which they squeezed phenomena and secondly of then using these too 
rigidly defined types in an evaluative manner. In addition to this it 
will also be seen that both Troeltsch and Niebuhr imported hidden 
theological criteria into the definition of their types which tended to 
obscure the empirical data which Weber had insisted was the proper 
material out of which ideal types should be formed.
STRUCTURE OF THESIS.
0.3.1. It is not possible to discuss Troeltsch and Niebuhr's typologies 
apart from their respective theologies as the latter forms the hidden 
criteria and presuppositions for the formation of the former. For this 
reason in this work Troeltsch and Niebuhr's theology and ethics are
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extensively discussed and analysed so that it might be possible to see 
clearly how these have Influenced the development of their typologies 
and the conclusions which, In turn, they draw from these typologies.(5) 
There is a continuity of thought between Troeltsch and Niebuhr's ethics 
and typologies. Troeltsch's ethics are expressed in his typology of 
religious orientation In the types he develops and Niebuhr takes the 
starting point for both his ethics and typology in Troeltsch's thought. 
In fact in his early years Niebuhr's thought Is simply a refined echo of 
the thought of Troeltsch. He adopts Troeltsch's approach to the 
formation of ethical and social values, and readapts Troeltsch's 
typology of religious orientation which embodies his approach to a value 
formation. It is only later that Niebuhr sees the shortcomings of 
Troeltsch's approach and begins to form his own independent approach. 
However even Niebuhr's new approach takes place solidly within the 
agenda and framework set by Troeltsch. For this reason both the
continuities and distinctions between Troeltsch and Niebuhr's thought
will be studied carefully in this thesis.
0.3.2. Consequently in chapter one, the thesis begins, with a 
discussion of Ernst Troeltsch's theology and ethics which is then 
related to his typology of religious orientation in chapter two. A 
similar pattern is followed in chapters three and four with regard to H. 
Richard Niebuhr. The difference being that the links between his 
theology, ethics, and typology of religious orientation and those of 
Troeltsch are considered in some detail. In the course of the 
discussion both Troeltsch's and Niebuhr's theological ethics and 
typological approaches will be seen to be inadequate for the purpose of 
contemporary Christian social ethics since they are found to be too
undefinable, dichotomous and reified to be of real use in Christian 
social ethical decision making. This critique of Troeltsch and Niebuhr 
is brought to a head in chapter five - the conclusion - in which the 
weaknesses of Troeltsch and Niebuhr's theories, both in their original 
and revised forms, and their historical dualism (which stands at the
back of their whole approach to the problem of Christianity and society) 
is identified, analysed and rejected.
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CHAPTER ONE
MJia-IHBQUSH SYHTHRP T,S;_ THE ETHTCM, QRIMlAUIilLQP THE THnnr.HT n,
TROELTSCH.
SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 .
The thought of Ernst Troeltsch was fragmented and constantly 
changing with the result that he never produced a theological or 
philosophical system. Nevertheless it was systematic in the sense that the 
different aspects and concerns in his thought were interdependent, 
interrelated, and moved along parallel lines to one another. A shift in 
one area would mean adjustment in all the others. (H.R. Niebuhr 1924:84-91)
1.1.2. For this reason no element within Troeltsch's thought can be 
approached in isolation. Every distinct aspect has to be seen in the light 
of the whole to be meaningful. Consequently it would be highly 
inappropriate to attempt to study Troeltsch's treatment of types of 
religious orientation without relating them to their wider context within 
Troeltsch's theology and philosophy.
1.1.3. The wider context in which typologies of religious orientation are 
located is Troeltsch's thinking about the nature of history and culture,
, and religion. Troeltsch found these areas subject to both
internal and external tensions which arose from various opposites that were 
endemic to their nature, and from the uniqueness and autonomy of these 
areas over against one another.(Clayton 1979: 83-88). He subsequently
developed his method of synthesis to reconcile these tensions. This 
consisted in the drawing together of the different elements within a 
Situation and arranging them in a temporary reconciliation on the basis of 
those ideas and values which show the most promise or potential for future 
development.(Ogletree 1975 225-8).
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1.1.4. This method is present from a very early stage within Troeltsch's
thought (Eelst 1966: 156-159) but did not come into its own until
Troeltsch's historical emphasis dominated the other areas of his thought
following his discovery of sociology through Max Weber.(Chamberlain 1976: 
372-398).
1.1.5. Troeltsch's thought developed through a series of stages in which a 
different emphasis predominated over the other elements in his philosophy 
and theology, and acted as a focus for them. In Troeltsch's early years as 
a scholar he was drawn to the pyschology of religion as represented by
William James. This became his major concern in his approach to religion
as he believed that it was necessary to stress the empirical nature and the 
diversity of religious phenomena.(Clayton 1979: 70-77). This concern may 
also be reflected in his emphasis on concrete individuality in history at 
this time. Troeltsch found this position too relativistlc and too 
vulnerable to reductlonism, and so he turned his attention to Neo-Kantian 
epistemology and sought to base the independence of different areas of life 
upon apriori concepts. It is at this point that Troeltsch's notorious idea 
of the religious apriori enters upon the scene.(Niebuhr 1924: 70-77) 
However Troeltsch found this approach too rationalistic and so he looked 
instead to history to provide a point of unity for his thought. Religion, 
ethics and culture were, in this last stage of Troeltsch's thought, to be 
understood through their historical development, and their logic and 
meaning were to be discovered through a synthesis of the different elements 
within their interrelated process of development.
1.1.6. Although history had always been a central concern of Troeltsch's 
thought, his historical phase began when he discovered the contextual 
nature of ethics and religion through Weber's analysis of the relation of 
the cultural superstructure to the social and economic substructure. 
Troeltsch thus came to believe that ethical and religious ideas are 
Influenced by social and economic situations and arrangements. 
Consequently they cannot be understood as ideal realities, as in the 
apriori, but only as they have developed in actual social and economic 
positions in history. This reorientation took place in Troeltsch's later
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years in Heidelberg (from about 1909 onwards) during which time he shared a 
house with Weber.
1.1.7. Central to Troeltsch's historicism was his method of synthesis 
Which he developed first of all in his historical studies as a way of 
overcoming the historical and moral relativism which was a product of the 
'modern' world as it had developed out of the Enlightenment. His approach 
was to combine the cultural values of the past with the rising values of 
the present and so maintain a continuity in ethics which was open to 
development. Subsequently Troeltsch applied it to ethics in an attempt to 
reconcile the values of autonomous ethics and the values of mundane secular 
life which were the product of the Enlightenment, and to overcome the 
ethical relativism of the Enlightenment. Troeltsch then extended his 
ethical synthesis to Christian ethics in an attempt to relate them to the 
secular culture of the modern world. Finally Troeltsch applied this method 
to religion firstly as a means of showing the superiority of Christianity 
over and against other religions and then as a way of defining the centre 
of Christianity in relation to its differing contexts.
1.1.8. When it was applied to all of these areas synthesis became more 
than a method; it became a metaphysical principle (Niebuhr 1924:39-54) 
through which h u m n  reality was brought into a temporary unity, while the 
Absolute and Infinite was revealed in a relative and finite context.
1.1.9. The method of synthesis culminated in 'compromise'. This was not a 
negative concept for Troeltsch but was a creative principle whereby the 
different elements within the synthesis were accommodated to each other and 
took on each other's characteristics. The end of this process was that the 
synthesis was given unity and the elements within it were mutually enriched 
by each other. The idea of compromise was thus the basic mediating 
principle between the various elements in Troeltsch's thought. Compromise 
tied these sometimes disparate elements together. It also became one of 
the main criteria that distinguished church and sect types and was basic to 
his account of the formation of the church type.
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. Sion and ethics outlined above. This will receive fuller treatment and 
discussion in the rest of this chapter.
THE CHALLENGE OF THE MODERN WORLD. 
The Rise Of HistoriciR^
::::::
T the rise of historicism. However it is still possible to draw together 
a^^cohesive picture of Troeltsch's understanding of historicism from his
1.2. U3. For Troeltsch, the modern view of history had its genesis in the 
enaissance revival of the Greek psychological approach to history. In the 
n ig enment this was given a rationalistic and analytical direction in
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the idea of a universal approach to history which would disclose the 
universal norms common to all mankind. In the German Romantic movement 
hhis rationalism and universalism was rejected in favour of a mysticism 
which saw the individual as the product of powerful spiritual forces at 
work within history to which he was subject and organically related. This 
view was finally complemented by advances in evolutionary theory and 
philology which tended to reinforce the Romantic view of history as being 
both individual and organic. It was individual in the sense that the role 
of the individual was the representation of spiritual forces and realities 
greater than himself, or which were beyond any single event. This view of 
history was also organic in the sense that the 'real' forces in history 
were supraindividual.(2) (Troeltsch 1897: 143-144: 1910c 1776-18: 1900
438-40: Rand 1964: 501-18)
1.2. 1.4. By Troeltsch's time this conception of history had led to a 
sceptical and reductionistic relativism which he called 'wretched 
historicism'. (Rand 1964: 510-515). It is not difficult to conjecture how 
this occurred; on the one side the historical method levelled all events 
down to the same status so that none could claim any uniqueness or 
independence from all other historical events. On the other side all 
events were seen as the unique and particular products of their context and 
time and so limited by situational condition. This made it possible to 
conceive of all events as the products of their natural or social and 
economic circumstances. Since all events were so conditioned the values 
they represented were relative; one set of cultural circumstances created 
one particular system of values and another quite a different system. 
Moral and cultural values, then, were seen as changing from age to age, and 
culture to culture. The philosopher Dilthey, who through his books, 
exerted a great influence over Troeltsch, welcomed this outcome of the 
anarchy of values" on the grounds that it set each age free to create its 
own values. (Dyson 1974:3-32). However it left many other historians and 
thinkers profoundly sceptical about any values whatsoever. In the end, 
though, this kind of historicism led to positivism, (Dyson 1968: 48-52),
and so back into the arms of Enlightenment rationalism.
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separated as mundane goals which gained ascendancy over religious goals. 
The supernaturalism from which religious goals drew their authority was 
severely questioned and challenged both by natural science and by the new 
historicist method which together denied any realities outside of the scope 
of their own scientific investigations.
1.2.2.2. In the second place both religion and ethics became subject to 
relativism born both of individualistic rationalism and historicism. As a 
result of this the traditional claims of Christianity to finality and 
superiority over all other religions were questioned.(Troeltsch 1898:396; 
1910b: 121-3). At the same time ethics and morality were seen as the 
products of time and circumstance with the result that a search commenced 
for a universal and coinmon basis for ethics and religion drawn from natural 
law. By the late eighteenth century, however, it became apparent that this 
search had failed.(Antoni 1962:73-75).
j
1.2.2.3. This situation led to Dilthey's 'anarchy of values' and the 
cultural task which he set each generation to create its own values for its 
society. (This is to be distinguished from existentialism in that these 
values are to be formulated on a collective and not on an individual 
basis.)
1.2.2.4. Troeltsch felt that he lived in a time when Western civilisation 
was in crisis, having lost touch with all of its values. (Reist 1966: 60- 
61). Furthermore secure foundations were needed. Consequently Troeltsch 
undertook to provide a new basis for values in Western civilisation. 
(Little 1966:350-351). Troeltsch's whole work in ethics, history and 
theology arises out of his sense of responsibility to European culture and 
was strongly sthiCQl as a programme and task. It is this author's 
contention that Troeltsch is first of all an ethicaJ. thinker vfho is 
searching for a new basis of values for Western culture within the limits 
of a historicist worldview. Thus Troeltsch takes an ethical approach to 
history, developing his method of synthesis in order to establish a basis 
for values in history. He then extends this method to include both 
theology and ethics.
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1.3.1.4. Troeltsch believed that the proper task and duty of the historian 
was to identify values in history. History, Troeltsch argues, should be 
used to provide an adequate understanding of, and values for, the present, 
as well as guidance for the future. In fact, he claims, these concerns
should guide historical research. According to Troeltsch all
historiography which does not take this approach either reflects a simple 
antiquarian interest in history or is mistaken in regarding historical
phenomena as superfluous.(Ogletree 1965:21-23).
1.3.1.5. Troeltsch identifies the essential elements of his 'logic of
history as 'individuality' and the concept which arises from it,
development . These, for Troeltsch, are the phenomenologically basic 
qualities of history (Little 1966:350-351) and as such the concepts which 
the historian must use to identify historical values. Individuality 
indicates the historical object, on the one hand, and development of the 
historical process of becoming on the other. In discussing individuality 
Ti oeltsch argues that history is characterised by uniqueness; there are no 
repeated essences, only individualities. These individualities, however, 
are totalities or wholes, such as epochs, cultures and institutions which 
are subject to, and joined together by, the process of historical becoming. 
Thus while Troeltsch's theory may emphasise the particular it is not 
atomistic. Furthermore what is individual, for Troeltsch, is also 
contingent or accidental; it does not arise out of necessity. Troeltsch 
uses this to emphasise historical uniqueness and the role of human 
freedom.(Troeltsch 1910c 720-21). Thus for Troeltsch the idea of
development is implied by that of the individual totality which is in a 
state of continual internal becoming or development.(Little 1966: 353-4).
1.3.1.6 It is in the identification of the leading ideas or 'essences' of 
historical individualities that values emerge from history. These essences 
are similar to Weber's ideal types (4) (Niebuhr 1924:241) and are crucial 
to Ti oeltsch s historical analysis. It is the essence which gives an 
individua], totality its unity and distinguishes it from other 
individualities. Through the use of concept of essence Troeltsch believes 
that the historian is enabled to separate and identify different periods, 
epochs, institutions and movements in history.(Sykes 1976:146-154). Thus
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the historian has to make a limited selection from historical phenomena of 
those accents which are most symbolically representative of specific 
individualities or unities of significance. The historian's selection and 
representation will, itself, however, be a product of a specific historical 
individuality and will be subject to the Judgement of history and as such 
IS provisional. (Stackhouse 1961:223-5). But this does not mean that the 
essence is merely a product of the historian's viewpoint; it arises out of 
values inherent to the individual totality which give it its unity and 
meaning. Troeltsch does believe, however, that the recognition of values 
on the part of the historian depends upon his own consciousness as a value 
former. This, though, is influenced by the historian's culture, and with a 
new world view, a new system of values will arise. This means that past 
historical totalities will be approached differently in different ages. 
Yet they will continue to be 'things-in-themselves' and not simply objects 
for future cultures. The integrity of historical totalities, is secured, 
according to Troeltsch, by the fact that the formation of their essences 
IS not a psychological affair but an a priori and logical one based upon a 
logical intuition which emerges from the synthetic logic of
history.(Niebuhr 1924:241-8 ).
IbQ Cultural Synthesis 
1.3.2.1
The next stage in Troeltsch's historical method is his 'material
philosophy of history which is based upon the 'logic of history'. The
purpose of historical research based upon this logic is to identify values
in history and bring them into a 'unity' for the present. ( Troeltsch 
1902:100-6).
1.3.2.2. The material philosophy of history has an ethical task; it must 
provide values for the present. This ethical concern is inseparable from 
history since history itself, Troeltsch would claim, raises the question 
of the relation of historical aggregates to the values of a culture or a 
period. Moreover it is ever necessary to pass Judgement on the 
developments of past history. The problem that besets this activity is an 
anarchy of values in which history is interpreted differently from many 
points of view; politics. Jurisprudence, ethics and religion. The only
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solution to this problem, Troeltsch feels, is to draw these different
valuations together in a complete system of values by which it will be
possible to judge various historical entities. (5). Troeltsch's view of
ethics thus entails a logical circle in %&ich it judges history by values
drawn from history. This, he claims, is inevitable and unavoidable,
(Troeltsch 1910 721-22).
...the difficulty can only be solved by the thinkers own
conviction and certainty that amid the facts of history (the
historians) has really recognised the tendencies that make for
ethical Ideals and that he has truly discerned the dynamic
movement and progressive tendency, of the historical process.
(Troeltsch 1902:721-2).
1.3.2.3. t]^ perspective of this ethical system historical progress
appears cus an approximation a complete 'harmony erf ethical values'.
Troeltsch states that this is Aore a question of faith since actual 
historical development eümtrs no uniform progress in history. However, 
Sdys Troeltsch, ethical systems do seem to move toward this harmony, but 
Its realisation will never be achieved in his life (Troeltsch strikes an 
eschatologlcal note here). This brings Troeltsch full circle back to his 
concept of individualisation in which the ideal of the system of values is 
reflected in different ways in history, it is not a fixed standard. This 
gives all historical phenomena a double character. On the one side it is 
an individualisation of tl^ absolute, which history is moving toward. 
the other it is only an approximation to a harmony of values (the absolute)
and its individual aspects can criticised as such.(Troeltsch 1910:722-
3).
1.3.2.4. The immediate task which lies before the historian is to discern 
what kind of approximation to the 'harmony of values' is possible in the 
present and then to draw values from past history that are compatible with 
the approximation and which can undergird it. This is an interpretative
act since it links past values with the present, ascribing continuity to 
them as having led to the formation of present cultural values. The 
historian must also act in the light of the future and select those values 
which, he feels, are able to carry his culture forward into the future. In 
all of this the historian has to be sensitive to the nature of his time and
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clearness.(Niebuhr 1924-254-5) ^Iven certainty and
1.3.2.
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In history takes place. Troeltsch even suggests himself in different
places in his work that new cultural syntheses are actually formed
unconsciously. (Reist 1966:249ff). This is rather at odds with the kind of
responsibility and skill he requires of the historian, though perhaps this
is still needed in Identifying the synthesis as it emerges. Secondly
Troeltsch only limits historical relativism, he does not really overcome
it. He m y  secure a basis for absolutely binding values for persons of a
particular time and place, but values still remain relative from culture to
culture and age to age.(Reist 1966:76-78). The result of this was that in
his later career Troeltsch's historical perspective narrowed until it
became solely concerned with European civilisation.(Pye 1977:63-5). But
Troeltsch may well have been content with this since he would have felt
that it was enough to have a basis for values within one's own time and
place. Lastly Troeltsch based his ethics on an absolute which exists above
and behind history which historical ethics or values reflect.(6) This is a
massive metaphysical assumption which is inconsistent with a purely 
historical approach alone.
Iroeltsch's Failure To Overcome Historicism
In these ways, then, Troeltsch seeks to use history to overcome 
the worst aspects of historicism. He may have succeeded, within his own 
terms, in removing the threat of historical reductlonism by making ethical 
values both autonomous within, yet necessary to, the historical process. 
However Troeltsch limits historicism through his historical method. While 
a set of values may be binding within a particular culture and time they 
Will have no value outside of their context. As the historical contexts 
change so will ethical values and the manifestation of the absolute upon 
which they are based. Thus there is only a temporary stability of values. 
Outside of this there is only a plurality and anarchy of values. Moreover 
If all cultures are in transition as Troeltsch insists, how is it possible 
to judge the currency of any particular values? Even in his own terms 
Troeltsch does not and cannot overcome history.
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civilisation which will produce an adequate orientation for the future. 
Troeltsch uses this method in history out of the conviction that it is the 
medium of the revelation or manifestation of the absolute. In the cultural 
synthesis the absolute is disclosed.
ETHICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION
Icoeltsch's Assimilation Of The Ethioal_Leg&cv Of The Enlightenment.
1.4.1.1. The Enlightenment left behind two lasting consequences for
ethics; the first was the priority it gave to mundane and 'this-worldly'
values stressing the importance of culture, art, science, economics and
politics as ends in themselves. The second was the search for an
autonomous non-dogmatic basis for morality and religion. This was linked
to a metaphysics of the personality which emphasised individual 
value.(Dyson 1968:63-5).
1.4.1.2. Troeltsch accepted both sides of the ethical emphasis of the 
Enlightenment and sought to incorporate them into his thinking. This is 
seen from his book on the foundation of ethics, Grundeproblem Her Rthik 
JLUKKLL (Von translates this title ZHs Fundamental Problems nf
Ethics. (Von Hugel 1921:145-7)).
1.4. 1.3. Troeltsch agreed with Kant that ethics had an a priori basis but 
he prefei red to understand this as establishing goals through reason rather 
than in terms of law. Out of the concept of 'ideally necessary ends', 
which Troeltsch argued followed from this, there developed a distinction 
between individual and social goals which in turn led to the individual 
morality of personal character development and social morality which
....presuppose each other and mutually determine each 
other.(Pannenberg 1981:90).
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Troeltsch further distinguished between these two sets of values in the 
following terms:
1.4.1.4.
In this manner Troeltsch embraced the mundane values to which the 
nlightenment gave priority, These cultural values, or objective goods, as 
roeltsch describes them, emerge In the course of historical development In 
specrfic institutions. While they may detach themselves from their 
orrgrnal contexts they still have to be Interpreted by their own particular 
hrstory, Thus no single vision of the absolute or 'Ideal' can be said to 
be at work in history, but only a system of Interpreted and articulated 
values. This leaves Troeltsch with the question that for him Is the 
oen ral problem of ethics.(Von Hugel 1821,153-4). Ethics, for Troeltsch 
becomes the Interpretation of the moral n.anlngs of social institutions and 
1 erent aspects of culture In their interrelationships In a given social- 
is or cal setting. Troeltsch makes ethics into philosophy of
culture.(7).(Little 1968:209-10).
1.4.1.5. These 'Objective values' resemble Troeltsch's historical 
essences. Like the essences they have emerged in history and give a moral 
to historical phenomena and give Its totalities a continuing 
life.(Stackhouse 1861,223-5). They are thus vital historical forces like 
the essences. Moreover when giving examples of individual totalities and 
cultural values Troeltsch frequently Identifies the same institutions, the 
the family, science, nation, culture.(Kelst 1866,56; Von Hugel
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1921,153-4). The essences of the historian, It would seem, are the same as 
the cultural values of the ethlclst, and the historian's task is to 
rediscover past cultural values and rehabilitate them for the present.
1.4.1.6. While Troeltsch does distinguish 'objective' and 'subjective'
values, these two areas of ethical life, are mutually necessary to one
another. Troeltsch argues that neither a purely formal, nor a purely 
pragmatic ethic Is possible by Itself. In the first place the formal a 
priori needs to be nade real In history through the Objective values,
(Little 1968,211,214), and so made subject to historical change. In the
second place the Objective values need Subjective ethics to elevate them 
above a purely pragmatic level.(Sleigh 1923,140-4),(Von Hugel 1921,625).
1.4.1.7. While Troeltsch thus makes a great contrast between subjective
and objective ethics he still seeks unity In his thought which he seeks to
ground in the ethical a priori or Idea of the 'good'. Both subjective and
objective ethics are founded, for Troeltsch, In the idea of the 'Good'.
So, the objective values are more than products of nature - they are
natural Instincts transformed by the Ideal of the ethical good.(Von Hugel 
1921:625).
1.4.1.8. Troeltsch bases his Idea of the 'ethical good' on the natural
ethical sense which he believes all human beings possess. The Ideal of the 
ethically good Is, it seems, simply another version of the moral a priori, 
namely the moral and ethical category of human consciousness. Thus whllj 
Troeltsch wants to get away from, or modify, a priori ethics, the Idealist
habit Is far too hard for him to break and he sneaks a version of the a
priori in through the back door.
1.4.1.9. Troeltsch returned to this scheme of ethics In an attempt to use
it as a way of overcoming and limiting the worst consequences of historical 
relativism as it affects morality. (Little 1968,216, Troeltsch 1923). To 
begin with he sought to anchor ethical values as a whole In 'subjective 
ethical values' which he now called 'the morality of personality and 
conscience'. Troeltsch held that this morality laboured to give fuller 
development to the human personality. As such Its values were universal
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and not specific to any one place or time. The ethics of personality, to 
roeltsch s mind, consequently represented the values of the absolute 
This, Troeltsch believed, formed a barrier against both relativism and 
naturalistic reductlonlsm in ethics. In the first place the ethics of 
personality could provide a standard which could, at least, limit 
historical relativism. In the second place these ethics provided an 
alternative source for ethical values, (In the quest for the development of
hpman personality apart from natural desire or historical
circumstances).(Troeltsch 1923;49-65).
1.4.1.10. The ethics of personality, like the subjective values have no
historical power or reality, they are dependent upon the objective or
cultural values', as Troeltsch now calls them to give them historical
em odiment. Troeltsch sees the cultural values as principles which arise
in history as part of the development of culture. They are a second source
of values Which lie alongside the ethics of personality. The ethics of
personality raise the cultural values above their merely natural and
IS orical origins to give them a greater nobility. Yet if put under
pressure by covering historical forces the influence of personal values on
ou ture can . easily be reversed while the cultural values will 
endure.(Troeltsch 1923:71-87).
1.4.1.11. The most pressing question, for Troeltsch, though. Is that of 
ow the personal and cultural values are to be brought Into a relationship
0 unity which will provide moral guidelines and a framework for life in 
the present and the future. This cannot, says Troeltsch, be brought about
y eoretical work alone, but evolves slowly in 'practical life' under the 
in luence of geography, environment and great personalities. This leads 
once more to the cultural synthesis which in ethics Is to be based upon an 
intuitive interpretation of European history as it has developed through 
c ance, necessity and human action. (This has already been considered In 
greater detail above). Within the cultural synthesis the morality of the 
personality Is to be related to the cultural values as these have been 
rought into a new harmony through the historical decision that lies behind 
the synthesis. The purpose of this Is to unite and strengthen these
1 ferent values. This too, notes Troeltsch, Is a matter of Individual
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judgement because there is no strict logic whereby the two ethics are to be 
related.(Pennenber 1981:100-102).
1.4.1.12. In all of this it emerges that the cultural values take the 
leading role in the cultural synthesis. It is these values which have 
greater historical reality and power, and these values which express the 
particular norms or values of a civilisation. It is clear, then, that In 
the decision Involved in framing the cultural synthesis the cultural values 
function as organising principles, and In fact become the criterion for the 
cultural synthesis. (Little 1968:217-18; Niebuhr 1924:249-55).
1.4.1.13. Troeltsch sought to affirm both the Enlightenment's ethics of
autonomy and Its mundane values and tried to overcome the relativism which
the Enlightenment produced, by bringing these ethics into a common
framework In which they could Interpret and augment one another. This
project, however. Is undermined by the emphasis Troeltsch gave to
individuality In his later thought. By the time Troeltsch wrote the essays
which make up Christian— Thought he had relinquished the idea of the a
priori and all the concepts of generality and universality that it Implied.
The result of this Is that Troeltsch's formal ethics of the personality are
Bade subject to Individuality. In the first place they were to develop and
emerge In history; in the second they have to be given historical
realisation. By themselves the ethics of the personality are purely
logical and ahistorlcal. Troeltsch proposes that these ethics should
■ limit', 'strengthen' and 'elevate' the cultural values. But how this Is
to be achieved Is difficult to see since the ethics of the personality
have, according to Troeltsch, no historical influence and are In any case
dependent upon the cultural values for their realisation in the world. It
seems that the net effect of Troeltsch's ethics Is that nature and the
cultural values overwhelm the ethics of personality In the cultural
synthesis where the primary factor is historical Individuality. The end
result of this Is that Troeltsch has subordinated the Enlightenment
valuation of the personality (which he stresses has Christian roots) to the
mundane values of the Enlightenment, (which are entirely secular in 
nature).(8)
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1.4.1.14. The second result of this movement away from universality is
that Troeltsch's ethics have no centre. While he stresses that the
cultural values are based on the absolute, the absolute Itself is
impossible to define and identify since It Is only ever partially realised
in the world. All that there is, is a variety of Individual values each of
which claim some kind of ultlmacy. It Is Inevitable because of this that
Troeltsch's ethics should collapse Into particularity. Troeltsch's r»ply
to this would be to say that the unity of ethical values Is the m l n
problem for ethics and not Its starting point. Each generation, he would
argue, must create a unity of values for itself. The difficulty with this
Is that such a unity will always be based on the Individual and particular
as the leading elements of the cultural values set the stage for the
cultural synthesis and thus order the other values in the synthesis
accordingly,. Where the unity of ethics is based on such contingent factors
which are totally irrational and accidental, how can Troeltsch appeal to
any Ideal value behind history and thereby distinguish his ethics from a 
cultural form of pragmatism?
Chïistisn Ethics and Culture.
1.4.2.1. While wholeheartedly embracing the ethical levacy of the
Enlightenment, Troeltsch also wanted to affirm the place If Christian
ethics in the modern world with the result that he tries to relate the
ethical heritage of Christianity, understood through the critical
assumptions of the Enlightenment, to the 'Modern World'. (Pannenberg 
1981:107, von Hugel 1971: 115 ff)
1.4.2.2. The logical place to begin an account of Troeltsch's view of 
Christian ethics is with his understanding of the ethics of Jesus. While 
Jesus, says Troeltsch, contended for the autonomy of ethics against the 
Pharisees, his ethic is not one of universal validity but of religious 
contents and ends, namely those of thelstic personalism and the Kingdom of 
God. The final aim of these is to create a community of persons who live 
in mutual love and service. Jesus expected the Imminent end of the world, 
Troeltsch says, and so social Institutions and 'natural' ethics are forced
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l-gely because of their eschatological content. Troeltsch is therefore 
ambivalent concerning their applicability in the modern world. On the one 
side Troeltsch maintained that the eschatological End of Jesus' ethics 
ould be relevant in the modern world since It Is still possible to work
God " h 1°'= "hlch is the goal of the Kingdom of
ic and a domestic ethic, (von Hugel 1921:154-161).
couragement. (Pannenberg 1981, 92-3). However Troeltsch defines
:::: :zr ::::
e world, and no direct principles, not even Its ethics, which can operate
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Troeltsch, consequently, argues that all Christian ethics are relative to a
paprcular economic and social background and so are not timeless but
relative. Troeltsch also .mlntalned that because of Its autonomous and
" iistian ethics and values are thus In the same position as
, personality; In themselves religious ethics
ural values which are compatible with religious values. Examples of
his would be the early and Mediaeval Churches use of natural law and the
trans ormatlon of the mundane values of humanism Into a mundane asceticism 
in Calvinism.
1.4.2.6 These alliances can only be formed through religious institutions 
Troeltsch are sociological expressions of religious ideas.
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ihese, through their adoption of specific cultural values, form mediating 
channels between a religious ethic and culture and society.
1.4.2.7. As with subjective values, then, religious values are also
dependent upon cultural values to the extent that their form, content and
influence in the world will, to a large extent, be determined by these
values. Thus cultural values also overwhelm religious values in
Troeltsch's ethics.
1.4.2.8. Tioeltsch undertakes to relate the history of the development of 
the oultuial values of Western civilisation. Jesus' ethics were non
acultural and centred on the Kindgom of God. Under the influence of Paul,
however, the early Christian community made Jesus, and not the Kingdom, the 
centre of hope and faith, and stressed present salvation. Troeltsch felt 
that this introduced a circular dualism into the heart of the gospel which 
made it both this worldly and other worldly. (Troeltsch 1903b 145). This 
shift moved the stress of Christian ethics from the content of the ethic of 
Jesus to the authority of His commands and the power of salvation. The 
content of Christian ethics itself becomes interpreted as a universal ethic 
in this later, more 'churchly' emphasis, which, Troeltsch states, persisted 
from Paul to Kant. This identification of Christian ethics made by 
Christianity through its churchly institutions took a variety of forms in 
history.
1.4.2.9. Two of these are of major importance to Troeltsch, the mediaeval 
synthesis of a Sacred society and Free Church Calvinism. The Mediaeval 
Catholic Church from Gregory the Great onwards formed a harmony between 
religious and cultural values by making religious values the end of 
fulfilment of cultural values. This was done by first distinguishing 
between the Lsx Dei (the Law of God as given in the Law of Moses and in the 
teaching of Jesus) and the L&X Naturae, (the moral requirements of ordinary 
life) and then by identifying them. The two laws were distinguished by the 
supernatural origin of the former which could be known only by revelation 
and then identified by arguing that before the fall the two were 
essentially the same and even now stand in continuity; however, the natural 
law could only find its proper direction and fulfilment in the divine law.
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Thus reason could only properly be reason on the basis of revelation and
na ure could only be nature on the basis of supranature. This established
the rationale and structure for the ecclesiastical direction of secular and
cu tural life In Europe, (von Hugel 1921, 93-97, 161-171; Troeltsch
1906b;9-20).
1.4.2.10. The Mediaeval Catholic synthesis was disrupted by the combined 
forces of nationalism, capitalism and Protestantism which shattered the 
socxal unity of Europe and produced new social structures and Ideologies, 
a n y  Protestantism, according to Troeltsch, represented a continuation. In 
a redefined form of the Mediaeval Catholic synthesis. The authority of the 
xble replaced that of the church's hierarchy and individual conscience 
assumed the function of ecclesiastical power.(Troeltsch 1906b, 42-8)
However, in the guise of Free Church Calvinism (10) Protestantism soon 
organised a new and more powerful synthesis with the forces of nationalism, 
capitalism and humanism which helped It to prominence. It did this by 
^ k i n g  the values which these cultural forces promoted the means or 
o annels by which religious values were to be realised. It consequently 
se about organising mundane values for the sake of religious ends, 
un ane values were never seen as ends in themselves but as means by which 
heavenly' goals were realised. As such they were given a high, though not 
absolute, value and they were diligently sought.(Troeltsch 1906b, 58-88).
1.4.2. 11. With the rise of the modern world the old identification of
na ural law and divine law was dissolved, largely through natural law
ecomlng an autonomous and critical principle. Moreover the mundane values
came to be seen as ends in themselves and as such could no longer be
subjected to religious ends. This led to both the demise of the natural
-  synthesis which lay behind both Mediaeval Catholicism and Protestantism
and the vocational ethic of Calvinism. This resulted in the crisis of
ristian ethics In the modern world, with Christianity needing to form a
new synthesis with culture. Western culture, in turn, is left without any
religious foundations, mundane values lacking any transcendent orientation. 
(Niebuhr 1923: 31-3).
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1.4.2.12. Any new synthesis will have to be inade from the side of 
religions ethics, according to Troeltsch, because it alone is in touch with 
the infinite and eternal end of man. Cultural values, by themselves, have 
no overall direction, and so are both insufficient to provide a basis for a 
new synthesis, and Inadequate as they do not aspire to the absolute. 
Objective ethics by themselves only cause men to search for ever higher 
ends. Troeltsch notes that the Christian ethic has been most successful in 
history when the insufficiency of worldly ends has been realised, as in the 
Graeco-Roman world. Troeltsch sees the reconciliation of these two ends as 
a difficult individual task. Religious or worldly ends will predominate in 
the lives of different people according to their situation in life: 
religious factors will be pre-eminent in the lives of clergy, missionaries 
and nurses, while the worldly values will have first place for statesmen 
and workers. Troeltsch recognises that this is similar to Catholic ethics, 
but he finds the Protestant attempt to create a morality in which religious 
and worldly ends are reconciled in the life of the individuals far too 
simple, failing to take into account the situation and maturity of each of 
the individuals. (Von Hugel 1921:164-9).
1.4.2.13. Troeltsch's answer is once again of synthesis, Imt this
time between mundane values and supraraundane values or goals representing 
the eternal and infinite. These supramundane values refer to the Kingdom 
of God. This gives Troeltsch's ethics an eschatological orientation which 
allows him to stress religious values by relativising mundane values. 
However the supramundane, religious values represent something which 
remains ever future for Troeltsch, in effect leaving mundane values 
autonomous in the present. (Pannenberg 1981: 93-111). (11)
1.4.2.14. All of this is to be achieved by a synthesis resulting in a 
compromise, but it is unclear on what basis this should take place. On the 
one hand Troeltsch argues that the synthesis has to be formed on the basis
predominant cultural values vvith which religious values then
allied. On the other hand, Troeltsch maintains that only religion can 
provide an adequate basis for giving unity to values. In practice, 
however, it would seem to be the cultural values which carry the day since 
U)6!y give a pragmatic practical unity to values. Religious values,
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they have any influence. In actuality, then, the cultural values are 
autonomous, and, while Troeltsch searches desperately for ways to relate 
personal and religious values to them, they remain the major powers in 
culture and history. In previous ages cultural values were attuned to 
religious ends, in the modern world, however, for Troeltsch, they have 
become wholly secular and therefore antagonistic to religious values. The 
world has for Troeltsch 'come of age' and no longer seeks the transcendent. 
Many of Troeltsch's difficulties here, though, arise from his initial 
definition of religious ethics as other worldly and ahistorical, but this 
is a consequence of his desire to preserve the autonomy of religion (as 
will be seen in the following section).
1.4.2.15. In conclusion it should be said that, in the first place, 
Troeltsch is concerned to assimilate tlæ ethical legacy the
Enlightenment, especially its emphasis on mundane values. In the second
place, Troeltsch wants to use those ethical values to put a limit on 
historical relativism. It is questionable, however, to what degree he 
succeeds. Thirdly, Troeltsch wants to use Christian ethics as a resource
for the modern world and so he seeks to relate transcendent ends to mundane
ends. The method that Troeltsch uses in each of these three instances is 
synthesis based upon creative selection and resulting in compromise.
CULTURE AND RELIGION
Ihe Implications of Hlstorlcism for Thenlngy.
1.5.1.1. Troeltsch held that the relativising consequences of historicism, 
Identified above, had to be accepted by Christian theology as much as any 
other academic discipline; it could claim no privileged status. The 
historical method and worldview would have to be embraced by theology which 
would then have to work within the constraints placed upon it by
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historicism, and so replace its 'dogmatic' method with the historical
method. This was the theme of some of Troeltsch's earliest works.(Morgan 
1977:9-11).
1.5.1.2. The rejection of the dogmatic method meant that theology would 
have to abandon what Troeltsch called its 'supernaturalism'. This was the 
basing of faith and dogmatics upon a supernatural miracle, whether the 
external' miracle of the incarnation, or the 'internal' miracle of faith 
and conversion. This event was then taken as being the focus of 
revelation. To accept such a miraculous event as a point of departure was 
to refer to a suprahistorical authority and to isolate one particular event 
from all others and to invest it with especial importance.(Troeltsch 
1902:43-49; Dyson 1968:216-19). Troeltsch found fault with Uiis on tvm 
counts: firstly a historical worldview could not admit such a
suprahistorical authority. Secondly, the historical method would not allow 
one event to be isolated from all others. The doctrines of analogy and 
correlation in history required that all events be similar find inter- 
connected. Thus there could be no events which possessed an extra- 
historical form of causality and so were significantly different from all 
other historical events, or without antecedents and consequents in other 
historical events.(Troeltsch 1902:49-57; Dyson 1968:219-25). For this 
reason no single event could be accepted as giving meaning for all others. 
So to accept supernaturalism was to rupture the fabric of history; this 
could not be permitted in historicism.
1.5.1.3. Troeltsch maintained that the only manner in which it was 
possible to arrive at any conclusions about religion that were compatible 
with history was to base those conclusions upon the concrete phenomena of 
religion within history. It was only through surveying the whole course of 
empirical history, or the particular material of the history of religions, 
that any religious truth could be discerned. For Troeltsch the Absolute 
was manifest within history. For this reason Troeltsch called himself an 
inclusive supernaturalist'. To draw religious truth from history was thus 
rather like drawing the cream off the top of the milk. It was this 
alternative approach to religious truth which Troeltsch called the 
historical method' in theology.(Troeltsch 1902:90-100).(12)
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SearcJa..fQr Christianity's Essence.
1.5.2. 1- As in his ethics and approach to history, Troeltsch, in his 
latter period at Heidelberg moved away from his emphasis on the a priori 
towards a greater stress on the philosophy of history which he hoped would 
be able to do what the a priori had failed to do in identifying the central 
characteristics of religion. Troeltsch thus elevated the historical aspect 
of his thought, arguing that the true character of religion in general, and 
Christianity in particular, was to be known through its manifestations in 
history and through the subsequent identification of its essence.(Dyson 
1968:259-278).
1.5.2.2. A religion's 'essence', that is to say, its central ideal and 
driving force, was to be formed in the light of its history as a whole and 
not just on the basis of its normative period. Christianity's essence, 
then, could not be established by merely pointing to the New Testament 
period. However, being formulative, this period did have major importance 
and one ought "to set one's compass by it". (Allen 1980:46-50).
1.5.2.3. To define Christianity's essence it was necessary to survey and 
draw upon the whole history of Christian faith and base any typification of 
Christianity on the broad sweep of its life and not just a small 
part. (Troeltsch 1903b:137-45).
1.5.2.4. Any study of Christian history will reveal, argues Troeltsch, 
that Christianity itself is a manifold phenomenon, having many forms in 
different ages which are relative to the time and place in which they 
existed. This leads Troeltsch to the conclusion that Christianity has no
§1*2, uniform and unifying essence but many essences which change from
6 to time and place to place. These various essences have arisen from 
Christianity's interrelationships in history.
•5. The essence of Christianity in any epoch and culture is based 
Pon the synthesis or composite it reaches with its host culture, in which 
host culture is Christianised and the church assimilates the value and
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worldview of the host culture. (Clayton ’ 1979:97-104). It is out of such 
patterns of assimilations that Troeltsch's Church type arises. Troeltsch 
points to the fusion of divine and natural law which characterised the 
Mediaeval Catholic church, and to the combination of election, vocation, 
mundane asceticism and mundane values in Calvinism as the supreme examples 
of such compromises.(Chamberlain 1976:310-17).
1.5.2.6. The compromises which Catholicism and Calvinism achieved, 
however, have run past their time, and have either collapsed or become 
antiquated. Contemporary theology's task, then, is to find the modern 
essence of Christianity by defining its meaning in the present. This 
definition must be made in the light of the history of Christianity and of 
contemporary culture with which Christianity seeks to establish a new 
relationship. The modern theologian thus has a twofold task; he must find 
ways of Christianising culture, and so provide his culture with more 
profound religious values. But to do this he must first orientate 
Christianity to its host culture so that it accepts its worldview and 
values and may thus become involved within it. (Dyson 1968:310-317). The 
question remains, however, as to which partner in this relationship 
predominates, Christianity or culture?
Culture and Religion: Conclusion.
1.5.3.1. Troeltsch makes Christian theology dependent upon history, both 
the particular history of Christianity, and the wider history of religions 
in general, and contemporary culture. In doing this he also uses his 
familiar technique of synthesis which was later to become Troeltsch's basis 
for formulating his church-type.
1.5.3.2. The triumph of the cultural values may also be discerned in 
Troeltsch s conclusion concerning the 'essence' of Christianity and the 
fact that the form and content of its teaching must correspond to the 
values of these cultural forces if it is to influence them or Christianise 
them in anyway. In the 'compromise' relationship, the cultural values
64
always have the greater sway and potency, thus the likely outcome of any
compromise or synthesis will be that Christianity is transformed more than 
its host culture.
THE CONCEPT OF COMPROMISE.
1.6.1. So far this study has revealed how Troeltsch applied his method of
synthesis, developed in his philosophy of history, to ethics and religion.
Thrs has revealed that this method requires a compromise between the
various elements in the synthesis. Because these elements are
metaphysically unique and autonomous, each having their own ground in the
absolute, they cannot easily be harmonised. Bather they co-exist in a
limited tension within the synthesis; the weaker elements accommodating 
themselves to the more powerful.
1.6.2. The reason for this, H. Richard Niebuhr believes, is rooted in 
character. Troeltsch took a broad and charitable view of
different intellectual positions, entertaining the claims of all, being 
opposed to absolutist claims in either philosophy or religion. As a result 
of this Troeltsch opposed systematizers who sought to rationalistically tie 
down every philosophic and theological detail. But despite these 
antiratlonalistlc tendencies, Niebuhr notes, Troeltsch was also a 
rationalist and this fact introduced a tension into his thought which 
accounts for the constant changes in his thinking as be moved on to new 
positions. This tension, says Niebuhr, was not resolved by synthesis but 
only by the compromise, in which the synthesis resulted, of the different 
elements, within the synthesis. (Niebuhr 1924:3-5).
"The whole of Troeltsch's thought", concludes Niebuhr, "Is thus
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1.6,3, This reveals the breath of application of Troeltsch's concept of 
compromise. He uses it in ethics and religion especially, but he even 
applies it to international relations, arguing for a compromise between 
erman culture and that of Western Europe,(Troeltsch 1922:213-222), and to 
omes ic politics in a compromise between conservatism and communism which 
Z ' r " ' '  individualistic socialism. (Troeltsch 1920:
® concept of compromise, however,
ends, to make its meaning very vague.(Pannenberg 1981:208).
1.6.4.
Clayton, in the light of this, has made an analysis of 
oeltsch s use Of the concept (Clayton 1979: 93-144). Clayton identifies 
nr main uses of 'compromise' in Troeltsch's writings: a) in the sense of 
political compromise between groups or Institutions in society, for
frzzjz— zz— z::r
~  z: z  —  —
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socletv represented by the kingdom of God, and secular
. ^ secondly the compromise between two ethical
>=ya ems, one religious and one secular. (Clayton 1979: 97),
1.6.5. As applied to religion and ethics, then, the idea of compromise is 
asically a mediating principle by which the ideal or transcendent is 
related.to and infused with the actual.
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1.6.6. In ethics, then, compromise between ideal values and nature and 
culture is necessary to give ideal values a positive influence in 
historical situation, to give moral dimension to the 'struggle for 
existence' , and to elevate the cultural values to higher goals. However, 
in order to achieve such effects ideal values must be compromised. This 
was not a negative affair for Troeltsch; in order to be realised in 
historical contexts the ideal values had to be compromised. The ideal 
values thus became historically contextualised and historically relative 
with the result that they become subject to their own critique.
1.6.7. In regard to religion and culture compromise, as a mediating 
principle, plays a double role, firstly relating religious ethics to 
worldly ethics, and secondly reconciling religious thought to secular 
culture.
1.6.8. Initially religious ethics, as ideal values, are to be reconciled, 
through compromise, with nature and culture in the same manner as formal or 
subjective ethics. But Troeltsch realised that this was too 
individualistic an approach to have any profound social impact so he 
stressed that the ethical compromise which Christianity reached with 
worldly culture had to be institutionally embodied in the Church, As an 
institutional force the Christian ethos could successfully hold its own 
with the other cultural forces and values present within society, and so 
influence them. To be embodied within a society, the Christian institution 
would have to adopt some of the characteristics and worldview of its host 
culture so that it could be intelligible and indigenous to its context. 
This was necessary in order that Christian values might be appropriately 
addressed to, and received by, the host culture.
1.6.9. The compromise between Christian thought and secular thought and 
science follows on from this ethical-institutional compromise and, in a 
sense, is an aspect of it. The 'essence' of Christianity is to be defined 
by the historical theologian in terras of the compromise which Christianity 
has reached, or Ideally needs to reach, with its context. This definition 
of the heart of Christianity will therefore be a description of 
Christianity as it has been brought into a relationship of compromise with
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, ^ this essence that dogmatic theology will then seek
o e.posit being careful to relate the religious ideas contained within 
m s  essence to the intellectual values, climate, and science of the time. 
Chrrstran doctrine will therefore be a theological articulation of the 
compromise which Christianity has reached with culture in a given time and
f ® double compromise, firstly as the
orma ion of the 'essence' itself and secondly in the exposition of the 
essence which is conducted in the light of 'modern thought'.
1.6.10. By the means of 'compromise', then, Troeltsch attempts to relate 
nstianity to its context. Contextualisation, it is true, is necessary,
r  Abiding centre of Christian faith, _ y
e es ablished over a new situation. Troeltsch's compromise approach seems
to go much further than this as he seeks to redefine the centre or heart of
nstianity in the light of its new cultural context. While his purpose
was to establish a bridgehead for Christian values in non-Christian
cu u:e, the result appears to be the opposite. Christianity is redefined
in erms o± its host culture, rather than the host culture being penetrated
cirisi T V '  the theory of compromise
istianity is inculturated rather than culture Christianised.
T tV i i ' T  Pannenberg, was contrary to some
Tree tsch s own best insights into eschatology, the Kingdom of God and
e goodness of creation. On the one side, the eschatological values of 
2  r  ' — ientating of worldly goals, and on the other arpz:::
ansformation ot society is achieved.(Pannenberg 1981:209). 
th!olV- compromise is crucial to Troeltsch's whole
. 1 5 1 » .  «,,.1.5, 1. Ih. ( t o a j M i , , ,  .. 5.
next chapter. —
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1.6.iJ. The concept itself is designed to bring unity in Troeltsch's 
thought but in effect it only brings temporary resolution to the tension 
between the various conflicting forces in Troeltsch's philosophy and 
theology, especially between religion, ideal values, and culture. 
Moreover, the integrity of some elements within Troeltsch's compromises are 
actually undermined as they are accommodated to the culturally stronger, 
predominant ideas of the compromise. The result of this is that a method 
(that of synthesis) which was intended to preserve the integrity of ethics 
and religion against naturalism and sociological reduction is actually 
destructive of that which it seeks to preserve in that it surrenders the 
integrity of ethics and religion to predominant cultural values.
1.6.14. The result of this, as Ogletree has noted is that the cultural 
synthesis favours dominant cultural tendencies, making Troeltsch the 
defender of the status quo. The future of a culture, Troeltsch feels, lies 
with these dominant tendencies, and not with the various protesting voices. 
To heed their calls would lead to the fragmentation of culture.(Ogletree 
1965:45-47).
1.6.15. This tendency is particularly evident in the way Troeltsch handles 
religion. In the cultural synthesis he wants to align Christianity with 
the most powerful forces within the culture of the time. This means that 
Christianity ends up serving history, or at least the future of Western 
civilisation, with the result that theology ceases to be an independent 
discipline and becomes dependent upon the cultural synthesis for 
determining iibs content.(Ogletree 1968:57-64, 74-77). This consequence 
will also be evident in the way that Troeltsch approaches religious 
typologies in the Social Teachings.
1.6.16. All in all, then, Troeltsch thought that the principle of
compromise was a creative force for the development of both religion and 
culture. In fact it is the point where his attempt to overcome the basic 
dualism of his thought breaks down. At the end of the day the forces of 
history and culture subdue and assimilate all contrary influences. 
Historicism overcomes, rather than being overcome, in 'compromise'.
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CONCLUSION.
1.7.0. Troeltsch was a divergent thinker stressing the individuality and 
autonomy of historical, ethical and religious phenomena. This leads 
Troeltsch to pose a series of dualisms, between culture and history, super­
structure and sub structure, religion and culture, ideal ethical values and 
cultural values, freedom and necessity, and rationalism and anti­
rationalism.
1.7.1. The danger of this dualistic worldview, while it did resist 
reductionism, was that it could easily become fragmentary and relativistic 
in an anarchistic sense. Troeltsch consequently sought to bring these 
various elements in his worldview into an operational unity through his 
method of synthesis, with the result that they were reconciled through a 
compromise.
1.7.3. In this compromise, however, the various elements forming the 
synthesis are transformed and accommodated to the leading ideas of the 
synthesis. This undermines their uniqueness and autonomy, since they are 
subordinated to the characteristics of their cultural setting. This was 
illustrated in the case of formal ethics and Christian faith.
1.7.4. This, in fact, is an operational reductionism in which religion and 
ethics are reduced to aspects of the dominant cultural forces in the
historical situation in which they are located. Thus the result of
Troeltsch's method of synthesis, is the very outcome which he employed it to
avoid.
1.7.5. This also means that the synthesis fails as an ethical enterprise 
since all it succeeds in doing is giving greater strength to prevailing 
historical and cultural values, whether they be good or evil. Such values 
are always the most potent elements within the synthesis and the rival and 
critical ethical demands of ideal ethics and religion are given a 
subservient position to those forces. Troeltsch thus runs the risk of 
giving religion and ethics a purely ideological role in relation to
culture.
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1.7,6. Despite the weaknesses of this method Troeltsch uses it as an 
analytical tool In his studies in the history of Christian social ethics in 
the S o c i a l Teachings. Troeltsch used his method of synthesis to produce 
his typology of religious orientation of Church, Sect and Mysticism, This 
typology shares the same weaknesses as his method of synthesis as it leans 
upon Troeltsch’s concept of compromise.
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secular with its ovm matters to which it had to attend. (Troeltsch 
1906: 20-28)
Troeltsch saw the Churches as anachronisms in the modern world; he 
argued that the Catholic Church exists as an intrusion and an anomaly 
in the present world, while other churches, their dogmas and ethics 
outmoded, clung to the remnants of ecclesiastical structure and 
authority while having no real influence. Troeltsch's conclusion is 
that the Church's influence in the modern world has been solely 
religious and individual in character, leaving vast areas of life 
untouched.(Troeltsch 1910c: 716).
2. The Romantic Movement stressed both the organic nature of reality, in 
a metaphysical sense, and the importance of the individual person or 
phenomenon as a representation of the whole. Within this framework of 
understanding, history could take on a more cohesive and 'mystical' 
character. Instead of merely being the narration of events and 
movements and the analysis of their causes, history becomes a 
spiritual affair in which hidden forces and reason work themselves out 
in reality to give ideal values ever more complete expression. Thus 
individual events and phenomena become harbingers of the greater 
reality, of the Spirit to which they are organically connected. It is 
little wonder that the term 'Historismus' (historicism) should come to 
describe this phenomena.(Troeltsch 1910c: 716-18).
3. At this point Troeltsch introduces his understanding of the historical 
method of analogy, criticism and correlation as it had developed since 
the Enlightenment and through these stages of development in the 
following passage.
■ On the analogy of events known to us we seek by conjecture 
and sympathie understanding to explain and reconstruct the 
past. From this point, again, we advance to the criticism 
of extant traditions and to the correction of generally 
accepted historical representations. Since we discern the 
same process of phenomena in operation in the past as in the 
present, and see, there as here, the various cycles of human 
life influencing and intersecting one another, we gain at 
length the idea of an integral continuity or correlation 
balanced in its changes, never at rest and ever moving 
towards incalculable issues. The causal explanation of all 
that happens, the setting of the individual life in its true 
relations, the interpretation of events in the most 
intricate interconnection, tlie placing of mankind in a 
rounded system of ceaseless change - these constitute the 
essential function and result of historical reflection. The 
latter viewed as a whole forms a new scientific mode of 
representing jnan and his development, and, as such shows at 
all points an absolute contrast to the Biblico-theological 
views of later antiquity.(Troeltsch 1913/14b:718).
4. Troeltsch is here clearly using Weber's earlier historical model of 
the ideal type which is subjectively sifted out of history by the 
historian. The difference between Weber's historically defined ideal
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9. Troeltsch never explicitly equates religious ethics with 'subjective
ethics' but the similarities between the two are great. Both aspire 
to Supramundane' ends, both seek the full development of the 
personality, both seek the human community of absolute love and 
fraternity and both are historically and culturally impotent. The 
difference between the two is that 'subjective ethics' or the 'ethics 
of personal value' have a 'universalistic' orientation in attempting 
to define the moral law for all times and places in a Kantian manner, 
while religious ethics are concerned soley with religiously defined 
contents and ends. Vhat is clear, however, is that they have to be 
given historical substance according to the same model. Both need to 
seek an alliance with powerful cultural values which find an 
expression in institutional forms, such as the family, economic life, 
the state and the nation. One of the roots of Troeltsch's Church-sect 
distinction lies here. The church type represents a religious ethic 
which has successfully penetrated society through an alliance with the 
state and culture and so has become historically power. The sect, on 
the other hand, has isolated itself from culture out of a desire to 
preserve the purity of its aims. As such it is historically impotent. 
Troeltsch's doubtful contender that the sect is socially ineffective 
thus rests upon the dualistic structure of his ethics which is open to 
severe criticism. '
10.
11
12.
Calvinism, rather than Lutheranism, became the most potent force in 
Protestantism for a variety of reasons in Troeltsch's analysis. 
Firstly, it was more culturally and socially dynamic than Lutheranism, 
roeltsch 1906b:52). Calvinism was also to secure the independence 
of the Church from the State whereas in Lutheranism the Church 
remained subservient. Calvinism was far more pragmatic and adaptable 
than Lutheranism which was static (Troeltsch 1906b: 72-4). Lastly
Calvinism was able to give mundane values an instrumental worth for 
religious life whereas Lutheranism could only forbear them and treat 
them warily. (Troeltsch 1906b: 79-85).
A similar pattern thus occurs in Troeltsch's attempts to reconcile 
religious values with cultural values as occurred in his attempt to 
reconcile personal values with cultural values. Troeltsch conceives 
of religious values as being orientated towards the transcendent and
o some extent unconditioned by mundane cultural forces. The result 
of this is that religious values are often disinterested in or opposed 
to, culture. However, to have any historical or cultural
significance, religious values must reach an accommodation with 
cultural values in order to modify, elevate them and give them more 
profound significance and thus influence history and society.
Tioeltsch sought to base not just theology but a 'science of religion' 
upon his historical method in theology. He felt that the scope of 
theology had to be broadened to include not just the particular 
history of Christianity, but the universal history and scope of 
religion, hence Troeltsch preferred to talk of a science of religion 
which was prior to theology. Theology as such was to be based upon 
^he history of religions.(Dyson 1968: 219-25).
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Troeltsch* s sc-l.enp.£— of— 122.1.1 g ion, was composed of several disciplines: 
the psychology of religion, the history of religions, the philosophy 
of history, the epistemology of religion, and religious 
metaphysics.(Troeltsch 1903: 114-20)
psyoholOgy— of— religion is not, for Troeltsch, the inner, mental 
acts or states associated with religious experience, but concrete 
religious experience itself. This was the study of empirical 
religious forms and practices, much in the way that William James had 
studied it in his Varieties of Religious Experience. This discipline 
would today be called the phenomenology of religion (Troeltsch 1903b: 
114-20).
history— of— r.elIgions for Troeltsch was the comparative study of 
the traditions and development of the great religions. The task of 
the history of religions was to identify and examine the individual 
totalities of religion. However it was not enough merely to rest with 
these empirical disciplines; the phenomena of religion raised 
epistemological and metaphysical questions which demanded 
copnsideration. • This leads to the more philosophical disciplines of 
Troeltsch*s science of religion; epistemology, philosophy of history 
and metaphysics.
epxstsfflology— of— rel Xgion, then, was concerned with the status of 
religious concepts within the field of human knowledge. In 
Troeltsch's mind it had two concerns. The first was to establish the 
independence of religion as a dimension of human experience apart from 
pure psychology and sociological determination. The second task of 
the epistemology of religion was to define the exact nature and place 
of religion within human consciousness. Troeltsch used the concept of 
the religious a proiri in both of these areas.
The philosophy of history, according to Troeltsch, was to see to what 
degree the various 'essences' of the different religions expressed the 
categorical nature of religion in its various manifestations, as a 
form of the human consciousness.
Troeltsch s epistemology of religion and philosophy of history were 
concerned with the nature of religious experience in history, but not 
with its object and truth. In Troeltsch's approach one must turn to 
Ilg.ligxpus metaphysics which considers the relationship of the Absolute 
and the infinite to the relative and finite to answer this question. 
This discipline will consider the different ways in which the divine 
might be manifested and encountered in religious experience and the 
history of religions. It remains, however, a highly speculative 
discipline.
Vhile Troeltsch envisioned the disciplines within the science of 
religion working together in a complementary and harmonious manner he 
did, at different times, give one or other of these disciplines pre­
eminence over the others and use it as the organising principle of all 
the elements of his science and religion.(Dyson 1968: 240-1). In his 
very early thought the psychology of religion came to the fore under 
the impact of James, but then in order to compensate for the
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CHAPTER TWO
lEQELTSCH'S APPROACH TO TYPES OP RELIGrOHR nRTPHTATinfr 
SECTION ONE; INTRODUCTION,
2.1.1. All too often In any discussion of Troeltsch's types of religious 
orientation, whether by sociologists or theologians, all that is achieved 
IS a confused, or at best limited understanding of Troeltsch's types (c.f. 
Hill 1973:51-57, Robertson 1970:115-117). The reason for this is that only 
one or other of the summary definitions of the types of church, sect, and 
mysticism that Troeltsch gives in the Social Teaching are examined, and 
these are taken in isolation and treated as if they were Troeltsch's full
and final treatment .of the matter. In fact each of these summaries only
defines one particular aspect or dimension of Troeltsch's typology. To 
gain a full picture these summaries must be taken together and placed 
within the context of Troeltsch's treatment of the types within the Social
lÊâçlmig:. This is the approach followed here.
2.1.2. This also means that the individual types cannot be discussed apart
from their counterparts in Troeltsch's typology, thus Church, Sect and
mystical types all have to be discussed together. It is important to
understand that Troeltsch's typology of religious association is a complex
and interrelated whole and must be approached as such, and needs itself to 
be placed in context.
2.1.3. Firstly, the evolution of Troeltsch's typology in his writings
needs to be traced. This is necessary in order to gain an insight into its
different components, and into the functions which Troeltsch intended it
should perform, as he used and developed it in different settings in his 
work.
2.1.4. Secondly Troeltsch's typology cannot be considered apart from the 
history of church-sect typologising prior to Troeltsch. Troeltsch stands 
wdthln this history, both adopting the framework, categories and concepts
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which it had developed, and reacting to them in redefining and in 
resituating them within a new framework.
2.1.5. In the light of these considerations the approach and contents of 
this chapter become very clear. It will begin with a survey of pre- 
Troeltschian church-sect typologies. This will be followed by a 
consideration of the ethical concerns, particularly in Troeltsch's 
programme of 'compromise', which lies behind the typology. This then leads 
into a discussion of the method Troeltsch employed in his typology. Both 
these areas are then illustrated in two substantive treatments of Church 
and Sect, in Troeltsch's writings prior to the Social Teaching and then in 
Teaching itself. A final summary and analysis will then be made 
of Troeltsch's types of church and sect in the light of this discussion. 
The chapter will cdnclude with a final consideration of the role of 
'compromise' in Troeltsch's typology.
PRE-TROELTSCHIAN APPROACHES TO CHURCH AND SECT.
2.2.1. The identification of some sociological groups within Christianity 
as 'sects' and of some others as 'churches' did not begin with Troeltsch. 
It has a Icnyr and nefarious history within ecclesiastical polemics frcm 
Gregory the Great to Ritschl. It was part of the baggage of Church history 
and theology which Weber and Troeltsch inherited and put to sociological 
use (Swatos 1976;129-30, Steerraan 1975;182-183).
2.2.2. Hegel seems to have been the first to give these terms any 
systematic application, and he set the tone for Weber and Troeltsch's 
subsequent discussions, Hegel interpreted polarities in the light of 
religious history and he discussed the problem of church and sect in 
relation to the question of the relationship of the individual to society. 
Consequently he speaks of the 'triumph of ecclesiastical statutes' over the 
sense of religious freedom. He is preoccupied with such themes as the 
rationality of different forms of religion, the relationship between 
religion and freedom, the significance of asceticism in mediating between
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church and state, and functioning as a means of social control, Hegel 
discusses sects in the light of these themes (Robertson 1975:242-244).
2.2.3. Further, Hegel
the process continues. (Robertson 1975:244-246). (1)
2.2.4. Hegel's proposed solution to this was an attempt to overcome the
Kantian distinctions between morality and impulse, reason and passion, and
so on, which he saw behind the cycle of accommodations, through a pantheism
of love. Thus Hegel attempts to bridge the church-sect dilemma through a
collective mysticism: Hegel here attempts a mystical reconciliation of
subjectivity and objectivity, which is a theme recurring throughout his 
work.
2.2.5. This leads Robertson to conclude that the church-sect problem is
linked to a 'subjectivlty-objectivlty problem' which is a major theme in 
sociological thought.
soclaîr^ ^ C r c l i l T  consJiTulej'a S ' o f
socially organised objectivity.(Robertson 1975:245).
2.2.6. Weber added some methodological rigour to the discussion of the 
church-sect motif with his theory of ideal types. (2) Weber used those 
Ideal types in his comparative method whereby he sought to identify those 
social forces which have led to the development of the modern world. Both 
church and sect types, according to Weber, have played a role in this 
process (Swatos 1976:130-133).
2.2.7. Weber noted the church-sect dichotomy first in The Protestant, Rtbio 
and the Spirit of Capital isn. The church in his view was
u n j u »
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While the sect is a
 believer's church and sees itself solely as a community of
personal believers, and of the reborn...(Rogers, quoted in Hill 
1973:47-48).
2.2.8. Weber arrived at this distinction in the context of a discussion of 
the Anabaptists, Mennonites and Quakers. He stressed the principle of
voluntary membership as the chief characteristic of the sects, especially 
where it was expressed in believer's baptism. The chief characteristic of 
the church, conversely, was compulsory or birthright membership expressed 
in infant baptism (Hill 1973:48). (Hegel's objective-subjective polarity
is echoed in these definitions).
2.2.9. Weber also identified a number of secondary characteristics of the 
sect: an emphasis on charisma as opposed to authority; charismatic 
qualifications for membership; strict discipline; and regulation of members 
relations with society.(Hill 1973:48-51).
2.2.10. Sects also played a crucial role in Weber's analysis of the rose
of capitalism, for while Calvinism may have provided the ideological
grounding for Ascetic Protestantism, (which was to create the ethical 
conditions conducive to the development of capitalism), • it v/as Lhe secl.- 
type which operated as a mediating structure inculcating the values of
Ascetic Protestantism into broad masses of people. Hence it was the sect- 
type which was actually the dynamic force which promoted the rise of an 
ethic which allowed the development of capitalism. Such a social
organisation as the sect was necessary, in Weber's analysis, to overcome 
the dominant values or traditionalism of sixteenth and seventeenth century 
cosity which were opposed to the spirit of capitalism (Berger 1971:485-99).
2.2.11. Weber also saw in the sects' demand for religious freedom the 
basis of all other human rights culminating in the Enlightenment concept of 
individual reason. Thus for Weber the sect-type was in fact at the cutting 
edge of social change (Nelson 1975:229-238).
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T R O E L T S C H ETHICAL CONCERNS IN HIS WORK ON CHURCH AND SECT.
2.3.1. Whereas Weber was concerned to analyse those forces which had 
produced the modern world, Troeltsch's interests were quite different. His 
approach to church and sect was determined by his concern for the 
application of Christian ethics to society. This gives Troeltsch's project 
in the Social Teachings and elsewhere a very specific orientation.
2.3.2. Troeltsch states that his research did not begin with those of 
Weber, but had quite independent origins.
Externally they were caused by the task which I was entrusted of
reviewing the book by Nathusios; Die Mitarbeit der Kirche an
der Losung der Sozialen Frage When I was engaged in this task
I found that there were no books in existence which could serve 
as a basis for tThe study of such a question, and I then began to 
, try to lay the foundations for such a study myself. This book 
was the result of my endeavour. When I began this work, however,
I found that all the interests of my research contributed to it: 
the sociological phenomena connected with the conception and 
nature of the church, which were based on the familiar doctrine
of Rothe  interests which concern the history of the
Christian ethic and, above all, my researches into the
meaning of the Lex Naturae  Finally the book embodied the
programme which in 1901 I outlined in ray review of Seeberg's 
Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschltcte (1901).(Troeltsch 1912:987, Niebuhr 
1960b: 7-9).
2.3.3. In his review of Seeberg's book Troeltsch had criticised the 
latter's static conception of Christian doctrine in which it developed 
quite independently of all social forces and argued instead that the modern 
historical method had
placed in the foreground the great cultural, and institutional 
contexts on which depends the actual, definite sphere of 
governing religious structures of thought. (Troeltsch, quoted in 
Riest 1966: 37-38).
2.3.4. Troeltsch therefore concluded that the only correct way to 
understand Christian thought is in the light of its historical and social
contexts. Troeltsch does this in the Social Teaching with regard to the
social ethics of Christianity. In the process he brings together his 
historical and ethical concerns.
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in society into a harmonious whole (in fact a synthesis). This was the 
par icular task of the political community which had to give the social 
realm a concrete meaning. Christianity contributed to this through its 
teaching of how social reality, including its own institutions, were to be 
State. Troeltsch thus asserted that the 'scientific' 
analysis of social thought would deal with the thinking produced by 
Chii.tianity about the relationship of wider socal life to political life 
n saying this Troeltsch assumed the relationship between Christianity and 
socie y akes place within a context not formed by Christianity and to some 
ex ent beyond its .control. The corallary of this is that Christian 
rnvolvement in society, in whatever form it takes, is only one force among 
■«any in the social realm (Troeltsch 1931:23-25; Keist 1966:29-30),
2.3:6.
_  ,, " Troeltsch gives Christian ethics a
t.oroughly sociological orientation, or rather he uses the tools of
sociology to expliqate Christian ethics. Troeltsch's primary interest in
area is always Christian ethics and the contribution they make to the
-rmation of a unity of life (or a cultural synthesis). The sociology of
re igion, for Troeltsch, is simply a vehicle whereby the results of
ristian ethics can be explored. But this use of sociology still
uences Troeltsch's approach to the history of Christian ethics. He is
I^^eJT specific ethical issues as he is in the structural
ntat ons produced by ethical positons to secular society. It is within 
rs context that Troeltsch's use and transformation of Weber's ideal types 
- urch and sect may best be understood.
2.3.7. Whereas Weber sought to give a sociological definition to the
ypes Of church and sect, Troeltsch, in line with his interests, gives the
ypes an ethical definition. He then uses them to Indicate the social
orientations of different groups.(Berger 1971:486ff; Reece 1975:75-76). As 
A.W. Eister writes:
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2.3,8. Troeltsch thus defined the church-type, and conversely the sect-
type, by their orientation to the “social problem" or the various
structures of society and their values. The church-type accepted the
values of the different structures of society and would seek to co-operate
in integrating them into a coherent and meaningful unity. The sect on the
other hand rejects both the values of society and the task of integration 
which the church adopts.
2.3.9. Clearly there is a meeting point here between Troeltsch's work on 
Christian ethics and his philosophy of history and culture. The church- 
type is defined by its acceptance of the 'objective' or 'cultural' values 
as from God and by its willingness to participate in the cultural 
synthesis. The sect is defined by its withdrawal from this task in protest 
against the secular orientation of the cultural values.
2.3.10. The result of this was that Troeltsch transformed Weber's types. 
Troeltsch was a theologian attempting to relate types of religious
experience to varieties of social teachings with which they could be
correlated. This meant that Troeltsch departed from Weber in shifting the
emphasis of the types from organisational behaviour, which had been primary 
for Weber, to ethical behaviour, which had only been a secondary 
characteristic in Weber's scheme.(3)
2.3.11. Troeltsch used the types of church and sect in order to understand 
the ethical stances of groups within Christian history, Indeed the manner 
in which he applied the types was very specific, perhaps too specific. He 
saw the Mediaeval church as the prime example of the church-type in
history, and, according to T.M. Steerman, the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century sects as the full development of the sect-type within history 
(Steerman 1975:101-204). The result of this was that Troeltsch's 
deiinltion of the types was severely limited and could not be applied to
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other groups outside of Christian history, or even Christian groups in
later period or cultural settings from the ones that Troeltsch studies.
This was of no consequence to Troeltsch, however, as he only intended to
use ttie church-sect typology to identify different currents in social
ethics in the history of Christian thought in the West. The church-sect
typology was, for Troeltsch, a heuristic device.(Johnson 1971:124-125; 
Nelson 1975:229-128).
TROELTSCH'S METHODOLOGY IN DISTINGUISHING CHURCH AND SECT: COMPROMISE
REVISITED.
2.4.1. Troeltsch's ethical concerns, in his work on church and sect, then, 
stand in continuity with his concerns in the cultural synthesis. In fact 
the philosophy of history in Bar Historismu.s. develops from Troeltsch's work
— le&chihg. Just as the theory of compromise is central to 
Troeltsch's treatment of ethics in the cultural synthesis, so too it is 
central in his work on church and sect.(Little 1968:222-224),
2.4.2. The basic premise of the theory of compromise, as Troeltsch applies 
it to religious ethics, is tlw^ to be socially effective such ethics have 
to enter a relationship of mutual interpenetration with cultural values. 
Apart from this religious ethics are impotent because of their ahistorical, 
transcendental orientation.(Little 1968:220).
2.4.3. Troeltsch believed that this had happened again and again in 
Christian history and so set out in the Social Teaching to study the 
various compromises Christianity had made v/ith Western culture.
Compromise' became the basic methodological principle of this work as 
Troeltsch used it to identify, explain and evaluate the different groups as 
they sought to relate to the stuctures of society.(Chamberlain 1976:377ff; 
Little 1968:220-222; Pannenberg 1981:106-108).
2.4.4. Troeltsch's theory of compromise also lay at the basis of his 
redefinition of church and sect types. The church-type represented that 
tendency within Christian ethics which formed 'compromises' with culture by
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seeking to embrace social structures cuni their values in order it
might dominate society and enforce its spiritual principles upon it. The
sect-type, according to Troeltsch, represents that tradition within
Christian ethics which reacts against such compromises seeing , them as a
corruption and secularisation of gospel values. Groups of this tradition 
reject existing social structures and either withdraw from them or seek to 
overthrow them (Reist 1966:161-165).(4)
2.4.5. The means by which these compromises with secular society have been 
effected in Christian history, in Troeltsch's account, was the Stoic idea 
of natural law. This was the ideal of a morality which was eternally
valid, universally recognised, and so operative in non-Christian cultures.
Natural law was not anti-Christian but simply pre-Christian and so
Christian ethics could be added to it. The content of this law twws
differentiated by a distinction between the state of humanity before and 
after the Fall. "The Stoics", says Bainton,
had posited a golden age without war, without slavery, and 
without property, and then an age of iron in which these three 
institutions had come to prevail.(Bainton 1951:75),
2.4.6. The early Christians adopted this theory, Troeltsch argues, early
in the career of Christian thought and equated the Stoic's golden age with
Eden, and the Law of Nature of the present age, the "age of iron", with
man's fallen state and the Decalogue (Bainton 1951:70), Whereas in the
golden age all men were equal, and all things were held in common and there
was no vmr, poverty, suffering, car law, in the present fallen state of
mankind men are unequal - some being rulers and others their subjects;
private property exists with extremes of wealth and poverty; there is war,
slavery, suffering, with the law enforced by the state to maintain order in 
the world.
2.4.7. In the former order t]^ golden the absolute Law of Nature
prevailed and so there was strict equality, communism, and harmony amongst 
men. In the present order of the 'Fall' or 'Age of Iron', this absolute 
Law is relativised by the sinful state of mankind and the institution of 
property, the state, and slavery. In the Christian application of this
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theory, inequality, private property, slavery, law and the state were all 
seen as instituted by God partly as a restraint upon sin and partly as 
punishment for sin. On account of this Christians were to accept them as 
God's will for humanity in the present age.(Reist 1966:158-160; Pannenberg 
1981:107-108).
2*4.8. Troeltsch used the natural Law theory as another means of 
distinguishing church and sect types on the basis of compromise. The 
church-type, he argued, accepted relativised natural law and acquiesced in 
favour of existing social conditions and structures and their values. It 
also sought to add spiritual values to them and orientate the institutions 
of relative natural law to spiritual ends. The church itself represented 
absolute natural law and so had the authority to complement and direct the 
world in this manner. The sect-type, on the other hand, rejected the 
relative natural law of the 'world' entirely and insisted upon the Absolute 
law of nature of the primitive state. Consequently the sect-type would
either withdraw from the world in order to realise the absolute law of
nature in its own community, or make war upon the existing structures of
the wOi. Id J.ÏÏ order to institute the order of the absolute law of nature in 
their place.(Chamberlain 1976:78-80).
2.4.9. The church-type, through its theory of relative natural law, 
achieved two great compromises in Christian history in Troeltsch's 
analysis. The first was the great Mediaeval Catholic synthesis of nature 
with grace, reason with revelation, and absolute natural law with relative 
natural law which culminated with Saint Thomas. The second was that of 
Ascetic Protestantism in which neo-Calvinism and the sects effectively 
raised the level of relative natura] law to form an intra-mundane
asceticism which affirmed the values of the world and so opened the v;ay for 
modern secular society (Little 1968:221). Both these compromises have now, 
a^coiding to Troeltsch, lost their influence and so a new compromise Is 
needed for Christianity in the modern world.(Reist 1966:160).
2.4.10. But this necessity for a new compromise is nothing new in the 
history of Christian ethics:
89
* a * B #
CHURCH AND SECT IN TROELTSCH'S WRITINGS PRIOR TO IHE SOCIAL TEACKTNn
2.5.1, The Church-sect typology has a long history in Troeltsch's 
writings, he was working with these concepts for a decade before the 
publication in German of the SDalaLBCfiasMag, in 1912. During this time 
Troeltsch developed these types as categories by which to analyse the 
various ethical orientations within Christianity. Without doubt Troeltsch 
borrowed the typology from his close friend and colleague at Heidelberg 
Max Weber (Reist 1966:106-113). However he refined the typology in his own 
terms and extended it adding mysticism to the types.
2.5.2. Troeltsch discusses church, sect and mystical types as early as 
1902 in his S m ndprobleme jimB_Ethik (08 II 552-672). Troeltsch first 
considers types from the perspective of the objectivity of doctrine and the 
subjectivity of ethics in both Catholic and Protestant Churches. In 
Protestantism, as in Catholicism,
m i H
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2.5.3. In this passage Troeltsch clearly sees the church as an 'objective' 
institution and the sect as a 'subjective' institution in the Hegelian 
sense discussed above. The church stresses the 'objective' sphere of 
doctrine, revelation, grace and salvation while the sect-type is orientated 
to the 'subjective' sphere of ethics and practical life.
2.5.4. Later in this work Troeltsch discusses all three types in relation
to the question of whether the moral power of Christian ethics lay in the
bestowal of moral power or in redemption. For Troeltsch the answer to this
IS relative to the different sociological and ethical types of
Christianity. Jesus' ethics, Troeltsch says, demand true justice, and
while redemption lay ahead, Jesus teaching was so fused with joy, the
certainty of God, and the forgiveness of sins that it was received as power
and not as law. Troeltsch contrasts this with the later church-type ethic
which combines redemption worked by Christ with a universal human ethic.
According to Troeltsch this shift took place in Paul and John when greater
emphasis is placed upon the mystical Christ and his cultus than on Jesus'
message of the Kingdom. With this the church's ethical stress moved from
the content of the Christian ethic to the authority of the commands of the
ecclesiastical institution and the power of the sacraments. The content of
the ethic Itself becomes Interpreted as a universal ethic. Faith now
venerates Christ and sees the church as a 'great foundation of redemptive
grace . This 'church-scheme', according to Troeltsch, persists from Paul
to Kant, and he places his other two types of sect and mysticism along side 
it (Von Hugel 1921:111-112),
2.5.5. The mystical type internalises the Kingdom of God and rejects all
external laws and seeks union with God. Since the world continues to exist
91
Kyfaticitiin seeta the internal sense of the Kingdom as the revelation of its 
presence in the world and not of its future advent. As a result of this, 
mysticism moves towards pantheism but still claims a relationship to the 
person and teaching of Jesus. Troeltsch argues, in this context, that 
through the insight offered by Biblical criticism and the sect and mystical 
types Christian ethics have been placed more under the influence of Jesus 
and less under the influence of dogma. In the light of this Troeltsch 
states that redemption must now take second place in Christian ethics and 
that the doctrine of original sin should also be rejected, (von Hugel 
1921:162-165).
2.5.6. Troeltsch divides his types on the basis of objectivism and 
subjectivism, the sect-type in this instance representing an external 
subjectivism. In addition to this, the idea of compromise is also implicit 
in Troeltsch s definition of the types. The church-type in altering the 
content of Christian ethics to develop a 'universal human ethic' is in fact 
'compromising' the Christian ethic to accommodate it to human needs and 
human society. The sect rejects such a compromise and the universal ethic 
and doctrines of objective salvation which are its correlates. By way of 
reaction the sect emphasises, in a rigorous and legalistic way, the content 
of the Christian ethic and either separates itself from the church and the 
world, or violently opposes them, in order to practise this ethic. The 
mystical type rejects both the external compromise of the church and the 
legalistic puiity of the sect in favour of a purely spiritual and "free" 
ethic which is neither compromised or legalistic.
2.5.7. In the following year (1903) Troeltsch returned to this topic In 
'Vhat does "Essence of Christianity" mean?'(Troeltsch 1903b: 124-179) in
tl^ context of discussing t]be 'essence' (]f Christianity a changing 
developmental principle. Troeltsch argued in this essay that there was a 
complex dualism at the heart of the original gospel which is both this- 
worldly and other worldly. Ihis polarity is also circular so that the 
different polar points are also united.
2.0.8. Troeltsch linked this dualism to his church-sect typology:
92
Christianity is an ethic of redemption whose world-view combines 
optimism and pessimism, transcendence and immanence, an abrupt 
polarisation of the world and God and the inward linking of the 
two a dualism in principle, which is abrogated again and again 
in faith and action. It is a purely religious ethic which refers 
man brusquely and onesidedly to the values of the inner life, and 
yet again it is a hunmn ethic which forms and transfigures
nature, overcoming the struggle with Inir through love. Sometimes 
one IS more apparent and sometimes the other, but neither may be 
completely lacking if the Christian idea is to be preserved.
This inner differentiation finds expression especially in the 
° ogical and cultic formations. As a comprehensive church 
and medium ^  grace for mankind it attempts to unify the two 
sides by setting up graded demands for the believers while the 
possession of salvation remains fundamental importance. In
the sects, which always make themselves felt alongside, the 
heroic, future believing, ascetic indifference to the world is
emphasised as a demand made on all believers equally, while ready 
r o o L T à Z ' à T .  ""It are left in the background, (Troeltsch
2.5.9. Once more, It should be noted, Troeltsch's concept of 'compromise'
IS implicit in his distinction between the church and sect types, (it is
the basic method Troeltsch employs in this essay). Here the church and
sect types are presented as related and united principles within
Christianity. The church-type represents optimistic, immanent, and world
affirming aspect of Christianity, while the sect represents the
pessimistic, transcendent, and world denying aspect. This distinction is,
in the first place, neither sociological or ethical; it is theological
involving different doctrines of sin, redemption, creation, man and God.
The ethical and liturgical characteristics which Troeltsch lists here are
basicaly the outworkings of two prior theological positions. Both, in
Troeltsch's estimate, are equally Christian. One is basically optimistic
about the world and the other basically pessimistic about the world. The
former, consequently will stress immanence of God within the world and His
affirmation of its goodness, while the latter will stress God's
transcendence over the world in holiness and His Judgement upon a wholly 
sinful world.
2.5.10. From 1900 onwards Troeltsch made a study of relationship between 
Christianity's adoption of Stoic natural law theory and its various 
compromises with Western civilisation (Reist 1966: 156-.161 ; von Huge] 1921:
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passim; Troeltsch 1921; passim). However, Troeltsch did. not connect 
natural law theory with his church-sect distinction, despite the fact' that 
he frequently discussed both themes in the same works, until 1910. In that 
year the German Sociological Society held its first meeting at Frankfurt. 
As part of the proceedings a colloquy was held on the sociology of religion 
in which Max Weber, Ferdinant Toennies, George Sirame] and Ernst Troeltsch 
participated. Troeltsch opened the discussion with an important paper on 
'Stoic Christian Natural Law and the Modern Secular Natural Law'.(Weber 
1973:140).
2.5.11. A.W. Eister states that in this paper Troeltsch was:
  concerned in the first place with the philosophical
question about the validity or truth values of competing 
theological ethical formulations (or with "belief systems" as 
they might be referred to today and with the question of whether 
or not truth is absolute and universal or "absolute" only for 
believers within the context or confines of their ovm culture(s).
He was using the three types of religious or socio-religious 
expression, churchly, sectarian and mystical, to help discover 
how these several diverse forms of religious organisation might 
be implementing the "Truth" embodied in natural law. The church 
through comprehensive institutionally organised sacraments and 
rituals (as well as the exercise of social powers), the sect 
through selective screening of those human agents it would 
"accept" and retain as members and the "association of mystics"
(for which Troeltsch apparently could not find an adequate term 
comparable l.o the other two) through emphasis on " inward" 
devotion of the religiously sensitive or the responsive. (Eister 
1975:227).
^:.5.12. In this paper, Troeltsch brought to a point his thinking on the 
Church-sect typology, at last combining his thinking on compromise and the 
church-sect distinction, and compromise and natural law. He did this by 
arguing that there were two forms of natural law which were related to the 
church and the sects, namely relative and absolute Natural Law. The 
methodology of the church-sect typology as Troeltsch will use it two years 
later in the Social Teaching is complete.
2.5.13. From this survey of Troeltsch's approach to church and sect types 
prior to the Social— Teaching it is clear that he based his version of the 
typology on Lheological and e,thi.CâL differences. Troeltsch's discussion of
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these types in the years 1902 to 1910 always takes place within the context 
of Christian ethics, and Troeltsch is always eager to contrast the ethical 
rigorism of the sect-type with the compromise and sacramental nature of the 
church-type. In his discussions of these types, then, church and sect are 
first of all distinguished by their ethical and theological characteristics 
which for Troeltsch are primary. Sociological characteristics, where they 
are discussed at all, are given a very secondary, even incidental place, 
being seen as products of primary ethical and theological characteristics 
of church and sect.
TROELTSCH'S PRESENTATION OF CHURCH AND SECT IN THE SOCIAL TEACHING.
The Dualism Of Early Christianity.
2.6.1.1. Troeltsch repeats the contention that he made in 'Vhat does
'Essence of Christianity' mean?' that the source of the church-sect 
typology is the implicit dualism of Christianity. This dualism took two 
interrelated forms: individualism and universalisra on the one hand and
radicalism and conservativisra on the other. In the first Troeltsch 
contrasts the individualism which arises from the call to discipleship, 
brotherhood in the Kingdom of God and the direct relationship that the 
individual can have with God with the universal ism of the Gospel which 
seeks to reach the whole of mankind. In the second this dualism is
expressed as radical and conservative tendencies within the Christian 
community. The radical tendency is related to the 'individualistic' 
stresses on discipleship and brotherhood and so challenges secular 
institutes and lifestyles for the sake of the Kingdom. The conservative 
tendency is a result of the Gospel's universal ism which seeks to embrace 
all mankind within God's grace. It is thus more tolerant of existing 
social conditions.(Troeltsch 1912:34-58, 82-6).
2.6.1.2. For Jesus, Troeltsch argues, these tendencies formed a duality.
Ihey only hardened into a strict dualism when Paul laid the foundation for
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ecclesiastical church life, In place of Jesus' loose brotherhood. Paul 
achieved this making Christ, instead of the Father, the centre of
fellowship and worship. He thus established the basis of the cultus. 
Furthermore, through Paul's doctrine of predestination, inequality is 
introduced into the Christian community and the principle is established 
that the’ individual must serve the universal whole.(Troeltsch 1912:78 79).
2.6.1.0. In primitive Christianity this dualism led Christianity to 
present its mbers with a radical model for their l.ives as Christians 
within the chiistian Community, However, in its ideas about ]eadeishi p it 
adopted a predominantly conservative and institutional stance. It also 
had, for the same reason, a basically affirmative attitude to the 
state.(Troeltsch 1912:S2ff).
2.6.. 1.4. In eai ly Catholicism, in Troeltsch's account, the conservative 
tendency of the Gospel found expression in the theory of relative natural 
lav/. Through this idea many of (he values of Roman and Hellenistic society 
were accepted, and a theocratic idea of the state was developed. The 
radical tendency, however, found a balancing emphasis In the idea of 
absolute natural law, asceticism, monasticisra, and a negative view of the 
state. Troeltsch concludes, however, that while the two theories of 
natural law and theocratic absolutism were the means by which the church 
formed a compromise with the world, the original sociaj ethics of (he 
Gospel were kept alive by the ideas of brotherly love, (die primitive state, 
and absolute natural law in inonasticism v/hicli took over' (;hc (:asks of social 
work, education, and Bible translation. The radical ideas of the Gospel 
would later break out from this source, bu (. onl y after l.),e Church' s 
dualistic political thcoiy of relative natural law and theocracy had helped 
to create a new civilisation. (Troeltsch 1912:100-61).
— Of— Ihs— Lilype Altsr Tlæ Development of the M^dtney^l
■SmtMeâst. TroÆltsch's Basic Analysis Of The Sect-Type
.o. 6. .c.. 1. Tioel tscli i.akes (.he theme of dualism up agai n at the end of l ire 
second chapter of the in the section entitled 'The Absolute
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2 . 6 . 2 .
thl'^'h^' c°"rse of church history follows
a channal c _ t « d  by th. church-typ. because cf its universalfs. in which
: seeks .c ccntrcl the » s s  cf .«ukiud eud sc dcmi.ete civilisation.
Jl.urs™, Troeltsch asserts, led the way in this direction in its desire 
" Christ, in its acceptance of the state and in its
ff;::;;:::#: :%T: i:  ,2 :::%:::
as th! T  1  prepare the way for the Kingdom. But
' " these supernatural and escha to] oglca 1 notes it had
^ "2W lifestyle in society the church had to 
con.rol society through the sacrament of penance and through the
r  — ptance of th.e world and
tne state (Troeltsch '931:334-3351. The church thus found M  impossible to
acor. imking a compromise with the state, the social order, and the
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pi e vâi I J. jiK, boOcial CQiuJ i L j. GÜS. ihe .Fhomi st philosophy, says Ti'aeltscb,
worked this out into a comprehensive theory which also maintained the
ultimate supernatural end of life. This theory, it claimed, was
derived from the Gospel which was conceived ....
  ^ universal way of life offering redemption to all,
whose influence radiates from the knowledge of Gcxl given by the 
Gospel, coupled with the assurance of salvation given by the 
Church.(Troeltsch 1912:335).
2.6.2.5. It was this development of the Gospel as an objective
sociological point of reference which allowed the dev^elopmant of the
church-type as a dominant ecclesiastical organisation. was also this
objectification which resulted in the subordination or suppression of the 
individualism and ladical fellowship of love of the Gospel. They ceased to 
be luling principles of the system' and as a result the sect movement
developed as a reaction.(Troeltsch 1912:335-336).
2.6.^.6. The church-type, Troeltsch states, is conservative and seeks to
dominate the whole of life. The sect, on the other hand, is concerned with 
personal life and therefore forms small groups and is either indifferent or 
hostile to society as it has no desire to control it in its existing form.
Thucb the sect either tolerates society or seeks to violently replace it
(Troeltsch 191c.331/. Troeltsch notes that church and sect both depend 
upon social development. The church uses the state and fuses her life wii i,
.. t, becoming part of the social order and as such dependent upon I he ujp'Ci
classes. The sect, on the other hand, are connected with the lower classes 
oi groups hostile to the stat.e and so " work upwards from be 1 ow, not 
downwards from above" (Troeltsch 1912:331). The church also seeks to 
harmonise a supernatural order with the natural order, and tries to 
incorporate asceticism into this harmony. In this order the supern.itural 
io en-OLintei ed - through nature. I he sects, however, refer to the
supeinatural world directly and develop a personal asceticism which is
hokit i ] e i.o idle WOI Id and does not mere 1 y /‘enounce it. A see I: i c i sm i. n t.ln?
Ciiui ch i.'ri mei itorious and based upon a dual Jsd.i.c moral i Ly: for the :;ec‘.r; i !
is detachment from the world and a concentrai ion upon the practice of the 
ethiu of lOve and of i:he oerinon-on l:he-Mount. This is er-rnt asscd in
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:z  : -  r  : :
natbial life (Troeltsch 1912:331-333).
!. 6 . 2 .
„  performance drawn from the life and • Lav,- of
= ....
o l r ' T i t Z I , '  , ; r  development and compromise, on the
ojecionce and radicalism".(Troeltsch 1912:336-337}
2.6.2.9. Troeltsch felt that this emphasis made it impossible for t,,.-. 
..■c -type to for. organisations _ their develop,.ent is M.iied V:
group, confined through personal relationships. This was also th:
reason that their Ideals had to be constantly renewed since it .esn,;:, i:
^ h.ansfom.t,on Of
VL..I !.. Ly lue |vi ificj pleu of love. (Troeltsch 1912:337)
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^.0,2. io. The sects thus gained in the intensity of the Christian life,
says Troeltsch, while losing the universalisin of the church. They held
that the world was so corrupt that it could not be 'conquered' by human
efiort, 80 contradicting the idea of the transformation of the world hv
love in which they also believed. As a result of this they adopted
eschatologioal views. Troeltsch concedes that in all of this the sects are
closer to the individualism of the Gospel than the church-type, but that
they tend towards legalism. The sects also gained in specific breath and
receptiveness of the church. They 'reversed' the process of assimilation
in which the church had engaged, having based its piety on an objective 
basis (Troeltsch 1912:337).
2.0.2.11, The sect is a voluntary community and as such its life and unity
depend on the life and effort of members in fellowship. For this reason
the sect rejects infant baptism and criticises the church's idea of the
sacraments. The spirit of fellowship is not weakened by individualism, but
strengthened by the service of individuals to the fellowship. Such
fellowship, however, has a narrow scope because of its intensity,' hence it.
does not Include relationships based on secular interests. These are
either rejected or avoided. As a consequence, Troeltsch toils us, the see,
doe... not seek to educate the masses, as the church does, but simply gathers
the elect in opposition to the world. The result of this is th.at the s.ect-
type preserves Christian universalisa, only in its eschatology. tfroeltsch 
1912:338-339).
2.6.2.12. Troeltsch believes that the sect's exclusive individuaiism .also 
asceticism which is a purely religious view of life
indifferent to culture. Troeltsch distinguishes th,e asceticism of the sect:
trom that of the church. The asceticism of the church is meritoiiouo,
to a special class. The asceticism of the sect, on
the Qtaer hand, consists in detachment from the world for the sake of the
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religious life and l:he fellowship of love. This is rooted in the Hew 
testament and is a continuation, albeit on a narrower basis, of Jesus' 
attitude to the world. Thus the sect's approach to asceticism is not 
contemplative and appropriate only for a special class - it is possible for 
all and directed towards all. It unites the fellowship of Lhe sect rather 
than dividing it.(Troeltsch 1912:339-340),
<c.o.2.13, Tioellsch recognises that while he presents these, the church
and sect types, in strict contrast to one another, they do impinge on one 
another, both are ....
..... a Ic^pca] result of the Gospel, and only Jointly do thev 
exhaus,the whole range of its sociological influence, and thus 
also indirectly its social results, which are always connected 
wi vh the religious organisation. (Troeltsch 1912:341),
This means that the church-type is not a deterioration of the Gospel but
its preservation, conceived as a free gift, as pure grace. Furthermore
with its universalis,, the church still continues the evangelistic impulse.
For this reason the church was forced into a position of compromise.
Neither, however, is the sect éimply a one-sided emphasis on certain
aspects of the church-type; rather it is a continuation of the Gospel.
Only in the sect are radical individualism and the idea of Christian love
fully stressed and an ideal fellowship built up upon these foundations.
tor this reason the sect develops a subjective and inward unity in place of
the external membership of an institution. The sect also retains the
original radicalism of the Christian ideal and its antagonism to the world.
!t retains the demand for persona] service which it also sees as a work of
grace. The sect emphasises the subjective realisation of grace in the
individual's life, and not objective assurance of its presence. The sect
coes not rely on past mi rac] es or on the mi.oculous n.atme ,,f
justification, but on the living presence of Christ, and victory in the
Clu isLian 1 ife. (Trne] Iscli 1912:341),
2.6.2. it. The starting point of the church, Troeltsch cnni inucs, is ftni
Exalted Christ and faith in Christ as Redeemer. This is iCs objective 
'treasure' which is made more objective in tlie sacra! i us t i tu l.i o„, i),.-
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sect, on the
the
other hand, starts fro.., the teaching and example of Jesus, and 
objective' work of the Apostles and their l i v e s  of poverty It 
unites Individualism with religious fellowship, and bases the office of 
ministry upo.n service and power, and not upon or di nation and tradition. 
The sect can therefore call laymen to the Christian ministry. The church 
dispenses the sacraments without reference to th.f character of the priest, 
in the sects they are either administered by lay,.en or made dependent upon 
the character of the president. in some cases they are discarded 
altogether. The individualism of the sect, Troeltsch says, moves towards a 
direct relationship with God and therefore it tends to replace the doctrine 
□  I the sacraments with the doctrine of the Spirit, and enthusiasm. (Troeltsch
1912:341-342)
2.5.2.15. Troeltsch once again states that both these types are based uoon 
"iunda,.ental Impulses of the Gospel". The Gospel contains the idea of 
objective salvation through the knowledge of God. Once developed this idea 
finds expression in the church. The Gospe] also contains the idea of 
absolute personal religion and absolute personal fellowship. The sect-type 
develops out of these ideas. The teaching of Jesus thus tends to lead to 
the sect-type, while the absolute faith in the person of Jesus tends to 
lead to the church-type. The Mew Testament thus helps to develop both the 
cnurch and the sect-types.(Troellcch 1912:342-343).
.2.16. Tn conclusion Troeltsch save hh^i      ,In conclusion Troeltsch says that the church type beg.a, 
Christian history and was responsible for a great world mission. Only wh, 
the church was objectified to its fullest extent, did sectarian tendenci; 
emerge as a reaction. (6, Just as the church developed in connection with 
.eudal society, so the sects aro.se in conjunction with the individualism of 
iate mediaeval city civilisation.(Troeltsch 1912:343).
Natu ra i w
2-C.3.1. After these lengthy and detailed comparisons of the church am 
sect types Troeltsch turns to a consideration of the ..anner in which tin 
sects used the idea of the law of nature.
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2.0.3,2. The sects based their attitude or. the 'Law of Christ'. Where 
they wanted to base their attitude on a rational or universal foundation 
they based it on the absolute law of nature of the primitive state in which 
there was no violence, war, law, oaths or private property. The sects thus 
rejected relative natural law, and the consequent compromise of Christian 
it entailed. The sects bad no idea of a graduated social order; for 
them only absolute contrasts existed. Through their appeal to the absolute 
law of nature the sects gave their Biblicism a greater emphasis and 
complemented it with illuminating reason and passionate 
sentiment.(Troeltsch 1912:344).
2.6.3.3. This conception of natural law was open to different
interpretations, it could include inequality, or stress equality and lead 
to democratic and communistic ideas. However, whichever interpretation is 
followed, both divine and absolute natural law are opposed to existing 
conditions. The more strongly this is emphasised, the stronger becomes the 
impulses for reform for the creation of something new. This end can be 
achieved in different ways; some attempted to realise the idea in groups 
which were detached from the world. Others took the way of peaceful
reform, which, if and when II; fails, can give way to violent, coercive and 
revolutionary methods which are justified by recourse to the Old Testament 
and the .Apocalypse. This reformist view of natural law is often linked to 
general social and political movements which are frequently nationalistic 
and sometimes fi lendly to the national state. (Troeltsch 1912:344-345)..
2.6.3.4. The fact that the sects swept away relative natural law and
replaced it with absolute law, says Troeltsch, produced a number of
i.l.glous and theological results which he describes as "typical of the 
sociological character of the sect system and of lbs relation to the church 
system". Firstly Divine Law was no longer reduced to the level of the 
decalogue and relative natural law, but was identified with the law of 
Christ in the Mew Testament and the Sermon-on-the-Mount. This aimed at a 
Christian ethic which was above that of relative natural law. .Secondly in 
removing the different grades of morality implied in relative natural law 
and replacing it with the absolute Law of God and nature, which required a 
response of all men alike. Divine law also removed the idea of a graduated
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ascent from creature to supernature. Instead it stressed tl^ immediate
1-91 atiQiit>hip of the creature with God. This, liov/ever, does not affect the 
organisation oi society as long as the sects avoided communistic and
ceinociatic political ideas. Thirdly the idea of God as Lawgiver became
dominant for the sects with the result that, despite the sectarians'
emphasis on personal service, grace and predestination, the idea of law is 
substituted for the idea of the church as the means of grace. (Troeltsch 
1912:345-347).
2.6.3.5. Troeltsch argues that tlm sect-type is to identified the
v/ay it interprets natural law which means that mystical and entliusi a.st ic 
movements may not be confused v/ith the sect-type, as they frequGnti.y are. 
The mystical type, says Troeltsch, is completely separate from the sect as 
it stresses the individual's relationship with God. However mysticism and 
enthusiasm can merge into the sect—type, but when it does so i t iralies on 
the sociological characteristics of the sect. Conversely the sect-type can 
also merge with the mystical type — there is a constant exchange b e t w e e n  
the two types. Sociologically, however, they are quite separate.(Troeltsch 
1912:347-348).
s. 6.3.0. Troeltsch thus gives sociological f].esh to his types, However 
some of the sociological characteristics of his types bear no forma 1 
relationship to one another. The reason for this is that the
ac te I i.r>tics of Troel tsch ' s types are not uni ted bv a primary 
sociological characteristic such as, f or' Vriber-, member shi p, but by 
different theological and' ethical principles, of which the two types' 
sociological characteristics are mere expressions.
ro. . 3. . . The chur cli-1yype is an eMpr'e,ssr on of tlie "uni versa I i sm" and
conservatism of the Gospel, the two irreducible aspects of Christiani ty. 
lue theological pt Inciple of universal ism leads the church !.□ creaie a n 
objective sacramental system through which it can embrace the- whol e life of 
the worl d a n d 11 s c i. t izens. The e t Ir i, c a 1 p r i n c 1 p 1 e o f c o n s e r ■v a t i s m le a d s 
the church to accept the world as it is, to accept relative natural law, 
and to work for its own spiritual ends with the ruling authorities. Put 
i/O^ethei these principles, one theological and one ethical, enabled I,he
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=nui-ch to compromise with the world, or rather made it inevitable that n  
.ould form such a compromise. The sect, conversely, is a product of the 
sospel's individualism and radicalism. Individualism, as a theoioeical 
princxple, leads the sect to emphasise subjective holiness In the life of 
m e  individual as being of primary importance, hence It creates small 
communities of ethically committed persons apart from the world where such 
performance can take place and where intense Individual relationships can 
0,. oimed. From this perspective the world Is, at best, irrelevant, or at 
vo.st, an obstacle to the spiritual life when its values erect barriers to 
rne practice of subjective holiness. The ethical principle of radicalism 
ea V the sect to adopt absolute natural law and to stress the 
eschatological hope of the Kingdom of God. In the light of this hope the 
p.esent order ol the world is seen to be totally inadequate and rejected as 
a result. This rejection either leads to an isolationist withdrawal, or to 
an attempt to destroy the old order by force.
malies it ever, clearer that Troell.sch's types .ire not.
in their intent or nature, sociological types; they are rathe., ' I !,eo I „ v i I
ana ethical types which have accompanying, and quite seconda,,
sociological characteristics. Further it is the theological and ethical
principles upon which the two types are founded that form th,i unlfylnr
iocus Ior the various sociological characteristics that are attached to Chi 
types.
& 2 ç t_ jkü jU illL _ P ro te s ta n   ^1 '-Ti,.
-6-4.1. Iroellisch adds to his theoretical statements about church ,-,nd 
sect in his introduction to the second volume of the Sociq.L.IfiacjHpg. Tl,c 
T>'--ch-type, Troeltsch informs his readers, as a supernatural, univer-sai
arisen oui
institution, absorbs all of human life on the basis that it ha:
3 preparation for the supernatural I i f < 
,ne sect ..type, however, h.as developed its social idea from the Gospel Th,
ainstian character and holiness of this ideal should be provided by tin
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“ I  g r o u p  a n d  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  i t s  m e m b e r s ,  n o t  b y  o b j e c t i v e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  i t  d o e s  n o t  r e c o g n i s e  s e c u l a r  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  e i t h e r  a v o i d s  then , i n  a  s p i r i t  o f  t o l e r a n t  d e t a c h m e n t ,  or ,  
u n d e r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  a n  " e n t h u s i a s t i c "  e s c h a t o l o g y  i t  a t t a c k s  t h e s i  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  r e p l a c e s  t h e m  b y  a  p u r e l y  C h r i s t i a n  o r d e r  o f  
S o c i e t y . ( T r o e l t s c h  1 9 1 2 : 4 6 1 ) .  I n  e a c h  c a s e ,  T r o e l t s c h  n o t e s  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
G h n s t i a a  f e l l o w s h i p  i s  s e e n  d i f f e r e n t l y .  I n  t h e  c h u r c h  i t  i s  c o n c e i v e d  a s  
a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  w h i c h  h a s  a b s o l u t e  t r u t h  a n d  s a c r a m e n t a l  p o w e r  i n d e p e n d e n t  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l i s m ,  w h i l e  i n  t h e  s e c t  f e l l o w s h i p  i s  s e e n  a s  a s o c i e t y  w h o s e  
l i f e  i s  c o n s t a n t l y  r e n e w e d  b y  t h e  l i f e  o f  i t s  I n d i v i d u a l  m e m b e r s .  F o r  t h i s  
r e a s o n  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  c h u r c h  i d e a  a r e  a b l e  t o  r e l e g a t e  t h e  i d e a  o f
C h r i s t i a n  p e r f e c t i o n  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  g r o u p  w h i l e  t h e  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  .sect 
s e e  I t  a s  b i n d i n g  o n  a l l  C h r i s t i a n s . ( T r o e l t s c h  1 9 3 1 : 4 6 1 - 4 6 2 ) .
a . 6 . 4 . 2 .  T r o e l t s c h  n o t e s  t h a t  t h e  c h u r c h  a n d  t h e  s e c t  a l s o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  
i d e a  o f  g r a c e  d i f f e r e n t l y .  T h e  f o r m e r  s e e s  t h e  e x i s t i n g  o r d e r  a s  a  r e s u l t
o f  s i n  a n d  s o  s e e s  " g r a c e "  .as a p o w e r  w h i c h  p u r i f i e s  t h e  w o r l d ' s
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  u s e s  t h e m  a s  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n s  o f  a  " h i g h e r  s t r u c t u r e " ,  a n d  
s u b j e c t s  t h e m  t o  a  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  s u c h  a s  t h e  P a p a c y  w h o s e  a u t h o r  it y i s  
c o n c e i v e d  a s  b e i n g  s u p e r n a t u r a l  i n  o r i g i n .  T h e  sect-type a l s o  s e e s
e x i s t i n g  s o c i e t y  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  s i n ,  b u t  f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n  t h e  s e c t s  r e j e c t  
""“ " " I - ’- t h e y  c r e a t e  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  s o c i a l  o r d e r  b a s e d  u p o n  t h e
o s p e l  a s  n  c h a l l e n g e  t o  e x i s t i n g  s o c i e t y .  " G r a c e "  for t h e  s e c t ,  t h e n ,  
m e a n s  t h e  e l e c t i o n  w h i c h  s e p a r a t e s  t h e  C h r i s t i a n  f r o m  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  
a n d  i n s p i r e s  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  G o s p e l  e t h i c .  " G r a c e "  a l s o  I n d i c a t e s  t h e  
v i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s e c t  .and t h e  r e v e r s a l  o f  s o c i a l  v a l u e s  i n  t h e  h a s t  
J u d g e m e n t .  " G r a c e " ,  f o r  t h e  s e c t ,  i s  n o t  a s u p e r n a t u r e  e r e C e d  a b o v e  
i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  si;ate. F o r  f - a l l e n  h u m a n i t y  
g r a c e  i s  n o t  p u r i f i c a t i o n  a n d  t h e  c l i m b  u p  t o  s u p e r n a t u r e ,  b u i  o n p o s i t i o n
to Sin expressed in t h e  C h r i s t i a n  spirit and moral I .,w. (Iroei to,.,, 
1 9 1 2 : 4 6 2 ) .
- o . T r o e l t s c h  a d d s  t h a t  t h i s  r e l a t e s  t o  a  f u r t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  
r - e l i g i o u s  p s y c h o l o g y  a n d  t h e o l o g y .  C h r i s t i a n i t y ,  h e  s a y s .  I s  J i n k e d  t o  
i d e a  o f  f e l l o w s h i p .  T h e  c h u r c h - t y p e  r e g a r d s  C h r i s t  a s  t h e  f o u n d e r  o f  t h e  
c h u r c h ,  a n d  i t s e l f  a s  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  t r e a s u r y  o f  g r a c e .  T h e  s e c t - t y p e ,  o n
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uLhüi hand iégards as Lhe Law Giver, divine example, and as the
present exalted Christ who fills the Christian community with his energy.
He is the source of all spiritual influence and activity.(Troeltsch 
1912:462-463).
2.6.4.4. Finally Troeltsch extends this analysis to ethics:
Toî our piesent subject It is vital to remember that the idea nf 
td.e church as an objective institution, and as a volunta^^
society contains a fundamental sociological, distinction. This 
distinction leads to a corresponding distinction in the sphere 
of ethics: on the one hand the Christian ethic is supplemented by 
t^2 natural ethic, aixi is thus enabled dominate the masses;
other, this idea of nature as the "complement" of 
is rejected, and t ^  influence of this group is therefore 
confined to small circles of passive resistors or 
revolutionaries. IHie church-type accepted a natural ethic whose 
standards differ greately from those of Christianity; the sect- 
type rejected this idea entirely. Those who regarded the 
churches as an objective institution looked upon "Nature" as 
something, though different from grace was yet capable of beinv 
moulded by it; wheras those to whom the Church was a voluntary 
society regarded "genuine Nature" altogether as something which 
was identical with grace, while they rejected "fallen Nature" as 
something which could not possibly be harmonized with ■■'^ racp at 
all. (Troeltsch 1912:463).
-.0.4.0. The themes of universal ism and conservatism and on the one hand 
and individualism and radicalism on the other are once more jmplicit in 
Troeltsch's analysis. Whereas before he indicated the manner in which ihey 
expressed themselves as sociological characteristics, now l,e seems to 
consider how these principles are expressed in doctrinal orientations to 
society. Because of its universalisim and conservatism the church-type has 
a conception iif religious fellowship which embraces the institutions of 
society, while that of the sect, because of its individualism and 
radjcalism, is such that it critically separates itself from the structures 
institutions of society. Similarly the doctrines of grace and cd: 
Christ are also orientated according to these principles to either 
;einforce the church's involvement in society, nr the sect's isolation from 
It. Tn the one case the doctrines of grace and of Christ so function as to 
facilitate the work of the church in society, and in the other they
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function as the basis of the separation of the life of the Individual frora
the rest of society within the religious co,.,.unity. Finally the two
tendencies also, in the area of ethics, produce different ideas of
'Nature'. The first naking existing reality compatible with Christianity.
and the second placing existing reality totally .at odds wi i I, Chr 1st i ani t^.’
This later view forces the Christian community to create its own new and 
independent "reality".
2.6,4.6. Troeltsch's reimrk that the sociological distinction between 
church and sect also results in ethical distinctions between nature and 
.grace demands comment. Troeltsch is putting the cart before the horse 
here, since it is the BiMcfil distinction that Troeltsch makes with regard 
to the individualism and universallsm in the "essence" of Christianity that 
actually produces his sociological distinction. It seems that Troeltsch 
v.-as not aware of the logic of his own thought at this point. (7)
^.b.4.7. In the following section on the Protestant sects (Troeltsch 
19121691-728) Troeltsch's emphasis on his universai ism-individuo)ism 
polarities is once again seen in the way in which he classifies these 
groups. Sects, in Troeltsch's analysis, were both individualistic .and 
radical. The Anabaptist movement which like the Mediaeval sects expressed 
Its individualism in a voluntary church which gave ,a subjective 
interpretation of Christian doctrines. The doctrines of Christianity were 
matters to be experienced and expressed in the individual's life and in tine 
life of the community. The Anabaptist's radicalism was expressed in a 
co,=itment to absolute natural law and in separated communi,ses with a hjgn 
stiess on church discipline. Again, like tb,c Media; Va j sec
Anabaptists retained the universallsm of the gospel in ihci, eschatology. 
troeltsch feels that this w.as a response to their salvation in the face of 
tne world. Mot infrequently this eschatologlcal note wouj.-i combine w i  I I, 
the sect's radicalism .and explode in apocalyptic violeruc such as at 
Munster and finally in the English Civil War where it reached its peak a ml 
burnt itselT. out. Never again, Troeltsch notes, did Christians try .and 
Gio'.abl itbh the K,i ngdom of God by the sword.
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2.6.4.8. However at this point the unity of Troeltsch's duaiistic typology
begins to fragment. Later groups, beginning with the English General 
Baptists, adopted the individualism of the Mennonites but rejected their 
ethical radicalism and commitment to absolute natural law. The Pietist 
movement, which issued forth into the Moravian church, Methodism and the 
modern sects, also separated individualisra and radicalism. It stressed the 
.subjective nature of Christian faith and doctrine in voluntary groups while 
maintaining a conservative bourgeois social ethic. In Socialism and 
Christian Socialism, however, the radicalism of the sect seeks to combine 
v/ith the u ni versa 1 i sm of proclamation in order to create a nev; social order 
through consent rather than by coercion.
2.6. 4.9. This left a great problem; how to combine the radicalism of the 
Gospel ethic with a popular mass religion. The upshot of all this is that 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the two theological and ethical 
tendencies that ar^ e intrinsic to Troeltsch's classification of tt^ sect- 
type begin to travel in two separate directions, destroying U>g uni fo) mi t.y 
of his typology. Troeltsch classifies as 'sects' disparate groups which 
are individualistic and conservative or radical and uni versaTi.stic. He is 
unaware of the fact that these different combinations will produce quite 
different theological and sociological characteristics.
2.6.4.10, Troeltsch also distinguished between aggressive and passive 
sects. The aggressive sects combined their rejection of existing society 
v/ith eschatological violence. They were not content merely i o re j ec t the 
world but sought to change it in an eschatological crusade. The aggressive 
sect alone, according to Troeltsch, attempted to change society and when it 
declined after its last push of energy in the seventeenth century this 
passion passed irsto Christian .Socialism which had se t. asi do the swor d as a 
means of establishing God's Kingdom.(Troeltsch 1912:604-806).
2.6.4.11. The passive sect on the other hand was non-violent. its view of 
eschatology caused it to withdraw from the world and form proleptic 
communities whose lifestyle would anticipate the coming Kingdom. Howcve), 
Troeltsch argued that the passive sects were short term phenomena and could 
not persist long after the commitment of the fit si. genera l.i on iiad passed
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a-.«y. As a result the passive sect combined with Calvinism to form the
•J-b.4.12. Calvinism was by nature inclined Iowa,do the church I vrc b„, 
fa, ling to gain power it had to adapt. It did this by adopting' the Free 
e.urch Ideal of the passive sects. Both Calvinism and the sects shared the 
eame attitude of intra-mundane ascetism towards the world. (8) but the seete 
aught Calvinism what it meant to be free while Calvinism, tauvhl the sects
' "  for Troeltsch was thc/second grea:
synthesis or 'compromise' of Christian history.(Troeltsch 19,2,805 820,\
2.6.4.13. In his account of Ascetic Protestantism Troeltsch presents an
ear y example of the theory of the process of sect development in .which the
sec. loses many of its defining characteristics and becom,es a species of
~ e church-type. As its eschatological hopes are disappointed its hold on
Chnsuian radicalism, is gradually loosened, thus it com,premises with the
world and accepts relative natural law in some form. Its individualism is
.two weakened as it accepts some elements of universal ism u „  the
..oelt,schian sense), in the form of the objectification of its doct, in.v and
the acceptance of the world. However having lost the two foci by which
loelloch defines the sect-typo, individualism and radic.alism, it is
longer a sect and in Troeltsch's .analysis becomes a sub-type of the w P c c h '  
type.
I S o c i a l  T A m r h i n : '  '
to the Socl4l__Jcachlhg Trncitseh  ...
hi_ th, Gc: types aind stresses their common roots in i;he Chrjs-l inn 
faith, however, on this occasion he indicates their point of .nut her,,.. 
unrty of experience. The church finds its centre on the objectivit
grace and sacraments, the sect its in subjective ho, i ness and c . M c  
-«yov.cal type in J iiiier experience. (Troeltsch 191.2:993-994).
y o
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2.0.5.2. Troeltsch argues, at this point, on the basis of his survey that 
of these types produces different emphases in theology and he 
illustrates this with regard to particular doctrines. For the church-type, 
he says, christ is the Redeemer vdio imparts th^ results of his finished 
saving work to individuals through the church. "The Christ of the sects", 
on the other hand ....
  Lord, the example and lawgiver of Divine author i ty
and dignity who allows lUs elect to pasas through contempt and
misery on their earthly pilgrimage, but who will complete the
real work of Redemption at this Return, when He will establish 
the Kingdom of God.(Troeltsch 1912:994).
2'6-5.3. The Kingdom of God for tl^ church-type is tl^ Church itself, 
whereas for the sect Jesus is the Herald of the Kingdom. He brings it into 
history Himself, thus the sects are inclined to ndllennialism. Again for 
the church redemption is complete in the atonement while the sect sees the
completion of redemption as a future event in Christ's Second Advent and
The establishing of the Kingdom of God, for which the whole course of 
worldly histoiy is a mere preparation. (Troeltsch 1912:994 995)
2.6.5.4. Troeltsch concedes that this presentation of doctrine is abstract
and acknowledges that the types Intermingle. However, he does stress that
these expressions .are not mere philosophical elaborations of the idea of
God or mythical additions; they are all based on the Christian ideas of God
ami fellowship. Tl^ perspectives ar^ perception of individual
thinkers, Troeltsch claims, will ever be determined by their basic idea
religious fellowship or their sociological o r i e n t a t i o n .(Troeltsch 
1912:995-996)
religious 
a of
2. 6. 5. 5 This sociological influence, says Troeltsch, may a l s o  be seen in 
the development of scientific theology: with each of the different forms of 
church-type whether Catholic or Protestant developing a form of theology 
which suits its sociological orientations. However the sect
  vdiich belongs essentially to the 1ower cl asses, and wh i ch
therefore does not need to come to terms with thought in gcncraT^ 
goes back co l.he pre church and pre-scientific standpoint, and 
uas no [ he o logy at all; it possesses only a strict ethic, a
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living myth, and a passionate: hope for the f u tui e. (Trne] in^ rh
1912:996).(9)
•i.6.5.6. Only mysticism, Troeltsch claims, has been able io develop a 
truly scientific theology in which Christian ideas have been connected with 
modern scientific ideas.(Troeltsch 1912:996-997).
2.6.5.7. Troeltsch also states that the different types hold different 
ideas about truth and toleration, which he feels sheds light on the
complicated relationship of Christianity to the State. The sect-type 
believes that it possesses the absolute Trutii of the Gospel, bu i. does not 
maintain, unlike the church, that this Truth can be grasped by the inziss of 
mankind, and stresses that it will only be consummated at the end of time.
Consequently the sects do not attempt to make the majority of society
conform to the Gospel. Moreover such coercion would be contrary to the
nature of the Gospel itself. However, says Troeltsch, the sects do seek to
maintain strict internal discipline over matters of truth while enjoining
tim state and the established church to exercise religious toleration.
V i,_,ism alone, of all the types, allows both internal and external 
freedom of conscience since it has a rel ativistic view of truth. This, 
Tfoeltsch lecognises, proves to be anarchic and ultimately d e s t r u c t i v e  of 
any organised fellowship.(Troeltsch 1912:997-999).
2.0.5. 8. hoi lowing this Troeltsch rehearses and summarises the place of
tl,e different types in the history of Christianity. First comes tine 
church-type based on compromise and relative natural law and a dualistic 
morality. The sect arose alongside the compromises of the church (and in 
reaction to them). The sects wanted to realise the ideal of the 
oei man on-the -Mount and so were comfor ted by the Hope of the Ki ngdom. 
done V or, in Ascetic Protestant i sin the sects found a wa y of on t ei i ug ti>c 
life of the world. In the aggressive sects the sect-type u.sed foicc when 
it felt that the imminence of the end justified this, -and sought to 
establish a Christian order by violence. Troeltsch adds that ihosc 
experiments wrre never permanently successful and in fact damaged the 
Christianity of these sects by substituting the Old Testament and the 
Apocalypse for the Gospel. Mysticism vdnch only appeared iii a distinct
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I.oî IT! lat.e in Cbi xsiicJii liistoi'y, was untroubled by questions of coiiiproiiij gg 
and relationships v/i tn the word d because its emphasis was purely inward, 
personal and asocial.(Troeltsch 1912:999-1001).
2 . 6 . 5 . 9 .  Finally Troeltsch turns to the question of what k i n d  n f  r e l i g i o u s
organisation is best for modern Christianity and states that the most 
effective form of Christian organisation has been the church which has 
pi esei ved the oojective form of doctrine, remained most dominant and 
carried the main thrust of Church history. However it has had to 
accommodate Christian l.hought to existing conditions and has ever been 
required to use compulsion to its spiritual ends. This compulsion,
Tfoeltsch notes, has broken down in the present day with the state being 
leligiously neutidl; many cuuntries allowing several confessions to exist 
side by side. Furthermore many of the activities in which the church was a 
leader have fallen into secular hands. The Roman Catholic Church seeks to 
compensate for this by dominating the leaders of these fields, but the 
Protestant Churches, having absorbed Free Church, sectarian, and mystical 
ideas, cannot do this. It has, instead, embraced the sectarian and 
mystical ideas of religious toleration, the separation of Church and State, 
and congi egational autonomy and freedom. Troeltsch discerns in tliis 
development a growing together of church and sect types, but adds that too 
much emphasis is still placed on external toleration. He, himself, would 
prefei a re-orienration of the state-church. Troeltsch desires to make it 
an institution in which internal toleration and freedom, on the mystical 
model, is established so that Christians of all opinions can find a home 
there, while at the same time enjoying peace and unity, and continuity with 
the past.(Troeltsch 1912:1006-1010).
2.6.5.10. In these final sections of the Social Teaching Troeltsrh surveys 
some further implications of the orientation of the sect to Individualism 
and of the church to uni versai ism. This time, however, he stresses the 
subjectivism and obj ec I: i vi sm which these orientations entai 1 . TIjug tJic 
sect has a subjective interpretation of Christian doctrines, stressing" 
their ethical ana experi enirial dimensions, while the church emphasi ses 
their objective implications for its institutional authority and power. 
Slubsequently the sect has no formal theology as its faith is lived, while
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the church articulates its doctrine in an objective intellectual system. 
This is related to different conceptions of truth. Truth for the church is 
objective, and so universally applicable - by coercion if necessary. The 
sect, on the other hand, understands that truth can only be grasped 
subjectively by the individual.(10)
2.6.5.11. The different orientations behind church and sect also have 
different historical results, according to Troeltsch. The individualistic 
and subjective sect is only a temporary phenomenon in history which has 
little cultural impact unless it combines with the church in some way. The 
universalistic and objective church, in contrast to the sect, dominates 
history and sets the direction for the development of Christianity. 
Troeltsch is clearly impressed with the cultural power of the church and 
for this reason he is orientated to its universal ism and objectivism. It 
IS out of this perspective that Troeltsch desires a revitalisation of the 
church-type, which should now be inclusive of the other types, so that 
Christianity's historical power, and ability to compromise, might be 
renewed.
SUMMARY AMD ANALYSIS OF TROELTSCH'S PERSPECTIVE ON CHURCH AND SECT.
2.7.1. It should now be clear that the divergent tendencies toward 
universallsm and individualism which Troeltsch sees in Church history are 
the focal ideas which lie behind his church-sect-distinction. These two 
basic characteristics are always accompanied with a corresponding tendency 
towards objectivism and subjectivism (Gustafson 1969:146-147: 1967:64-68;
1975:224-226). This is no accident, since Troeltsch is drawing upon the 
tendency within the philosophy of his day, following Hegel (see above), to 
distinguish between the objective and subjective aspects of a phenomenon. 
In this case Troeltsch has sought to distinguish between the objective and 
subjective tendencies within Christianity. For him this is a more 
fundamental question than the sociological types of church and sect since 
the Gospel itself has both objective and subjective aspects which were 
later to develop into the types of church and sect. In distinguishing
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the church articulates its doctrine in an objective intellectual system. 
This is related to different conceptions of truth. Truth for the church is 
objective, and so universally applicable - by coercion if necessary. TTie
sect, on the other hand, understands that truth can only be grasped 
subjectively by the individual.(10)
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and subjective sect is only a temporary phenomenon in history which has 
little cultural impact unless it combines with the church in some way. The 
universalistic and objective church, in contrast to the sect, dominates 
history and sets the direction for the development of Christianity. 
Troeltsch is clearly impressed with the cultural power of the church and 
for this reason he is orientated to its universal ism and objectivism. It 
IS out of this perspective that Troeltsch desires a revitalisation of the 
church-type, which should now be inclusive of the other types, so that 
Christianity s historical power, and ability to compromise, might be 
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SUMMARY AMD ANALYSIS OF TROELTSCH'S PERSPECTIVE ON CHURCH AMD SECT.
2.7.1. It should now be clear that the divergent tendencies toward 
universalisra and individualism which Troeltsch sees in Church history are 
the focal ideas which lie behind his church-sect-distinction. These two 
basic characteristics are always accompanied with a corresponding tendency 
towards objectivism and subjectivism (Gustafson 1969:146-147; 1967:64-68;
1975:224-226). TMUs is no accident, since Troeltsch is drawing upon t)^ 
tendency within the philosophy of his day, following Hegel (see above), to 
distinguish between the objective and subjective aspects of a phenomenon. 
In this case Troeltsch has sought to distinguish between the objective and 
subjective tendencies within Christianity. For him this is a more 
fundamental question than the sociological types of church and s;ec^ since 
the Gospel itself has both objective and subjective aspects which were 
later to develop into the types of church and sect. In distinguishing
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£;EH=£3 =
O- u . - d  eKperjence which furthered the dlsclpleship of the individual and 
the community.(Johnson 1953:88-92).
eociologioal characteristics this dualism means that 
e c urc manifests Itself as a compulsory institution. It claims all of 
socie y s citizens as its members from birth. I„ this way it is a 
sociologically objective institution, like the state, and it satisfies its 
en ency to universalism by embracing the whole of a culture. The sect, on
;;
n specific groups and communities.(Robertson 1970:1]6-117)
:: ;.r : : :  ■:
relative interpretation of natural law, and the sect, in its 
individualistic concentration, adopting an absolute interpretation of 
natural law. Through the church's emphasis the Christian ethical values 
can be related to a more universal social ethic which can be practised by 
he broad mass of humanity. In this manner, too, the church becomes an 
jec ive social force. The sect rejects relative natural law and Instead
S.ves an absolute Interpretation to natural law which leads to a 'utopian' 
thic Of love and fraternity defined either with reference to the past in 
pnmi ivist terms, or with reference to the future in eschatological terms.
. i.tians within their voluntary communities of commitment; it is an 
internal, subjective ethic.
115
Y T  " " 1  seek to establish the rule of
absolu e natural law by violence, In these instances the sectarians see
hen^elves as agents of eschatological wrath, called to fight for the
xngdom in the face of the godless. Thus their ethic does not become a
-jority ethic; it remains that of Christian individuals. Those who are by
violent means forced to conform to it must then join the (subjective,
c urch community. In any case it is the passive sect which Is closer to
TroeltscVs ideal type and not the aggressive sect as suggested by
S eerman(U); the rejection of violence practised by the passive sects is
closer to the ideal of absolute natural law than the militancy of the
aggressive sects who embrace the Holy war. (Steerman 1975;189-191).
2.T.5. The conservative inclination of the church, as it seeks to accept
society as it is, and the radical inclination of the sect as it pursues the
Ideal are also manifested in different interpretations of natural law. At
he earn, time, both of these inclinations add to the universalism and
objectivism of the church, by aligning it with the social order, or the
individualism and subjectivism of the sect by orientating it towards
alternative values to those dominant in society. As a consequence of these
conservative and radical inclinations, the two types will tend to be
associated with, and disposed to, the interests of different social and
political classes. The church-type in its conservatism will be aligned
Kith the ruling classes, and will share their values, while continuing to
work With the lower classes, often acting as a means of social control.
e sect, because of its radicalism, will find points of agreement with the
ower classes, especially amongst those disaffected with the social order
a as. far as the sects draw on and direct these interests they are
subversive. Occasionally, the sects are aligned with revolutionary
movements, but more often they contribute to the fragmentation and
rejection of established authority within a society and so bring about its 
demise by degrees,
2.7.6. This leads finally to the cultural stance of the two types. The 
church, in seeking cultural objectivity, will always seek involvement 
within the structures of society and within the dominant tendencies of the 
age in order that it might channel them towards its own universal mission.
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The sect, though, by definition, will always withdraw from culture seeking 
its own subjective and particularised alternatives. Culture for the sect 
is either evil, an obstruction to holiness, or a mtter of indifference.
2.7.7. Any discussion of the cultural stance of Christianity, however, 
entails a return to Troeltsch's concept of compromise. The church-type in 
its involvement in culture will seek a compromise with culture. It will do 
this by trying to penetrate culture with Christian values that are so 
altered that they are socially relevant and realisable. The church-type 
will also receive the predominant cultural values of a society into its 
Christian ethic thus acclimatizing Christianity to its host culture. This 
process, Troeltsch feels, is necessary if the Christian ethic is to have 
any sociological impact, but it is possible only for the church as the 
Qbiective manifestation of Christianity. As an objective institution, like 
the state, the church-type is able to bring different social and cultural 
forces into a synthesis by being able to dominate them and direct them 
according to its own ends. Furthermore, only the church-type is able to 
bring Christian values into such a cultural synthesis because it translates 
its doctrines into social powers by objectifying them. It applies 
Christian ethical values to society through its concept of relative natural 
law, and through its use of coercion it brings all members of society and
all areas of social life into the cultural synthesis which, along with the
state, it seeks to create. Troeltsch hopes that it will finally even bring 
the sect and mystical types into such a synthesis, but through moral
authority rather than through compulsion, since the values of freedom and
toleration also need to be incorporated into any new cultural synthesis.
2.7.8. The sect-type as a voluntary and subjective community gives 
expression to those extremes of Christianity which may never be synthesised 
and so prohibit compromise in Troeltsch's sense. The sect emphasises the 
transcendent and 'utopian' or ideal nature of Christian ethical values. 
These are framed in terms of absolute natural law which is in eternal 
opposition to secular culture and which calls forth ever renewed protests 
against the church and its compromises. The idealism of the sect, however, 
is sociologically inapplicable. The sect-type can never have any direct 
cultural influence because it does not accommodate itself to historical
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reality. Consequently it withdraws from the mainstream of culture and 
history and seeks to create an enclave in which it might practise its ideal 
values despite the recalcitrance of the rest of the world. Such a course 
of action Troeltsch regards as ethically noble, but socially impotent.
2.7.9.  ^ There is a clear parallel here between church and sect and 
subjective and objective ethics or cultural values. The former, for 
Troeltsch, represent the ideal and absolute good, -and the latter those 
relative goods and systems of value which arise in the course of history. 
Subjective ethics and values only have any historical consequence if they 
are related to history through the mediating agency of the cultural values.
making this transition they must be accommodated to historical 
oircumstances and so loose their radicality. Objective, cultural values
and ethics are, however, indirectly founded upon, and inspired by, the
subjective, personal values.
2.7.10. Sirallary the sect represents the absolute and ideal aspects of 
Christian ethics which, in themselves, are irrelevant to history and 
culture. The church-type, on the other hand, represents Christian ethics 
as applied in history and culture. If the values of the sect are, in any 
way, to have historical impact, it must come to terms with the church in 
some way. At the same time the church-type also needs the sect-type for 
its own revitalisation. The sect, then, is the expression of Christianity 
in terms of the morality of the conscience or 'subjective' ethics. The 
church is the expression of Christianity in terms of Christian values in 
terms of the cultural values or objective ethics. While Troeltsch affirms 
the necessity of both types, just as he affirms the necessity of the two 
moralities, he prefers the church-type for the same reason that he prefers 
the cultural values. The church-type is able to bring many elements into a 
synthesis, whereas the sect-type leads to pluralism and polality by 
emphasising extremes.(Frieson 1972:75).
2.7.11. Thus Troeltsch's typology and the notion of compromise related to 
it are a direct reflection of his treatment of subjective and objective 
ethical systems in relation to history and culture and the cultural
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synthesis. In fact Troeltsch's analysis of church and sect form a part of 
his overall programme in his theology of culture and history, discussed in 
the last chapter. This analysis is, it would seem, inspired by the basic 
intentions of that programme, soxi so inseparable :h%)m it. Troeltsch's 
treatment of the church and sect is thus dependent upon his theology of 
culture and his preference for dominant cultural values and forces that he 
displays in that theology: the church-type adopting these cultural values, 
while the sect seeks the absolute and ideal which are beyond history.
SECTION EIGHT: A CRITIQUE OF TROELTSCH'S TYPOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION
2.8.1. Troeltsch's typology, especially the dualism he creates between 
church and sect types is open to serious criticism on several points. For 
tlæ purposes of discussion these will be divided into two areas:
sociological and theological and ethical.(12)
2-8.2.0. S o c i o l o g i c a l  Criticism of Troeltsch'
2.6.2.1. Sociologists of religion find fault with Troeltsch's typology on 
two counts: firstly that it is too limited and secondly that the diverse
characteristics of the two types have no logical coherence.
2.8.2/2. Troeltsch's types are limited in that they ane too historically 
specific; they ar-e ixm closely identified with pheonomena in Christianity 
between the eleventh and eighteenth centuries. Troeltsch's church-type is 
so defined in terms of Mediaeval Catholicism that it cannot applied 
easily to later ecclesiastical institutions, such as Lutheran, Calvinist 
and Anglican churches. His sect-type so closely resembles Mediaeval and 
early Reformation sects that later examples no longer correspond to the 
type. Tlie consequences of this is that Troeltsch's typology is incapable 
of functioning as an explanatory tool by which modern Christian groups can 
be understood. Nor can it be applied outside of Christianity to the
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. xtutlons of other religious traditions as a tool of the universal 
socro ogy of religion,(Gustafson 1969:147; Johnson 1963:539-542; 1971:124- 
125; Moberg 1962:73-99; Redefcop 1962:151-160; Steerman 1975:181-254).
Y Y T  . Troeltsch's critics it appears that his types are
XT) terms of the empirical characteristics that such groups have 
possessed in history. His definitions are not 'analytic'; they are not 
ogxcally consistent constructs which define a type in terms of its main 
c araoteristics. All of the secondary characteristics of the type should 
ogically related to its :nain characteristics as this is necessary for 
an Ideal type. It see.ns to the sociologists that Troeltsch's types lack 
s consistency, the characteristics of the various types having no 
internal logical relationship to one another. The characteristics of one 
type frequently appear in examples of another type. This has led to one 
commentator (Robertson) to remark that Troeltsch's types are not really 
/PCS at all but a 'dichotomous classification' of groups in terms of their 
empirical characteristics.(Robertson 1970:115-116, cf Gustafson 1967:65-67- 
Johnson 1963:538-542; 1971:124-125; Redekop 1962:161).
2.8.2.4. In making these criticisms the sociologists have misunderstood
roeltsch's purpose and approach. In the first place Troeltsch's only
concern in the Social Teaching was the history of Christian social ethics
and he applied and adapted Weber's typology for this purpose. It is little
wonder, then, that Troeltsch defines the types only as they apply to
certain periods of Christian history for this was the brief that he set
himself. Troeltsch was a historical theologian using a sociological 
method. ^
2.8.2.5. Secondly Troeltsch's types do have focal points and organising 
criteria which gave his types a certain coherence as has been shown. (13) 
These, however, are not sociological characteristics but theological and 
ethical orientations which stand behind Troeltsch's sociological
ormulation of his types (Johnson 1955:88-89). The sociologists looked for 
sociological organising criteria in terms of a main sociological 
C aracteristic for each type, and finding no such criteria, assumed that 
-here were no organising criteria at all. Because the focus of Troeltsch's
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types were not sociological they were opaque to Troeltsch's sociological 
critics. All of Troeltsch's types do have a clear internal logic, but it
is iliefl-logical and not SQSio-logical.
2.8.2.6. This in itself, however, is a major fault for most sociologists 
in that it introduces 'subjective' elements into ideal types which should 
be defined in sociological terras alone,(Eister 1967:87).
2.8.2.7. Futherraore, the kind of ethical interests which Troeltsch 
discloses through his typology, (e.g. , the contrast between 'pure' and 
'compromised' religion), always lead to a portrayal of options in terms of 
polarized and dualistic extremes which by nature are inexact. This may do 
very well for the prophetically minded ethicist in his all inclusive 
polemics, but it is useless for the sociologist in that it does not allow 
the portrayal of the -diversity of religious phenomena which cannot be 
embraced within simple dualism. (Dittes 1971:375-385)
2-8.2.8. In the light of'this there is little wonder that sociologists' 
have found Troeltsch's typology unworkable for their purposes. It 
represents theological interests which are given a sociological 
formulation- The typology introduces all manner of extraneous elements 
into sociological work which are incompatible with good sociological 
method, hence, the difficulty which sociologists encounter in trying to 
apply and define Troeltsch's typology. If they wish to develop a more 
adequate sociological understanding of church and sect then they must turn 
to the alternative definitions of Weber, Berger and Martin.(Swatos 
1976:129-142; Berger 1954; 1958; Martin 1952). But Troeltsch's typology
must be evaluated on the grounds on which it is founded; those of theology
and ethics.
hmlflgjcal and Ethical Critir.i ams of Troeltsch's Tvpnln^y
2.8.3.1. The series of dualism and polarities which lay behind Troeltsch's 
typology have already been noted. It is sufficient to say that Troeltsch's
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historical presuppositions and guard against them.(Frieson 1975:271; 
1972:595).
2.8.3.4. The framework, Troeltsch has produced, distorts those options in 
Christian ethics which it seeks to describe. It forces them into polar 
opposites, each having extreme characteristics, which they do not have in 
history. The framework thus misinterprets history and historical
movements, placing groups which do not really belong together into 
overrigld and straitjacketed formal categories, it also theoretically 
excludes other mediate and alternative positions. This is done without
making real reference to any logical sociological relationships between the 
characteristics which define different groups and movements.
2.8.3.5. Thus, for instance, the fundamental characteristics which 
Troeltsch identifies with church and sect types are often switched between 
the two types. The universallsm of Christian Socialism (a sect-type 
movement in Troeltsch's analysis) and the political and social conservatism
of the Pietist sects are but two examples of this,
2.8.3.6. Again the characteristic of 'compromise' which is so Important
for Troeltsch's definition of the church Is not necessarily the inevitable 
path a church must take. Society might accommodate Itself to the church, 
or the church might take a sectarian stance against society over some 
issues. A good instance of this Is the position of the American Catholic 
Bishops over nuclear weapons. This is an expression of the prophetic 
dimension which remains in all Christian traditions. (Johnson 1971;131-132),
2.8.3.7. Moreover, the reverse also holds true in that the sect Is not 
necessarily withdrawn from society. Sects may, as Weber noted, become a 
major force for social change. Society became accommodated to the values 
of the sects as an innovating movement within society, replacing 
traditionalist values with those favourable to nascent capitalism. In this 
connection 8.D. Berger notes that Weber's Idea of the se'ct is similar to 
Marx's idea of the revolutionary party. Both act as mediating structures 
which inculcate new values Into broad groups of people which will later 
result in their effecting social change. Both require a total commitment
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upon the success or otherwise of different soclal-ethlcal strategies.
2 .8 .3 .10 .
^ and described in strict terms, all three of
oeltsch s types are pathological from the perspective of ethics. The 
C urc, type is so hopelessly compromised with the dominant values of the 
woi d that it can offer no serious challenge to them. The sect is so 
-orally withdrawn into itself that it can have no influence upon society.
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Troeltsch is primarily interested in the social ethics of Christian groups 
and not in those of Christian deviations such as the Mormons, the 
Christadelphians and the Jehovah's Witnesses, all of which had emerged by 
the time he wrote the Si3aiaI„Teaching, but to which he makes no reference.
2.8.3.15. Both f(^ these reasons, ai^ because the terms 'church' gnM 
'sect' carry with them implicit value judgements, one of approbation and 
one of derogation (Moberg 1962:89), Troeltsch would have chme better to 
talk of the different ethical emphasis of different churches standing 
within different traditions and styles of ethical reasoning rather than in 
attempting to force them into his typology. Troeltsch himself concedes 
this point at two places in the Social Teaching, (Troeltsch 1912:334,340- 
341). But to have changed his language would have exposed the arrogance of 
the claim that the direction of Christian history lies with one kind of 
church rather than with the Christian community or movement as a whole. 
Furthermore, it seems inevitable that Troeltsch's Lutheran mindset should 
lead to his polarising the church community just as he polarised everything 
else. Here again Troeltsch contradicts one of his own insights. He has 
allowed a sociological definition of the church to swallow up a theological 
definition of the church. This is despite the fact that he maintains that 
sociology cannot fully understand the transcendent nature of the church 
wil^ tJ^ result t]w^ priority ought to given to the theological
understanding of the church.(15)(Relst 1966:30-35).
2.8.3.16. Troeltsch's typological approach thus fails in a number of
areas: it is neither good sociology, run- good ethics, rmæ jgo^i theology.
If th^ history c)f Christian ethics is to be understood, ^oid if a more
adequate basis fc%- developing a viable social-ethical strategy the
Christian faith today is to be found, other approaches will have to be 
adopted.
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2.9.0. CONCLUSION: "COMPROMISE" COMPROMISED
2.9.1. The central thesis of the Social Teaching and many other of 
Troeltsh's writings on church and sect is that Christian ethics are more 
historically and culturally effective when united with secular social 
values in a compromise. Such compromises, he argues, can only be developed 
by the church-type which, in its universai ism, seeks to embrace society. 
The sect may present a noble witness to the idealism and purity of the 
Gospel ethic, but it is socially ineffective because of its refusal to 
compromise with society.
2.9.2. The basis of this argument is found in Troeltsch's philosophy of
culture in which the moral and cultual values of an age and its 'meaning'
are set by a cultural synthesis which seeks to harmonise the diverse and
often polarised forces and values in a society at a given time. This 
synthesis is brought together around the most powerful and dominant forces 
and values of the age which act as a focus for all the other elements 
within a culture and give them their meaning. The church-type, as a social 
force, is able to feed Christian values into the synthesis and so give them 
social relevance.
2.9.3. However in the critique of Troeltsch's typology which has been 
offsned in bhis chaptei Troeltsch's thesis has been shown to be in error. 
Compromise, in the . first instance, is not necessarily a function of the 
church-type, and, in the second instance, 'compromise', even in Troeltsch's 
sense, is not necessarily the most effective way of giving relevance to 
Christian ethics. The 'breakthroughs' which challenge the dominant ethics 
of a society which can be achieved by those groups which Troeltsch calls 
'sects' may often be far more effective in this regard.
2.9.4. In fact, the church type, because of its compromise with the 
dominant and established values of society may actually hinder social 
progress, as indeed Troeltsch himself complains in many places. The 
alignment of the church-type with the state causes it to be naturally 
conservative and antagonistic to any change. This in turn may lead to the
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identification of Christian values with those of the established order and 
result in the alienation of many from the Christian faith for this reason. 
Further the church itself will begin to think of the social relevance of 
Christian ethics as being the justification of the established order, 
whatever it be, and so fail to translate Christian ethics into a critique, 
of social conditions and into movements to change them.
2.9.5. . Furthermore, because of its deliberate alignment with, and
preference for the dominant forces within culture, the church may find 
itself affirming an essentially evil set of cultural values, in the way 
that many churches and Christians did in Germany during the Third Reich. 
How in Troeltsch's cultural philosophy this cannot happen since each epoch 
stands in a direct relationship to God and so its imUn cultural ideas are 
the manifestations or revelations of God. Troeltsch's assumption that the 
main cultural values of a culture will be basically good clearly 
underestimates humanity's capacity for idolatry and radical evil which can 
then be expressed in its social structures. Yet this assumption is central 
to Troeltsch's theory of compromise, since if cultural values are 
understood as emanating from God and being expressions of the divine will,
then the church is both summoned to form a compromise and justified in so
doing. Without this assumption the imperative to compromises loses both 
Its obligatory nature and its legitimacy. Without this assumption the 
tendency to compromise has no moral authority, and so the central tenet of 
Social Teaching collapses as a result.
2.9.6. In conclusion, then, it must be said that because of the doctrine 
of compromise Troeltsch exaggerates the credibility and effectiveness 
the social ethics of the church-type and its approaches to society. At the 
same time he seriously underrates the social potential of the position in 
social ethics represented by those groups which he designates as 'sects'.
In setting up tlüs extreme polarisation of ethical positions he als^ 
excludes the possibility of other ethical standpoints. In view of the
ethical confusion of the present day it is necessary to move beyond both
Troeltsch's typology and assumptions if a clear view is to be gained of the 
real options that exist for strategies of Christian ethics in contemporary 
society. Sadly many Christian ethicists have not yet made this transition.
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m i E 3 TO CHAPTER TWO
1) Troeltsch seems to duplicate this dialectic in his account of the 
'Free Churches'. (Troeltsch 1912: pp 661-673).
2) For a fuller discussion of Weber's ideal types see 0.2.3.-0.2.7. 
above.
3) This suggests, according to G.W. Swat os, that Troeltsch was not 
seeking to establish sociological paradigms but analytical aids to 
help him understand his material.(Swatos 1976:133).
4) This appears to be a further reflection of Hegels diatectical theory.
5) This, B.A. Reist claims, is Troeltsch's summary of his Social Teaching 
which, he says, may be completely summed up in his concept of 
compromise.
6) Troeltsch appears to be taking an intenable position at this point in 
suggesting that the church type was present from the beginning. 
Sociologically, however, Early Christianity had the forma] 
characteristics of a sect.
7) Troeltsch's prior predication of individualism and universalism within 
the heart of the Gospel as different ethical tendencies which are then 
expressed as radicalism and conservatism respectively forces him to 
interpret all later manifestations of Christianity from within a 
dualiStic framework.
8) As they lost their eschatological hope the passive sects made their 
peace with the world by adopting the Calvinist doctrine of the 
'calling' with its world-orientated ascetisra, and. by adopting a 
bourgeois lifestyle which was eventually to lead to the rise of 
capitalism. In doing this the passive sects merged with neo-Calvinism 
to form the broad movement of Ascetic Protestantism. The social ethic 
of this movement was basically conservative and work orientated. It 
was also pre-eminently practical and pragmatic forming a social 
doctrine which clearly preserved Christian ideas of personality. 
Ascetic Protestantism as a social theory effectively dominated the 
societies of the Anglo-Saxon world producing conservative democracies 
which maintained religious and economic reason.
9) Troeltsch does not entertain the idea of 'existential' or narrative 
forms of theology which are common to these types of groups. Instead 
he understands theology only in the narrow, and abstract form of 
academic theology. (R. Friedmann The Theology nf Annbaptism Herald 
Press Scottdale. Pa 1973 pp 21-35; J.B. Metz Faith in History and 
S o c i e t y  Barnes and Oates, London 1980 pp 205 - 218).
10) This assertion is open to question since the doctrines and sacraments 
of even the most institutionally and intellectually orientated 
churches are open to mystical interpretation and experience. Examples 
of this are Jesuit and Puritan mystics. On the other hand, external
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CHAPTER 3
■ GQH— BESPOHSIBTLITY AND. TRANSFORMATION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF H. RTC H A R D
NIEBUHR'S THEOLOGY AND RTHTCR.
1. INTRODUCTION
3.1.1, Like Troeltsch, H. Richard Niebuhr is a holistic thinker and so it 
is not possible to take one part of his thought apart from any other. Thus 
to study his typology of religious orientation one must study his theology 
and ethics as well. Furthermore it is the contention of this thesis that 
neither Troeltsch’s nor Niebuhr's typologies can be separated from the rest 
of their theologies and philosophies. They are, for these thinkers, 
devices of ethical and theological analyses rather than of disinterested 
sociological lesearch. This makes it necessary to make a survey of
Niebuhr s thinking in its breadth and depth before turning to his typology 
of religious orientation.
3.1.2. There are three themes which are central to Niebuhr's thought which 
v/ill be considered in turn. The first is that of 'radical monotheism'. 
This 1 epresents Niebuhr's basic theological position where everything is 
orientated around the oneness of God as the 'principle of being'. The 
second is that of 'responsibility'. This is the ethical development of 
radical monotheism in which God is seen as acting upon the self in every 
event. The self must respond to such events as God's action in a fitting 
or appropriate manner. Undergirding both of these themes is the third 
major theme of Niebuhr s thought; that of transformation or conversion. 
This is the proper purpose and outcome of both monotheistic faith and 
responsiblist ethics; all of human life, culture and existence is to be 
relocated around God's centrality. However, in studying these themes one 
must consider Niebuhr's historical development in order to place them in 
context.
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TROELTSCH'S LEGACY: NIEBUHR'S AGENDA
3.2.1. While still a seminarian Niebuhr wrote three articles for the 
^^g3-^ine of the German speaking Evangelical Synod. In these articles he 
shows a predilection for a pluralist or dualist philosophy in which evil is 
not attributable to God, a concern for social ethics and the role of the 
church in society, and an awareness of the problem of historical 
relativism. He writes under the influence of European and American 
religious liberalism (Fowler 1974:8-17). Given these interests it was 
almost inevitable that on commencing doctoral studies at Yale in 1922 he 
should choose to study Troeltsch under D.C. Macintosh. Niebuhr's own deep 
interest as a young man found a resounding echo in Troeltsch's programme, 
and it was only natural that Niebuhr would seek to clarify and give form 
and substance to those interests through a detailed study of Troeltsch.
3.2.2. In his thesis on Troeltsch (Niebuhr 1923), Niebuhr analysed 
Troeltsch's philosophy of religion. In the first part of this work he 
outlines Troeltsch's intellectual development. He notes the various 
influences on Troeltsch from the neo—Kantianism of the early period of the 
religious a priori, to his later historical period under the pull of 
Dilthey, Weber, and Mienke.(Niebuhr 1924:1-91). In the latter part of his 
thesis Niebuhr discusses Troeltsch's philosophy of religion. He considers 
Troeltsch's various dualisms which he seeks to reconcile in a synthesis, 
his theory or method of compromise, his attempt to 'overcome' historical 
relativism by finding the absolute in history, and the various 
methodologies Troeltsch develops to analyse religion and produce a solution 
to the problems he perceives In the relation of religion l.o culture and 
history. Niebuhr concludes that Troeltsch never really achieves a 
synthesis between the various dualisms in his philosophy and theology, only 
a series of inadequate compromises. In Niebuhr's view the goal of 
synthesis of bringing various elements into a harmonious whole was 
frustrated by the very means of compromise by which Troeltsch sought to 
achieve it; compromise entailed accommodation rather than reconciliation. 
Niebuhr conceded that Troeltsch did find a point of modest certainty in the 
concept of the relative absolute - the immediate, but limited, 
manifestation of God within a culture. Niebuhr, it seems, found this a too
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precarious and temporary solution to the problem of historical relativism. 
Lastly, Niebuhr distinguished between Troeltsch's formal, neo-Kantian 
method of analysing religion and his actual, historically orientated 
method. Niebuhr argues that the two methods are at odds with each other 
and that Troeltsch seems to favour the historical approach. This, it would 
appear, is also Niebuhr's choice.(Niebuhr 1924:92-270, Fowler 1974:19-22).
3.2.3 While Niebuhr had profound disagreements with Troeltsch, he adopted 
much of his thought and approach. In the first place he made the issue at 
the centre .of Troeltsch's philosophy and theology - the problem of the 
relation of Christianity to culture - his own. In doing this he also 
embraced the various questions which were attendant upon it. He accepted, 
as established, historical relativism and sought to study Christianity and 
culture within the framework of catagories and critical methods which it 
created. He consequently adopted the sociological interpretation of 
Christian institutions and movements which Troeltsch had learnt from Weber. 
The sociological approach to the situation of Christianity in its social 
and historical context committed Niebuhr to take up Troeltsch's search for 
a new Christian ethic suitable for forming a creative synthesis with 
contemporary culture. Historical relativism made all Christian ethics 
particular to a given time and place and the changing social and economic 
substructures of society required new institutions and new patterns of 
ethics as their counterparts.
3.2.4. Niebuhr also inherited another of Troeltsch's priorités with his 
acceptance of historical relativism. Like Troeltsch, Niebuhr had to relate 
the absolute and its revelation to history so that all values were not lost 
in a sea of particularity. He began this task by adopting Troeltsch's own 
philosophy of critical realism which saw that historical relativism did not 
overthrow the Absolute, but that the Absolute somehow existed behind 
historical relativism, being implicit within it.
3.2.5. As well as inheriting Troeltsch's framework or complex of concerns 
and problems, Niebuhr also took over his method of trying to resolve those 
problems. This was his method of historical analysis in which the 
historian would attempt to circumscribe an individual totality by
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identifying its 'essence', its process of development and its latent 
possibilities. Ibe historian would then bring this essence into a new 
synthesis with the present from which a temporal or time-bounded value 
could be derived. Niebuhr used this method in his earliest works.(Niebuhr 
1924, 1937, 1941, Fadner 1975, 96-100).
3.2.6. Niebuhr establishes a harmony between revelation and history in his 
scientific objective and his subjective or internal history. They are 
simply different ways of viewing the same events. In fact they should 
inform each other. Scientific history should adopt insights produced by 
internal history and internal history should likewise be influenced by 
external history so that a community is able to see itself as others see 
it.(Niebuhr 1941:59-66).
THE EMERGENCE OF RADICAL MONOTHEISM 
The Roots of Radical Monotheism
3.3.1.1. Though Niebuhr's basic monotheistic conviction had always been 
with him, perhaps as part of his Reformed heritage, the sources which he 
chose to help him to give it expression were diverse. In the first place 
he adopted a number of philosophical ideas which were to prove vital to the 
expiession of his monotheism. There was firstly Mead, whom Niebuhr met j.n 
19.:.1 (Kliever 1977:18-20). Niebuhr used his value theory to establish a 
sociological theory of things and the identity of persons. Secondly
Niebuhr found Royce's analysis of faith, requiring both trust and loyalty 
to the transcendent object of faith, very useful. Lastly Niebuhr used
Whitehead's analysis of the transformation of the idea of God from void to
enemy, to friend to depict the movement from false faith to true faith.
However, none of these philosophical theories promoted the triumph of 
Niebuhr's monotheistic convictions over his dualistic tendencies. For that 
one must look to the theological influences which profoundly altered 
Niebuhr's approach.
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3.3.1.2. Niebuhr encountered these in a very theologically influential and 
concentrated form during his sabbatical - visit to Europe in 1930-1931. He 
discovered that German theologians considered American theology to be 
deficient in its doctrine of God, but Niebuhr found German theology 
deficient in its ethics. Niebuhr saw the need for a transcendent view of 
God, Ewch that developed ty crisis theology, to correct the culture- 
bound moralism of liberalism with which Niebuhr was disillusioned. However 
Niebuhr did not sacrifice ethics to deity, as he felt some of the crisis 
theologians did, but he wanted to find a third way, or 'third piece', which 
would combine these two emphases.(Fowler 1974:57ff),
3.3.1.3. With this in mind, Niebuhr appropriated elements of Barth's
theocentric general theological approach but felt that it had to be
complemented by a more "worldly" emphasis. He was drawn to Tillich's
cultural theology in which God is present in all culture but undertook to
give it a more practical orientation.(Hoedemaker 1970:27; Kliever 1977:29- 
36)(1):
3.3. 1.4. As a result of his encounter with Barth and Tillich an idea 
began to crystallise in Niebuhr's mind how American and German theology 
might be reconciled. He believed that American empiricism might be 
combined with German transcendentalism. (2) Niebuhr identified three 
elements which he believed could make up his third missing piece, in 
theology between them in articles he wrote in the 1930's. A new 
theological synthesis would be
ampirical. while maintaining the Independence of God from
experience ....  yaluationml while preserving the priority of God
  UigtoricaL while accounting for the presence of
God (Kliever 1977:36). (3)
3.3.1.5. To develop such a synthesis for American theology, it seems, wes 
the chief purpose of Niebuhr's experiment in doing theology as history in 
The Kingdom of God in America, (Niebuhr 1941). in this work he attempts to 
define how the reality of divine transcendence or sovereignty has been 
related in history to human action and culture. Niebuhr sees this as the 
root problem of Protestantism. By stressing God's kingship it relativised
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the absolutism of the Catholic Church. However it threatened to replace 
this absolutism with various others of its own which in turn would be faced 
with a sceptical anarchism which again appealed to the immediacy of God's 
Kingship. The task of what Niebuhr calls "constructive Protestantism" is 
to steer a course between these two extremes. (Niebuhr 1941:15-44). In The 
Kingdom ...of. .God Niebuhr examines how American Protestantism had sought to 
achieve this balance. Niebuhr sees the cultural forms of Christianity as 
movements in which faith is expressed in the "overcoming kingdom". Above 
all he searches for the correct balance between human freedom and divine 
sovereignty and finds it in Jonathan Edwards, the great philosopher 
theologian of the American Great Awakening.
3.3. 1.6. At the centre of both Edwards' theology and philosophy was the 
supremacy, centrality and dominance of God. For Edwards, God is both Lord 
and King over all creation and the fundamental source and creation of
being.(Sandon 1976:102-113).(4)
3.3.1.7. Edwards also redefined personal freedom as freedom from sin 
through faith in God. This was very attractive to Niebuhr. This sense of 
freedom transformed people's concept of God. from a being who was feared as 
the enemy to one who is loved for his own sake and beauty. Edwards
completes the full transition from God as void to God as enemy to God as 
companion which Niebuhr believes Barth failed to make. (Fowler 1974:120-30; 
Niebuhr 1941:99-119).
3.3.1.8. In discovering and accepting Edwards at this time Niebuhr also 
discovered what he called the 'Great Tradition' which emphasises God's
sovereignty and man's sinfulness. He identified its members as Paul, John, 
Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Edwards, Pascal and Kierkegaard (Godsey 
1970:21). While these figures do have points of agreement it is doubtful 
that they can be taken as part of one line of development. What is
important to note is that these were the thinkers whose Influence Niebuhr 
was now consciously adopting for the further development of his theology 
and ethics.
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3.3.1.9, The roots of Niebuhr's radical monotheism are, then, to be found
in his struggle with American Christianity. He went to Germany with a
great dissatisfaction with American Liberalism, a dissatisfaction which he
found confirmed by German theology, especially that of Barth. However, he
wished also to maintain the practical emphasis on ethics which he felt was
the strength of American theology and the weakness of German theology. He
looked to a practical reinterpretation of Tillich's theology of culture to
provide such an emphasis and it is this that is partly enshrined in
Niebuhr's theory of value. Niebuhr left Germany with a profound conviction
of the importance of the '!otherness" of God and that the "Kingdom of God"
was in fact the essence of American Christianity and the basis of its
ethical concerns. In this light it might not be too much to claim that
part of Niebuhr's purpose in the Kingdom of God, was to discover if in
American theology the Kingdom of God had ever been placed in a conjunction
with God's otherness. (5) Niebuhr found just such a conjunction in Edwards
who opened up to him the whole Augustinlan and Calvlnlstic tradition in
theology. In Edwards Niebuhr found just the right balance between the
otherness of the divine in God's glory and perfection and the rule and
presence of God in the world. This was expressed in God's sovereignty and
sustaining providence as the one in whom all beings cohere and find the
source of their existence. In Troeltschian terms Niebuhr must have
believed that Edwards' theology with its dimensions of divine transcendence
and imminence was just the right cultural value to be brought into relation
with modern American theology. He believed it could provide a new
synthesis which would take American theology beyond its current Impasse.
Niebuhr's development of his radical monotheism is his attempt to arrive at
such a creative synthesis - which in many places he presents as a cultural 
synthesis.(Kliever 1977:37-45).
Ihe 3ha.pg of Radical Monotheism
3.3.2.1. t]^ centre of Niebuhr's radical monotheism is his concept of
God as the centre of being and centre of value.(Niebuhr 1922, 1941:115-39; 
Fowler 1974:167-76). Tlûs is given practical expression in Niebuhr's 
analysis of faith as commitment and loyalty to a centre of value.(Niebuhr 
1933:276-80). Ekch faith, Niebuhr argues, is am existential necessity for
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m n  who cannot live without relationships of trust and loyalty which 
require commitments to centres of faith. All henotheistic or polytheistic 
centres of value fail because they are too limited and come to grief over 
the universal scope of being. They only ever have a partial embrace of 
reality but can never include its entirety. Consequently these false areas 
of values flounder on the hidden reefs of those aspects of reality which 
they deny or whose existence they may only dimly perceive but cannot 
acknowledge without invalidating themselves. A fully consistent and 
enduring faith which is free from illusion is only possible on the basis of 
a coramitraeni. to the universal and an affirmation of the value of all that 
is.(Niebuhr 1960: 16-39, 114-19). Niebuhr seeks to buttress and
accommodate to Christian orthodoxy his existential affirmation of the 
ontological situation with his Christology and his language about God.
3.3.2.2. Niebuhr develops his Christology as an adjunct to his monotheism
and as a way of orientating it to his basic loyalty to the Christian
tradition. However, he reformulates traditional Christology to suit his 
monotheism and its existential ontology. Thus for him, to say that Christ 
is both human and divine in the traditional sense of Chalcedonian 
formulation and their international theology is to lapse into Christo- 
monisin and into a henotheistic and defensive faith.(6) Consequently
Niebuhr tries to represent the 'two natures' doctrine in terms of the
double movement from man to God (Jesus' humanity) or from God to man 
(Jesus' divinity). This does not, however, express the full intention of 
Chalcedon as Niebuhr has no concept of the pre-existence of Christ. He 
makes no mention of it whatsoever, not even to reject it, and his idea of 
Christ's resurrection is also vague and verges on the symbolic. Having 
said this, Jesus does play an important role in Niebuhr's theology. He is 
the exemplar of radical faith; he is the one in whom God displays his 
faithfulness. In Jesus God as the centre of being is shown to be faithful, 
benign and dependable. God is also disclosed as being the centre of value. 
Jesus further becomes the symbol through which people are integrated into 
the Christian community by reinterpreting their lives. Thus it is by 
looking at Christ and by responding to him that, in Niebuhr's rendering of 
the Christian faith, people attain to radical faith.(Niebuhr 1941:100-]43;
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1952:26 43; 1960:39-44; Fowler 1974:90-95; HoedjBaker 1970: 17-21; Kliever
1977:93-102).
3.3.2.3. Niebuhr's doctrine of the trinity develops along similar lines to
his Christology. He cannot accept the Hioene formulations of three persons
of one substance because it is contrary to the unitary concept of God which
his monotheism requires. This can in no way admit of any plurality in the
Godhead. (7) As a result Niebuhr develops an economic trinity of functions
in which God characteristically acts as Creator, Euler and Redeemer and
must be responded to as such. Again this is far from the intention of 
Nicea. (1946:371-384).
3.3.2.4. Niebuhr does affirm a personal concept of God (Niebuhr 1960:44-
3), but It is hard to see how he can substantiate this from the rest of his 
theology(8). How Is it that the "principle" or "structure" of being can 
exhibit traits of personality, have a life story, or freedom? Niebuhr 
might argue that this is the way that human beings must existential ly 
relate to the centre of being, but an illusion it remains - even If it is 
an exlstentially. necessary one.
3.3,2.5. Niebuhr's theology of culture, which for him covers religion,
politics, and science, is also highly dependent on his doctrine of God as
well as his analysis of faith. With it he makes a penetrating critique of
the parochial commitments in each of the areas he studies. Niebuhr
establishes that for religion, politics or science to function they must
have an orientation to the whole universe. Niebuhr's examination of the
scientific enterprise, which has its own faith and morality, is
particularly valuable in this regard. However the problem in Niebuhr's
theology of culture, as in his analysis of faith, is that of defining
coherently that universal to whom one should be orientated. All that he
allows is some kind of existential intuition from the course and structure
of life.(Niebuhr 1939:27; 1946:10, 240-45; 1952:129-133;. 1960:30-63; 78-69; 
93-99; 127-41).
3.3.2.6. In the evolution of, Niebuhr's radical monotheism there is also a 
clear movement on Niebuhr's part away from history toward existence and
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ontology. Miebuhr moved fixim some of Troeltsch's assumptions and
methods toward Tillich's method. He attempts to solve the problems cxf 
history, which he inherited from Troeltsch with existential and ontological 
methods which he had gleaned from Tillich.
3.3,2.7. Niebuhr's radical monotheism is, by and large, coherent and 
basically consistent. Its inconsistencies arise in connection with the 
traditional categories of theology with which it seeks to align itself - 
Chriptology, the doctrine of God, and the Trinity. The reason for this is 
that Niebuhr's radical monotheism is not so much theology in the usual 
sense as an interpretation of the acts of God as perceived from within a 
particular religious tradition. Instead it is a religious philosophy or 
existential theory of human life which attempts to use the categories and 
vocabulary of Christian faith and in so doing redefines them.
Bodice]-- Monotheism— Eeplacing__ Historical Peiati.,.- Religious
3.3.3.1. It would be wrong to think that Niebuhr's development of radical
monotheism and his consequent shift from history to ontology which it
entailed caused Niebuhr to lose sight of the problem of historical
relativism. For Niebuhr historical relativism was one of the unavoidable
conditions for all human thought (Niebuhr 1952a:94) and is still present in
the background of his monotheism, and Indeed is one of the factors in its 
development.
3.3.3.2. Troeltsch, in his approach to this problem, was afraid that 
historical relativism would lead to a. total relativism of values (an 
anarchy of values). He had tried to guard against this by his postulation 
of a cultural synthesis which has to be created in each age to establish 
the values that will govern that age. This was a combination of tradition 
and ideals in which the absolute is partially manifested giving these 
values their relative and temporary authority.
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3.3.3.3. During his re-orientation to monotheism in the 1930’s, Niebuhr 
rejected Troeltsch's concept of God which he felt was too closely 
identified with culture (Kliever 1977:29-36). He also rejected Troeltsch's 
process of historical (crisis) value formation, which he had sought to use 
^^ — S.QCi^-I— Spurc(r?.i with his adoption of value theory.
3.3.3.4. Instead of seeing God as the absolute which penetrates culture 
Niebuhr sees God as, in Edwards' terms, the centre of the harmony of being 
and the centre of value. The position of God in the universe as "the One 
beyond the many" and "the infinite principle of being" means that all other 
beings are related to the Deity and defined by that relation both 
ontologically and valuationally. No existence in this perspective has any 
meaning in itself, it only has meaning in relation to the One. The result 
of this is an ontological relativism in which all finite points and 
relationships are relativised and revalued in reference to the infinite 
centre of value.(10) Relativism, then, is a quality of existence. When 
applied to human beings it means that their knowledge, understanding, and 
valuing will always be relative to their ontological and existential 
position. This position is always changing as God redefines that position 
by enlarging their context and vision, and through the events of history.
3.3.3.5.- Historical relativism now becomes a special instance of 
ontological relativism as it is simply one of the factors which define and 
redefine the human situation in the universe. Given that, this is the 
nature of the universe before the One, it is a aberration of both faith and 
reason to take any position as absolute, since a sensible epistemology must 
accept relativism because it is in the nature of things (Niebuhr 1952:14).
3.3.3.6. Niebuhr's method of value formation in contrast to that of 
Troeltsch, is also ontological. Values are defined in relation to the One 
and not to societies or cultures. They will change as one's perception 
and situation are redefined by God,
3.3.3.7. Niebuhr thus confronts moral relativism but does so in a 
different way from Troeltsch. Niebuhr makes moral relativism an ethical 
necessity since no point of morality can be taken as absolute - it only has
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»ea„i„s as part of the relation between an 'existent' and the centre of
value which is Itself the only true absolute. Its contingent nature and
Its situatedness must be accepted. However this does not mean that human
beings can abandon values, or simply devise and select their own because
they are relative. Rather a system of values is forced upon them, being
determined by their relationship with the centre of being. Thus while
values are relative they are also inescapable, being defined by the
situation in which people must live and act. Values may not be transferred
from one situation to another, but there is no escaping them either; they
are ontologically necessary and inevitable. Just as much as the laws of 
nature.
3.3.3.8. So it is that Niebuhr transcends the problem of historical
relativism in which_ the conditions, perceptions and inperatives of any
historical moment are redefined and revalued by their relation to the One
beyond the many whom Niebuhr believes to be dependable, trustworthy and
faithful.(11) This is the basis for Niebuhr's objectivism or "beliefful 
realism".(Fadner 1975:41-57).
NIEBUHR'S TRANSFORMATIONIST ETHICS
Ihs... Development of Niebuhr's Sense of Re.cnnnsiMm-;,
3.4.1.1. Niebuhr's responsibalist ethics are very closely related to his 
monotheistic theology and grew up alongside it. Prior to 1930 Niebuhr 
still thought of ethics in liberal, social gospel and Troeltschian terms 
(Kliever 1977:46-47, Niebuhr 1929:3-6) as idealistic and dualistic - 
needing to be accommodated to the conditions and values of culture 
However after 1930-1931 when Niebuhr experienced his 'conversion' to 
radical monotheism he began to explore an ethic which related to God's 
priority and God's action in history. This exploration came to expression 
in Niebuhr's debate with his brother, Eeinhold, over the nature of God's 
presence and action in history in relation to human conflict in 
1932.(Niebuhr 1932a, 1932b, R.Niebuhr 1932).
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ra e. is a withdrawal In repantence from the cycle of self-assertion in 
story and a call to others to do likewise. The aim of withdrawal is to 
c ear a path for God's action which is free from the vanity of both
them d from proud attempts to manipulate
toward humanly devised goals or idols. This is necessary for God to
■
articles basic conviction further in a series of
"'-Id Var. (Niebuhr 1942a: 1942b:
= Z S Z S  r.t.r-:ïr
2) . author of all action and all events. (Niebuhr 1942a:630-
*“  '■ p“ " I" » . . .
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3.4.1.4. In the 1930's pieces, the correct inoral response to God's action 
was seen' by Niebuhr as waiting passively and purposefully for the divine 
action in all historical events to come to its culmination. In his war 
articles, Niebuhr strikes a much more active note. Now the correct moral 
response is to act in the light of God's present action. (12) The question 
"What must I do?" must be preceded by the question "What is God 
doing?"(Niebuhr 1942a:630). This identification of correct moral action 
will be of great importance to the development of Niebuhr's contextual 
ethic and he defines it for the first time in these articles.
3.4.1.5. However, to act in the light of God's action one must first make 
an interpretation of the pattern of divine action. The interpretations 
which Niebuhr makes of God's action in the war is that God is acting in 
remedial judgement and that the whole situation resembles the crucifixion. 
This means that one must act first to restrain the aggressing party from 
injuring one's neighbour, who should always be one's main concern. 
Secondly, one should intervene to protect the weak and innocent whenever 
one can. Thirdly, it means that after the war, when God's judgement on all 
nations has been completed, or at least this stage of it, there must be a 
generous international settlement in which forgiveness is exercised so that 
the offending nations are restored to the community of civilised nations. 
Fourthly, and most importantly, as God's action takes the form of remedial 
judgement and crucifixion it means that all parties must accept their guilt 
and repent; none may see themselves as more righteous or morally superior 
to those whom they oppose. This means that any thought of judgement must 
be put aside and forgiveness offerred instead as all stand under 
judgement.(Niebuhr 1943:208-210).
3.4.1.6. The shift Richard made in these later articles may have taken 
place under the force of his brother's earlier injunction that Christians 
must have some present responsibility for society beyond anticipated 
waiting and palliative action.(Reinhold Niebuhr 1932:468-9). It seems that 
Niebuhr accepts this criticism but he redefines it in his own terms; that 
one must decide to whom one is responsible and for what. In a further 
article of 1946 (Niebuhr 1946b) Niebuhr defines the Christian's social 
responsibility as being that of being responsible to. God for society. This
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means that in exercising; its social responsibility the church does not 
merely have to react to the crises and demands of society. Rather it must 
respond to God's action as Creator, Ruler and Redeemer of society. (Niebuhr 
1946b). This is the first occurrence of Richard Niebuhr's concept of 
responsibility, and indicates, along with Niebuhr's war articles, the 
development of a relational ethic. Niebuhr understands this as acting in 
the light of God's action of creation and redemption, rather than out of 
loyalty to the universal community of being for which one is responsible.
3.4. 1.7. In an encyclopaedia entry, published two years later in 1945 
(Niebuhr 1945), Niebuhr's ethics advance a little further along these lines 
and draws the ideas he was articulating in 1942-43 closer together. Here 
he makes his famous distinction, for the first time in print, (13) between 
teleological and deontological ethics (Niebuhr 1945c:259-60), while at the 
same time describing Christian ethics as
 that part of Christian theology which deals with the
principle of human response to divine action in creation, 
revelation and redemption.(Niebuhr 1945c;259-66).
The. Subsequent Development of Niebuhr's Ethics
3.4.2.1. Niebuhr's thought in the early 1950's was centred, on providing an 
analysis of the conditions and processes implied in making the kind of 
responsive decisions to God's action which he had originated in the 1940's. 
This analysis takes two parts. Firstly in Evangelical Ethics (Godsey 
1920:86-93; Irish 1973:9-12) and in Christ and Culture (Niebuhr 1952a), 
Niebuhr looks at the human side of such decisions. He is particularly 
concerned with their existential context and conditions and the faith and 
relationships in which people must stand in order to make them. Secondly, 
in his analysis of 'missionary motivation' Niebuhr sets out the divine 
conditions of life in the world to which human beings must respond.(Niebuhr 
1951). Niebuhr summaries this double analysis in his essay on Biblical 
Ethics in the collection edited by himself and Waldo Beech (Niebuhr 1955) 
by defining Biblical ethics, and so Christian ethics, as a dialogue between 
God and humanity. Christian ethics, he says, begins and ends with God, and
149
while it sometimes takes the form of laws, it defines good and evil in
relationship to the neighbour and in terms of attitudes to God. (Niebuhr
1955:10-16).
3.4.2.2. In this material one also detects a remarkable coherence between 
Niebuhr's developing ethics of response and his radical monotheism. His 
doctrines of God and of faith are particularly important as a foundation 
undergirding his ethics. In many respects Niebuhr's contextual ethics are 
simply an extension of Niebuhr's theology of radical monotheism to the 
sphere of morality.
3.4.2.3. In these pieces of the early 1950's all the main elements of 
Niebuhr's responsibilist theory of ethics are present. They remain only to 
be synthesised into a unity which he does in his posthumous work The
Responsible Self which he presented first as lectures in 1960.
3.4.2.4. Niebuhr begins this work by comparing three symbols or metaphors 
of the moral life which have been highly influential in history. The first 
is that of deontological ethics which operates on the 'Man-the-Citizen'
model of humanity and seeks to answer moral problems by asking "What law 
must I obey?". The second is that of teleological ethics which operates on 
the model of 'Man-the-Maker'■ and starts with the question "What shall I 
do?". Niebuhr finds both of these theories inadequate, the first 
subjecting the good to the right, and the second the right to the good. 
This problem cannot, he maintains, be avoided by combining the two theories 
developed by Plato and Aristotle respectively. It is hinted at by 
Aristotle s doctrine of the mean which Niebuhr sees as parallel to his
ideal of a 'fitting' response. Niebuhr sees the same in the Stoic stress
on rational response to the world, and in Spinoza's idea of the proper
interpretation of reality. However Niebuhr believes that the 'proof' for 
this theory is actually found in the experience of human suffering which is 
not created by the self and so is an external force, but not one amenable 
to law. The self thus has to decide what is going on in its suffering and 
respond accordingly. Neither the deontological nor teleological theories,
Niebuhr holdts, can explain what is happening in suffering.
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however, In his lectures w&ich present God zns Creator, which means tlmt 
humanity must respond with reverence for the whole of creation; as 
Sustainer or Ruler and Judge, to whom all must respond by accepting the 
limits God imposes on their lives through nature and through others, and as 
Redeemer, to whom human beings must respond by transforming all their
values.(Niebuhr 1963:24-41, of Fowler 1974:151-211).
3.4.2.9. Niebuhr's responsibilist theory of ethics grows up steadily 
alongside his monotheism. In fact it is basically an extension of this 
monotheism. Viewed as a system Niebuhr's theology and ethics form a highly 
consistent unity. This being the case the same problems that were
encountered in Niebuhr's monotheism will also be encountered in his ethics. 
It IS no easier to define the One who is present in all actions and events
than it was to define the One who is the centre of being. God is simply
the confluence or convergence of events, if there is such a thing. This is 
identical to Niebuhr's ontological definition of God in his theology - that 
God is the convergence or confluence of being.(14)
THE INTEGRATING THEME: TRANSFORMATION
3.5.1. The Christian religion, like all other great religions, for
Niebuhr, has a vital task within human life in which it often fails. Its
function is to transform or convert human life by turning it from
particular commitments and perspectives by relativising them and then 
reorientating them to the universal. It is with this in mind that Niebuhr 
formulates both his radical monotheism and his responsibilist ethics; it is 
the clear imperative which stands behind both and which purpose both serve. 
This much is clear from the survey of Niebuhr's thought undertaken in this 
chapter.
3.5.2. The notion of transformation finds considered articulation in The
Meaning of Eavelation where Niebuhr states that he conceives the
relationship between natural religion and revealed religion as one of 
transformation rather than replacement (Niebuhr 1941:IX-XI). For Niebuhr, 
natural religion arises out of human psychological and social needs for
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all events. This makes possible a new interpretation of the world in 
monotheistic faith -which is able to act and decide freely within the 
constraints of the moment in response to God's action as Creator, Govenor, 
and Redeemer.(Niebuhr 1963:136-145),
3.5.6. Human cultures are transformed through the relativisation of their 
history and henotheistic faith and values. These are identified as limited 
and transitory and can have meaning only if they are re—intei pieted and 
revalued by the Absolute. Politics, science and religion will only
function in a creative way if they are re-orientated away from narrow 
traditional and cultural perspectives to the universal commonwealth of 
being. A society's history, culture and tradition can only have lasting 
meaning if it is re-interpreted and re-appropriated in the light of that 
absolute universal which Niebuhr calls 'God'.(Niebuhr 1939:19-35; 1960:38
39; 1963:90-107).
3.5.7. In all of these transformations the self too is transformed as its 
history and relationships are changed. It reinterprets its own life as it 
sees itself and all others as having value to God and so locates itself 
within the universal community of being. The self thus learns to see all 
action upon itself as God's action and learns to respond accordingly as it 
comes to believe in the principle of being as good and reliable. By all 
these conversions the self's being is redefined so that it no longer serves 
its ovm narrowly defined causes, but the cause of being. It is this, in 
fact, which is the theme of the Responsible gell.
3.5.8. The means by which these transformations take place is Jesus Christ 
v/ho discloses the will and nature of the one God. The symbol of Christ 
relativises all human commitments, activities and accomplishments, and then 
relates people to God. This new relation to God enables them to respond to 
God's will and purpose resulting in the transformation of their lives and 
action.(Niebuhr 1952:26-43; 1963:162-178).
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3.5.9. The accumulative effect of these transformations is a permanent 
revolution (Mebuhr 1941:128-129), in which actions, faith, commitments, 
history and values are all relativised by their own historical contingency 
and by God's absoluteness. They are then transformed by being reorientated
from a focus on the limited and partial to a focus on the unlimited and
universal. That this process should occur again and again is due to 
several causes. Firstly, to the tendency of human beings to henothelsm.
Secondly, to the relative nature of all history and culture. Thirdly to
the movement and action of God interpreted as the advance of the divine 
purpose to the eschaton, which is implied in Hlebuhr's thought. This 
movement revises and changes the relations and values of things.
3.5.10. Thus the central thrust of Klebuhr's thought is clear, but what is 
unclear is the content of the universal toward which all being is to be
orientated. Without a clear picture of the identity of God the character 
of the universal, benign or otherwise, simply cannot be identified.
NIEBUHR'S ADVANCE ON TROELTSCH
3.6.1. Having given an overview of Niebuhr's theology and ethics and noted
Its starting point in the problems of Troeltsch'ss theology of culture it
would be appropriate to review Niebuhr's theology in the light of this
starting point.
3.6.2. In the first place, Niebuhr resolves Troeltsch's problem of 
historical relativism by subsuming it under the ontological relativism 
produced by his monotheism. It is not only the position of values, 
traditions, and ideas in time which make these things relative, it is their 
position in being, because they are to be valued and interpreted by their 
relation to infinite and not merely within their cultural context. Niebuhr 
solves, the problem of history by replacing it with the problem of being.
In fact, historical relativism is simply a particular example of the
precariousness of all 11 fe before God. This also makes room for 
revelation. Rather than revelation being undermined by relativism,
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revelation actually produces relativism by relating all things to the
principle of being before which everything is relativised.
3.6.3. Niebuhr's radical monotheism also enables him to go beyond
Troeltsch's identification of the forces of God and the forces of culture,
and the values of God and the values of culture. In Troeltsch's theology
God as the immanent Absolute is directly related to each and every culture
through its cultural synthesis. In this synthesis something of the
ultimate purpose of history is manifested giving the values of the
synthesis divine sanction (they become relatively absolute). Niebuhr felt
that this was too close an Identification of God and culture. While he
relates God directly to each culture, he interprets that presence to mean
the judgement and transformation of cultural values rather than their
sanction. Troeltsch defined the relation between God and culture in the
way that he did in order to give some kind of authoritative undergirding to
relative values. Niebuhr avoids the amoral consequences of relativism by
making those values and responses which emerge out of their relationship
with God, at a particular place and time, obligatory for human beings.
Thus it is in the relationship to God that relatively absolute values are 
to be found and not in culture.
3.6.4. Troeltsch held a dualism between universal and absolute values and
contingent cultural historical values; between spirit and history. Niebuhr
dissolves this dualism in his radical monotheism (which identifies God as
the centre of value (Troeltsch's absolute value)), by defining God as the
principle of being and author of all events (Troeltsch's cultural-
historical process), with the result that all values, both those of
conscience, and those of history exist only in relation to God. Further,
because values are relationally defined, they are not changeless and
absolute. Only God is absolute. Moreover the same one who values all is
also the one who is active in all historical events, so that there is never
a question of relating history to the will of God; history is the will of 
God.(15)
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3.6.5. Lastly, and most significantly, Niebuhr replaces Troeltsch's 
concept of compromise as the basis of the cultural synthesis with that of 
transformation which becomes the proper task and function of religion. 
This enables Niebuhr to require religion to have a great deal more impact 
on culture and society without itself being accommodated to its values. It 
means that in the cultural synthesis he is able to look for, and demand, 
more on the part of religion. Religion, or rather radical faith now 
becomes the senior partner in the synthesis rather than the junior, as in 
Troeltsch, by demanding that culture turn from its limited commitment to a 
universal commitment.
3.6.6. Niebuhr's approach to the problems of history and culture does 
represent a clear advance on the positions that Troeltsch took. His 
transformations of the problems of history into the problems of being make 
them soluble ontologically and theologically. Faith and revelation are 
given a more positive place in the world rather than trying to merely 
protect them from the threats of history as did Troeltsch. Niebuhr's
radical monotheism also allows him to say all that Troeltsch wanted to say
about the immediacy of God to culture but without the damaging consequence
of God being identified with culture. Lastly, Niebuhr's substitution of 
conversion or transformation for compromise as the aim of religion and the 
cultural synthesis is probably his most crucial advance on Troeltsch(16), 
since it avoids the subordination of religion or faith to culture and seeks 
the renewal of culture by radical faith. This is altogether a more worthy 
and positive programme than the simple attempt to stave off the anarchy of 
values that occupied Troeltsch. Niebuhr is concerned with the
transformation of cultural values rather than their stability and 
preservation.
THE RELATION OF NIEBUHR'S THEOLOGY AND ETHICS TO HIS TYPOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS 
ORIENTATION
3.7,1. It is how possible, after having comprehensively reviewed Niebuhr's 
theology and ethics and indicated their relationship to Troeltsch's
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thought, to tentatively suggest how they relate to Niebuhr's typology or 
religious orientation.
3.7.2. Troeltsch had used his typologies of religious orientation as a 
tool in his ethics and theology of culture - to Illustrate Its rain themes 
within the history of Christian ethics. Thus church, sect and mysticism 
are all used to show patterns of compromise, corporate and individual
religion, and of absolute and relative ethics.
3.7.3. As Niebuhr adopts much of Troeltsch's methods it would only be
natural to assume that he will use typologies of religious association in a
similar manner: to Identify patterns of faith: of monotheism and henothelsm 
and polytheism; of responsibility and irresponsibility, of relatedness to 
God or being and to culture, of particularism and universalisa.
3.7.4. Secondly, just as Troeltsch used his typology in a normative
fashion - classifying his types by their degree of compromise and assessing
them accordingly, it might be reasonable to suppose that Niebuhr would do
the^ same. In which case It should be anticipated that Niebuhr, having
defined the cultural task of Christian Institutions as that of
'transformation' should in turn classify and assess their representative
types according to their success in this task. Whether or not this is so 
v/ill be made plain in the next chapter.
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interests it is irresponsible.. In this discussion Niebuhr alsx; 
allows I or the use of coercion but does not indicate what kind of 
coercion, nor under what circumstances it should be used, nor the 
extent to which it should be used. (McFaul 1974:141-143).
This piece of work set the tone for Niebuhr's writings of 1942 and 
1943 in  ^ which he carefully examines the motives both of 
coercionists' and pacifists without giving explicit sanction to 
either position. What is also different in these later articles, 
and^ stands in contrast to the pieces of 1932-1934 is that the 
Christian's task is not to passively wait for God's action to come 
to completion in the future, he must react to it in the present. 
For Niebuhr this seems to mean, reading between the lines of his 
articles, responding to the crucifixion of the innocent by 
restraining the aggressors and co-operating with God's use of the 
nations to bring them to judgement and redemption. This certainly 
entails the use of coercive force.
This movement from a strict non-resistant position to a very subtle
just war' position which defines the justness of a war, and the
side which one consequently chooses to support, by reference to
God's action within it of judgement and redemption, seems to have
two sources. The first is that Christians have a responsibility to
act to restrain sin (here it seems that Richard Niebuhr was
influenced by his brother's argument). second source of this
change was the further development of Niebuhr's contextual or
responsiblist ethics in which decisions are to be made on the basis
of the circumstances of the context, and of God's action within the
context. This meant that he could no longer maintain the strict
.principle of non-resistance which he took from the example of
Jesus. Niebuhr is now concerned with God's immediate actions in
contemporary events, not the outcome of these actions in the
future, as was Jesus. Niebuhr's vision is now tactica] and not 
strategic.
It IS for this reason that I cannot go along with McFaul's 
contention that Niebuhr's pacifism was a response to the 
circumstances of the times.(McFaul 1974:41-43). This is to read 
back^ into the 1930's ideas which he only fully developed in the 
1940's. In the 1930's Niebuhr was concerned with understanding the 
strategy of God's action in history, as disclosed by Jesus. This, 
to him, demands non-resistant renunciation of self-assertive and 
aggressive action to allow God's purposes in history to come to 
their completion. I%r the 1940's Niebuhr's focus has narrowed to 
the action of God in one's immediate context to which one must 
respond and co-operate. He is concentrating on the tactical level 
of God's actions. This is a significant shift perhaps brought 
about by the urgency of events between 1934 and 1940 with the rise 
of Hitler and the advance of the Second World War.
13. Fowler records that Niebuhr was discussing teleological and 
deontological ethics, and 'Man as Responder* to the action of God 
as Creator, Governor and Redeemer from this date, though it seems
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from this article he speaks of God's action as that of Creator, 
Revealer, and Redeemer.(Fowler 1974:148-149).
14. All that is possible is a resigned aquiescence in the face of the
relentless movement of being to its finale. This is the attitude 
of the stoics and Spinoza.whom Niebuhr greatly admired. But this 
attitude is only possible if 'being' can be perceived as having a 
single direction or good and is not, in fact, merely a chaotic 
interaction of arbitrary forces. In Niebuhr's judgement 'being' 
does have a meaningful unity but this could simply be his own 
'hopeful projection'.
Two contradictions in Niebuhr's conception of God are also exposed 
by his understanding of 'being' - that Niebuhr's God is both amoral 
and apersonal.
In the first place, if God is merely the 'centre of being', defined 
in terms of 'principle' or 'structure', then terras of value make no 
sense when applied to 'God'. If God's value is ontologically 
defined, then the dimension of freedom no longer exists in the 
deity. All that remains are the amoral inevitabilities of the flux 
of being which determine 'God's' existence.
In the second place, if God. is the 'centre' or 'principle' of 
being, as by ontological necessity, then 'God' may not be a person 
in any meaningful sense. Personality is only possible where 
freedom, self-consciousness and responsiveness to others exist. 
Niebuhr's God has none of these qualities and so may not be known 
as a person. (Niebuhr's entire episteraology is also undermined at 
this point as it depends on a personal ground for knowing).
By defining 'God' in terms of being as ontological necessity, 
Niebuhr has stripped away all elements of personality and morality 
from the deity. It might be possible to say that being has a 
'centre', whether this is comprehensible is doubtful, but it is not 
possible to ascribe either personality or value to this centre 
since it is merely the confluence of necessary forces which can 
hardly be said to be moral in nature. It is at this point that 
Niebuhr's radical monotheism collapses into an amoral ontological 
monism.
It is interesting to note that both Tillich and Barth avoided these 
contradictions. Tillich did so by placing 'God' outside of being, 
as its 'ground'. Barth, on the other hand, began with 'God's' 
personality and defined everything else on the basis of this 
premise. In this Barth stands closer than Niebuhr to the Christian 
tradition.
15. But this brings the wheel full circle, for if history is God's
will, then God is responsible for historical evil, the very thing 
that he sought t o ' avoid with his original dualistic theology. 
Niebuhr does try to avoid the consequences by interpreting such 
evil as God's will through the model of crucifixion but to do so
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only restates the problem: does God crucify Jesus and all the
innocents of history, or do human beings? If history is si mply the 
expression of God's will where does the freedom of human action, in 
which Niebuhr seems to believe, fit into the picture? In any case 
I am not sure if 'innocence' is quite the right word to describe 
Jesus' attitude as he faced the cross. It was a deliberate, choice 
for him, it is not for many others.
16. After the Social Sources Niebuhr says little about the cultural
synthesis, yet it is clear that this, or something like it, is his 
purpose; he is seeking the renewal and reorientation of Western 
culture through radical faith.
164
CHAPTER 4
THE ORIENTATION QF CHURCH,TO CULTURE IN THE THOUGHT OF H. RICHARD NTHRIJHR.
INTRODUCTION
4.1.1. This chapter begins with an examination of the dialectic which is 
found to be crucial to Niebuhr's whole development of his typological 
appioach. Attention is then given to Niebuhr's early church—sect— 
denomination typologÿ. Particular stress is placed upon its ethical
intent as a means of exposing the disunity of the Church and establishing a 
strategy for its recovery. Niebuhr's growing disillusionment with the 
general approach of this kind of typology is also noted. The next section 
then examines Niebuhr's later five-fold typology which found expression in 
Christ— and— Culture. The source of this new typology is located in 
Niebuhr s encounter with Gilson's classification of different solutions to 
the problem of revelation and reason which he gave in his Reason and 
Revelation— l_n— the— Middle— Ages. (Gilson 1932). Each of Niebuhr's five types 
are carefully examined in relation to Troeltsch's and Gilson's typologies, 
and in relation to Niebuhr's withdrawal-engageraent dialectic. This is 
followed by a summary and critical review of Niebuhr's whole typological 
approach. Niebuhr s approach is severely criticised for its tendency to 
distort the positions which it presents and its obscuring of others which 
it does not, This occurs because of the bias of the typological approach 
toward one particular type. The chapter concludes by relating the 
development of Niebuhr's typology to that of his theology and ethics, 
arguing that the problems in Niebuhr's typology arise from problems in his 
thought as a whole.
4.1.2. The general argument offered here is that Niebuhr's typologies,
like Troeltsch's, are vehicles of his theology and so demonstrate the 
superiority of one preferred type over others which’ are then viewed as 
pathological. As a result of this Niebuhr's typology becomes a pathology
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of dysfunctional cultural relationships, in which the preferred type 
also, inevitably, included.
WITHDRAWAL AND ENGAGEMENT
Orienta....
4^2.1.1. mehuhr's work In his typologies of religious orientation see,^ 
to be an expression of different polarities, He has an Institution- 
-unrty dualism which seems to be the Implicit content of his church and 
act types, especially as it appears in his writing of 1945 (Hlebuhr 1945a;
re e.ence restating his two polar referents as 'Christ' and 'Culture', 
n erlyrng both these typologies Is Niebuhr's dialectic of withdrawal and
engagementd) which Implicitly Informs his whole treatment of different
types of religious orientation. (2).
2^ :::::: c  : : :  :z c
represent an engagement with the world which sooner or later leads to 
accommodation or compromise with culture. The second type is Its
counterpart which. In reaction to the Church's compromise, calls for its 
disengagement from the world that it might be restricted to loyalty to Its 
Head, and to purity for its God. The strengthening of the Church to which 
lis eado will in turn create a momentum for an aggressive re-engagement 
in culture. Niebuhr's two polar types represent, as will be made clear, a 
eye e of withdrawal and engagement which forms the Church's perpetual 
response to culture and also informs the other types in Niebuhr's
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" (Of Fowler 1974: 39-46; Kllever
, , ■ " introduction to this book Niebuhr argues that he and his
emporaries are living through a time when the Church Is threatened by
■mi
orders. (Niebuhr 1935a: 1-4).
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4.2.2.3. Niebuhr develops the contention that the church must detach 
itself fi oiD the world in his article in this volume; Toward the 
Independence of— the— CiutDch- In this article he describes the relationship 
between church and civilisation as a cycle of alliance and withdrawal. The 
church launches an aggressive assault on non-Christian societies until 
these civilisations, being 'converted', accept an alliance with the church. 
The church then grows corrupt as the civilisations it sponsored decline and 
become corrupt. The only remedy for this is a withdrawal by which the 
church itself might be converted anew and prepared for a new aggressive 
assault on civilisation. Niebuhr denies the possibility of attacking
civilisation without this withdrawal. For Niebuhr the central question for 
any Christian is to discern where the church stands in its time; whether it 
should retreat from the world, or attack it. Niebuhr feels that for
Christians of his time the choice has to be one of retreat in order to 
prepare for a new assault. However, Niebuhr stresses that it is not
^^vlllsation itself which is the church's enemy. The real enemy is 
worldliness which corrupts the church. Niebuhr defines worldliness as 
Lflolatry and lust ; the first being the perversion of worship and the second 
the perversion of love. It is this, Niebuhr contends, that holds the
church captive. (Niebuhr 1935a: 123-128).
4.2.^.4. Niebuhr proceeds, in Uie— Independence of the church, to describe 
the captivity of the church to capitalism, nationalism, and 
anthropocentrism . The church's liberation from these bondages is to be 
found in an internal revolt which is motivated by a love for the church and 
which steers its own independent course orientated to the Gospel. The 
revolt ideally avoids entanglement with other ideologies and protests.
Ultimately, the only freedom which the church may find -from cultural 
captivity is captivity to God. (Niebuhr 1935a: 120-154).
4.2.2.0. Yet this path to liberation, Niebuhr warns, will be far from easy 
since any church which seeks to assert its independence will find itself, 
once more, in a familiar dualistic tension.
There is no easy way in which the Church can divorce itself from 
the world. It cannot flee into asceticism, nor seek refuge again 
in the inner life of the spirit. The road to independence and to 
aggression is not one which leads straight forward on one level.
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How to be In the world and not of the world has always been the
5Z:r%:S:5 ■
one of the important problems of a Church moving toward its 
independence. (Niebuhr 1935a; 154-155),
4.2.2.6. In these two works Niebuhr sets the general strategy of
withdrawal which he advocated in his earlier writings into a general
pattern or framework and which he argues has occurred several times in
history. This serves to make the strategy far more comprehensible to his
audience and consequently far more commendable as a course of action. In
addition to this he substantiates what he hints at in the . S o c ia l  H n n r r o c ,
and reiterates in Christ and Culture, that withdrawal from culture and
engagement within culture are both the solution and part of the problem of
the church's relation to civilisation. Thus the answer to this question,
least at this stage, for Niebuhr, lies in the process or pattern of
movement between the two poles of withdrawal and engagement and in
determining one's place in that process. However, to pursue one or other
of these options to the exclusion of the other is to give a seriously false
answer to the problem of Christ and culture. In Niebuhr's words it is to
dissolve the dualism In which the church necessarily exists in being in the
world but not of the world, of being both called to God and sent into the
world. This dualism may be dissolved by an exclusive emphasis on
withdrawal into the 'monism' of other-worldllness, and of passive waiting
for an ahistorical eschaton; or into the monism of a this worldly reform
programme which leaves the world substantially as it found it. The church
as a revolutionary society can be content with neither of these responses.
Its business is to prepare the way for God's transformation of human life 
within history.(3)
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4.2.2.7. Niebuhr says nothing new in the Kiagdnm_ai_&al about the process 
of withdrawal and engagement but he does seek to give It a grounding In
history. Hitherto it has simply been a theory to which he has alluded. 
Niebuhr finds the historical expression of this process In the orientation 
of the different groups within the Protestant movement. That is to say in 
the dualistic tension between church and world under which all these groups 
lived, and in the cycle of prophetic and institutional forms through which 
these groups developed as a movement.
4.2.2.8. Niebuhr's next treatment of the Vlthdrawal-Engagement theme 
occurs in his seminal article 'The Responsibility of the Church for the 
World' (Niebuhr 1946) which plays a very significant role in the 
development of his 'ethics. Niebuhr begins by acknowledging that the 
question of the church's responsibility for society is a difficult one; 
neither Jesus nor his disciples found an easy answer to it. This leads to 
a paradoxical attitude toward culture which later found expression In the 
antithetical types of Christian organisation; the culture defending 
"churches" and withdrawing "sects". This problem, adds Niebuhr, is rooted 
in the nature of both church and society. It is most acute in the present 
time since the church is located in many societies which are on the point 
of death; either from abject poverty, or from anxiety, despite great 
affluence. These are the same nations which the church has taught and 
formed, thus its sense of responsibility for them, and its feeling of guilt 
and inadequacy in the face of the failure of their Christian cultures is 
great.(Niebuhr 1946: 111-114)
4.2.2.9. Niebuhr defines the church's 'responsibility' as being 
responsible for the world to God. The purpose of this responsibility is 
the conversion and redemption of everything in the world and not its 
judgement whl(^ remains God's right. 'content' the church's
responsibility, says Niebuhr, is mercy. (Niebuhr 1946:114-120).
4.2.2.10. Niebuhr uses this definition, first of all, in a negative sense
to analyse patterns Irresponsibility iUnst have occurred In the
church.
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Two sources of temptations seem especially prevalent in history, 
the temptation to worldliness and the one to isolationism. In 
the case of the former the to whom, in the case of the latter the 
iili:. .what of responsibility is mistakenly defined. (Niebuhr 1946: 
120) .
4.2.2.11. The Worldly— Church is a church which becomes responsible to 
society for God rathen than responsible to God for society. It operates on 
the basis of approval of society, especially of the rich and powerful 
within it as it, itself, enjoys the trappings of power. Most often it is 
allied with the existing social order (4) but it may also ally itself with 
revolutionary forces. Its chief sin is that it substitutes a group for 
God, whether it be class, nation, or even humanity which is finite. It 
most often takes a conservative option from a legitimate desire for order, 
though it sometimes follows a revolutionary path out of a concern for the 
reformation of society.(Niebuhr 1946: 120-122). The church which has 
become "worIdly" in this manner will engage in false prophecy and false 
priesthood. It will proclaim the security and divine sanction of a culture 
or a cause, and threaten those who dissent with divine punishment. It will 
believe that all supreme values are manifested in the group it has made 
absolute. The worldly church will also seek to cultivate through religious 
means those virtues which will support its culture or ideology as a kind of 
sacrifice for God's favour. Niebuhr states that this kind of church 
represents a tendency to look at all questions of human values from the 
perspective of society both as their justification and their source. 
(Niebuhr 1946: 122-124).
When the Church has accepted this view of itself it has given 
evidence of its complete fall into worldliness for now it has 
substituted civilisation or society for God as author and end of 
its being. (Niebuhr 1946: 124).
4.2.2.12. Niebuhr believes that the worldliness of the churches developed 
as a reaction to the isolationism of these same churches in the past. The 
Church which seeks isolation is aware that it is accountable to God in 
Christ but believes that the body for which it is accountable is only 
itself. Thus it seeks its own growth, health, and continuation apart from 
the world which it rejects as being impure and sinful. The world must be 
avoided since contact with it brings corruption. It denies its
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accountability for the world of which God is the Creator - seeing itself as
the Ark of Salvation. Niebuhr sees much evidence of this attitude in the 
Christianity of the first and second centuries, in the monasteries, in the 
Protestant sects, and in the currents of Protestant individualism. 
(Niebuhr 1940: 124ff).
4.2.2.J3. For Niebulw these two forms of irresponsibility are
interdependent in that either extreme calls forth its antithesis. He is 
concerned that the tendency in the early twentieth century to worldliness 
will produce a counter-movement toward isolation. The solution to the 
question of tesponsibi 1 ity is not to be found in either extreme, nor in a 
compiomise between the two options. The answer is to be found in attending 
to the two aspects of Christian responsibility in a proper way so that 
neither aie confused or separated, but maintained in the 'unity of 
responsibility to God for the neighbour'.(Niebuhr 1946: 126).
a
4. .£,.2. 14. Lastly, Niebuhr discusses the strategy that a properly
lespomniole church will pursue. He notes thal: the church's
1esponsibi1ity to God for society will vary with changing situations and 
positions he feels that its strategy (%in still described in
geneial lashion. Firstly, Niebuhr says, the church has an apostolic duty 
1.0 proclaim the Gospel message that at the heart of all being is good ness 
and love as shown by God-in-Christ, not only to individuals but also to 
groups such as societi es and nations. It fails in this responsi bi1i tv
unless it finds an appropriate way to make an address to these 
collectivities. Niebuhr argues that the church has not yet crossed the 
bridge from an individualistic to a social reality. When it does address 
society it often speaks of it as a physical body rather than as a spirii.ual 
reality, and so concerns itself only with prosperity and peace. The church
must pi Liclai m the need for repentance - the message of grace arid
forgiveness is not rig;htly heard without, this note. Moreover corporate and 
not merely individual sins must be condemned, such as the evils of the 
Nazis .and t.he saturation bombing of the Allies, Nor is it: enough, merely t;o 
addre.ss prominent individuals: people in their communities must be
appr oached. Tire church must, change i i..s methods of pro.clamati on to serve
^Dth God Neighbour. Secondly, a response to Christ-in-God tl^
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cbt.rcb also has a responsibility, as the Shepherd of the lost, to care for 
the 'lost sheep' of society; for the poor, sick and downtrodden, both 
directly and in working for social, political and economic change in 
society. In this connection lllebuhr notes that many of the leaders of the 
SoiliarGasiiai movement were inner-city pastors. The church is also called 
to extend the s,ame concern to entire nations; to defeated nations, and to 
victorious nations in moral danger. Thirdly, the church is a social 
pioneer. Mlebuhr sees the church as that part of society which responds to 
God as the representative of the rest of society and pioneers renentance 
and change because it has the Word and the Spirit of God. Thus it has the 
active responsibility to identify the sins of society and repent of them on 
Its behalf and be freed from them within itself as a pioneer of new life. 
Klebuhr likens this to the representative responsibility of the Hebrew 
propnets and the prophetic remnant, and of Christ who acted on the part of 
mankind. Thu.s, in the case of slavery, the Church recognised this 
evil, purged it from itself and worked for its abolition. It must do the 
same in the case of the abuses of wealth and property and in the race issu.v 
otherwise its voice will be hollow. The church does this, not in order to 
secure its own holiness or salvation, but to bring the world to repentance 
as Christ brought the elect to repentance. This form of pioneering or 
representative responsibility(5) is the highest form of social 
responsibility to which the church can aspire(6). (Hiebuhr 1946:126-132).
4.2,2.15. In 'The Responsibility of the Church for the 'World' Hlebuhr for 
the first time identifies the extreim poles of his withdrawal engagement 
dialectic with sect .and church, an identification which had only been 
implicit before. Hiebuhr also gives his clearest de.scription and criticism 
yet of the disconnected extremes that this dialectic c.an produce in terms 
of the worldly and isolationist churches. However. change of note also 
occurs with regard to the way Hlebuhr values the process. Hiebuhr relates 
the process to his theory of responsibility and he changes some of the 
nspects of the dialectic. The withdrawal of the church to God is restated 
ir, the responsibility theory as accountability to God, and the movement of 
-uur.,h finiii be... to I.lie World is restated as accountability to God for 
society. The result of this i.s that Niebuhr is no longer concerned with 
clijr,.h s strategy of withdrawal from, or re-engagement in the world,
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 ’ ! 6iiitj.ons!-iip ce tween the Church's Ood-wanl and world-
ward orientations. The Withdrawal-Engagement dialectic is emptied of its
positive content by this new development and so ceases to be, for Hiebuhr, 
the strategy whereby the church and the world are to be transformed and 
becomes, instead, a pernicious cycle of irresponsibility which has to be 
transcended. (7) The vehicle by which this can be achieved is lliebuhr's 
■responsible' church, which is a kind of hybrid of the withdrawing and 
engaging types, somehow embracing within itself both sides of the 
dialectic.(S) Thus it is a faithful servant of the Gospel while acting as 
a pastor to the hurts of the world - defined in collective terms. Above 
representatively responsible for the world before God - and thus
this,^ it would seem, would be a summary of the church's role in this stage
of Uiebuhr's thought. In fact he affirmed this position again in 1949 in 
Disorder in the Church'.(Niebuhr 1949:84-86)
4.2.2.1b A clear process of evolution is discernible in these articles in
'Which Niebuhr, in the 1920's, begins to commend a strategy of withdrawal of
the Church from culture as a preparation for a renewed assault on culture.
By 1935, Niebuhr has Identified this strategy with a dialectic between
withdrawal and engagement which re-occurs again and again in the history of
the Church. The extreme poles In this dialectic, moreover, give rise to
pathological forms when dissociated from the dialectic. This dialectical
process itself, it seems, is Niebuhr's strategy for the transformation of
the world. However by the 1940's Niebuhr has become disillusioned with
this dialectic: he now sees it, and its polar positions, as pathological
and needing to be transcended. He accomplishes this through his theory of
responsibility into which he transfers the positive aspects of the
dialectic, and which replaces the dialectic as his programme for cultural 
transformation.
4.2.2.17. However, this evolution is not as clear as it seems from this 
summary since by 1952 Niebuhr has again revised his judgement on the
Withdr.awal-Eng.agemenl dialectic in his introduction to Christ and    
^ÎDebuhr 1952a: 43, 53). He seems to view it here as an existential and 
historical inevitability produced by the various relativisms which bear
Vithdrawal-Engagement dialectic is simply the
down upon human ]jfe. Th
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context in waich the question of the relation of Christ and Culture is ko
be resolved. Niebuhr still regards the extreme types of the dialectic as
pathological, favouring instead the mediate types which seek to embrace 
Doth poles of the dialectic, and he does not see the dialectic as the 
solution to the Christ-culture question, but as part of the problem. 
Instead looks to his 'conversionist' position which transcends Ure
dialectic to provide the answer that he seeksO).
4.2.2.18. It has already been argued in this chapter that Niebuhrts
dialectic of withdrawal and engagement strongly informs his typologies of 
religious orientation. Indeed in 'The Responsibility of the Church' he 
quite explicitly relates this dialectic to his church-sect typology 
(Niebuhr 1946: 114-ff). This claim will be more thoroughly substantiated in 
the following sections which will concentrate on an analysis of the 
development of Niebuhr's typologies of religious orientation.
C H U R C H ,  oECi, D E N O M I N A T I O N :  N I E H B U H R ' r S  E A R L Y  T Y P O L O G Y  O F  R E L I G I O U S
O R I E N T A T I O N
4.0.1. Niebuhr's first and most comprehensive discussion of church and 
sect occurs in the Social Sources. He explains his typology in the first 
introductory chapter of that work.
One element in the social sources of theological differentiation 
deserves special attention. Max Weber and Ernst Troe]tsch have 
demonstrated how important are the differences in the
sociological structure of religious groups in the determination 
of their doctrine. The primary distinction to be made here is
that between the church and the sect, of which the former is a
natural social gj'oup while the 1 a 11 e r is a voluntary assoc i a t i on .
Ihe difference has been well described as lying primarily in id)g
fact that members are born into the Church whTle they must join 
the sect. Churches are inclusive institutions, frequently are 
national in scope and emphasise the univcrsalism of the Gospel: 
while sects ai^ exclusive in character, appeal to the
individualistic element in Christianity and emphasise its ethical 
demands. Membership in a church is socially obligatory, the
necessary consequence of birth into a family or natZuu, .and no
special requirements condition its privileges; the sect, on the
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otheî hand, is liKely to ds ma ad some oeiinibe type of religious 
experience as a prerequisite of membership.(Niebuhr 1929:17-18)
4.3.2. Having described tlm basic features cdr church arml sect Niebuhr
turns to explain the process whereby the sect becomes a 'denomination' - a.
process dubbed by later sociologists as 'the sect-cycle'.
The sociological character of sectarianism, however, is almost 
always moaified in the course of time by the natural processes of 
birth and. death, and in this change in structure changes in 
doctrine inevitable follow. By its very nature the sectarian 
type of organisation is valid for one generation. The children 
born to the voluntary members of the first generation begin l:o 
make the sect a chuich long before they have arrived at the years 
of discretion for with their coming the sect must take on the 
character of an educational and disciplining institution, with 
the purpose of bringing the new generation into conformity with 
ideals and customs that have become traditional. Rarely does a 
second generation hold the convictions it has inherited with a 
fervour equal to that of its fathers, who fashioned these 
convictions in the heat of conflict and the risk of martyrdom.
As generation succeeds generation the isolation of tlie community 
from the world becomes more difficult. Furthermore, wealth 
frequently increases when the sect subjects itself to the 
discipline of asceticism in work and expenditure; with the 
increase of wealth the possibilities for culture also become more 
numerous, and involvement in the economic life of the nation as a 
whole can less easily be limited. Compromise begins and the 
ethics of the sect approach the churchly type of morals. As with 
the ethic, so with the doctrine, and. also v/ith the ad mi ni strati on 
of religion. An official clergy, theologically educated and 
schooled in the requirements of ritual, takes the place of lay 
leadership, easily imparted creeds are substituted for the 
difficult enthusiasms of the pioneers; children are born into the 
group and infant baptism or dedication becomes, once more, a 
means of grace. So the sect becomes a church. (Niebuhr 1929:IQ- 
20).
4 3.3. Niebuhr offers as examples of this process the 'Half-way Covenant' 
of the New England churches, the birth right membership of the Society of
Friends and the transitions which have t:aken place in Die histories o.f the 
Mennonites, Methodists and Baptists. (Niebuhr; 1929:20-21).
4.3.4. Having defined the i ns ti tut ions and the processes vri i.h which he is 
dealing Niebuhr stands back to make an ethical assessment of the phenomena 
he has considered thus far. He finds evil in it, but the evil, he argues.
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T "  ""'-h forced an eTfectCe balance to the
chunch and which preached the Gospel to the poor, nor In the rise of the
enomnatxons as such since they also play a useful role. Rather the chief 
evrl lay in the fact that the institutional church-type did not see beyond 
1 . own self-preservation, and displaced Gospel ethics with church ethics 
and so could not move beyond its allegiance to a particular class to serve 
the Whole oo^unity, thus imking the rise of the sects necessary. This' 
ea.e sin, Miebuhr claims, is being repeated by the denominations who, 
ac ing a unifying sense of Christian brotherhood and loyalty, have no 
basis of cohesion from which to work. They thus leave the way open to 
c^her lower' cohesive forces such as class, nation and sectional interests 
O etermne the structure of society to which they then conform. Thus in 
every social conflict in America the churches have taken divisive sectional 
stances which were dependent upon the group on which they were based. The 
^^nominations never speak with a united Christian voice; they have no 
orotherhood but are divided by the world's caste system; the world has
1929-21-25) have lost all their moral authority (Hiebuhr:
4.3.5. Hiebuhr's treatment of church and sect at this point in time is 
asically Troeltschian. He employs the same primary criteria that
roe..sch described; the relative and absolute forms of ethics, the 
difference between institution and voluntary community, and the 
universalistic and particularistic focus of each group. The o n l y  f e a t u r e
distinction which Troeltsch makes between the 
radical and conservative tendencies in Christianity. Hiebuhr also 
acknowledges Weber's contribution to the church-sect distinction in hi= 
re«rks about the church being e natural group and the sect a 
'Oun,ary association (Hiebuhr: 1929:17). But while he begins his
treatment of church and sect with this it. i ,s not enough to challenge the 
strongly Troeltschian flavour of his treatment of these
c a  t e f f o r i e s .
4.3.6. The one element which does seem new in Niebuhr's approach Lo this 
question is the emergence of the denomination out of the skabilislng of the
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sect's life and its embourgeoisement. This, though, is simply a 
development of Troeltsch's ideas on the rise of the Free Church. (Bister 
j_^3.coy 341). In this process, the sectarian movements approximate 
churches in the growing economic prosperity of their members and their 
adoption of elements of a Calvinistlc theology.
4.3
Troeltsch had studied this transition in relation to a specific 
group of protest sects, but Niebuhr generalised it by relating it to the 
internal change a sect experiences when its members begin families which 
children who must be nurtured, trained and socialised Into the religious 
life of their parents, as in the church-type. What was a ,matter of 
conviction for their parents will be a question of tradition for the 
childien. Thus for Niebuhr, the sect almost inevitably becomes a church 
through the natural_ biological processes. He also relates the economic
development, which Troeltsch records, to this process as an adjunct, but
not as its mainspring.
4.3.8. The real difference between Troeltsch and Niebuhr lies in the use 
he makes of the church-sect typology. Hiebuhr uses it to make a moral 
judgement about the development of Christianity. This breaks all the 
conventions of good sociology. He attacks the church-type for its 
compromise with the world as a result of which it lost its vision and 
failed to serve all sections of the community, especially the poor. The 
very relationship which for Troeltsch was the great positive strength of 
t.he church-type for Niebuhr is its greatest weakness and its greatest sin. 
Tne relationship of the church-type with the powerful in culture and 
society has divided the Body of Christ.
‘1.3.9. Niebuhr's dialectic between withdrawal and engagement is also 
present in the typology of the SQclal_aauj2ja£. In fact it becomes .a 
sociologjcal process. The church's worldly co],,promise provokes the 
withdrawal of the sect which eventually finds a re-eng.agement in the world 
in the form of a denomination. However the process as it occurs here is 
moie accident than strategy, being a process generated, in the first place, 
by the sin of the church-type.
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4.3.10 Nieouhr has little to say that is complementary about the church or 
denominational types in the SQ£iiLl_SQuj:i^S.. They have both, in their way, 
corapromisea Christian faith with the ideologies of the social groups to 
which they have conformed and thus contributed to the division of the 
Church. However, there are two groups ufxm which Niebuhr dcK!s bestow 
praise. The black denominations, in which, he argues, the aspirations of 
black people have found free expression, and Ihe sects which have 
maintained their integrity in the face of the compromise of other groups 
and have evangelized the disinherited and the masses vfhich the churches and 
the denominations had excluded and alienated. In the final analysis it is 
to the kind of Christianty represented by the sects that Niebuhr looks for 
the salvation of the church from its condition of malaise produced by its 
social conformity. The sects' form of Christianity will enable the church 
to aggressively face society once more.(Niebuhr 1929:20-76, 106-111).
4.3.11. Denominational Christianity, Niebuhr says in his conclusion, can 
never.provide a basis for a cultural synthesis but only the Christianity of 
the New Testament in its revelation of a Christ-like God in the person of 
Christ wüich presents the highest way of life, through the fatherhood of 
God, and brotherhood of man. Niebuhr claims that this ethic is in many 
respects echoed and anticipated in many movements of social reform and 
national independence. It will overcome international conflict through 
non-resistance; the gulf between rich and poor through a 'love communism', 
and the colour bar through the practise of this same spirit in its day-to- 
day dealings. He stresses that the church must have unity in itself before 
it may address the world. Niebuhr anticipates the objection that this 
would make the Church into yet another sect. He maintains that this need 
not be so. He sees this Christianity as a kind of 'hidden Church' within 
the historical Church. It is a fellowship which has often quietly 
sponsored the Christianity of brotherly love. It has frequently produced 
sects, ,mny of which have been untrue to it by championing their own 
interests and welfare, and by trying to pass on the spirit of this 
Christianity through legalistic channels. At the s.ame time this follo\,ship 
has produced many outstanding individuals who ha ve served both God and 
humanity. It is the growth of this Christianity which will turn the 
tide.(10) (Niebuhr 1929: 278-294).
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4.3.12. Vhils Niebuhr does criticise sectarian CTiristianity here for the 
first time in the Social SourCGR it is only its distorting secondary 
features vÆich ^  challenges. The basic ethical ar^ theological stance
v/hioh i u embodies is one which he basically approves of at this stage.
4.3.13. In the Sbcial Sources, then, Niebuhr is thoroughly Troeltschian in 
the way that he defines church and sect types, but not in the way that he 
uses them - he stands Troeltsch's position cm its head. Compromise is, 
for Niebuhr, a point of failure rather than success. . Niebuhr castigates 
the .-.hurch t}pe in boiJi its strict and denominational forms, and gives a 
qualified approval to the sect. In this Niebuhr is less sociological than 
even Troeltsch. He gives sociological categories a subjective, implicit 
theological and valuation content. tlnsn us&s these categories to make
further value judgements. It thus is surprising, given this, that 
sociologists have made such an extensive use of the Social Sources This 
book is really a work in ecumenical studies and Christian ethics; Niebuhr 
using sociological concepts and methods to these ends.
4.3.14. Later, in the articles he wrote for the 1931 ediLion of the 
Eiljzyclopedia of the Niebuhr takes a far more sociological
approach to this whole question and, in his articles cm 'Protestantism' 
(Niebuhr 1931b) and 'Religious Institutions' (Niebuhr 1931c), he defines 
different types of religious institutions by their internal 
characteristics. Initially he distinguishes three types of Protestantism; 
the 'institutional', the 'sectarian' and 'Galvinistic' types. The 
Institutional' type is represented by Anglicanism and Lutheranism which in 
many respects stands close to Catholicism since it regards the Church as 
having an institutional character as a divinely ordained teacher, pastor, 
aiW priest. However, in Protestantism this institution is co-e%konsive 
with the national community and subject to political control. In the sect- 
type, on the other hand, which is represented by the Anabaptists, Quakers, 
Bapt ists, and Congregat1 on,a lists,  .....
........... Ghurch is a voluntary association of believers
separated from the state, subject to democratic uejority 
rule in m.a tiers of faith and practice, and devoid of 
sacramental character. (Niebuhr 1931b:571).
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The ...al vxai^txc type, hiebuhr continues, shares some of the characteristics
oi the other two. It sees the Church as co-extensive with the national
community, but does not concede control to the state. It also makes some
concessions to democracy in its structure, but subordinates the local
congregation to the national institution ar^ the laity to the clergy 
(Niebuhr 1931b:571).
4.3.15. Hiebuhr Identifies the political disposition of each type. He 
notes that the institutional type is basically conservative and orientated 
to feudalism. The sect one on the other hand is democratic and orientated 
to socialistic revolution or reform, when it does not withdraw from 
society. Calvinism for its part is disposed toward democratic liberalism 
and capitalism. From this it is clear that the 'institutional' type is a 
restatement of Niebuhr's church type, while the 'Calvinistlc' type has some 
of the features of the denomination.(Niebuhr 1931b;571-575; 1931c:267-272),
4.3.16, The orientation of each type to theology, ethics and class remain 
what they were in the Social Sources. The only difference is that Hiebuhr 
discretely Introduces a fourth type - that of the 'society' which stands 
half-way between the sect and church types, This is the form which all 
churches take in the United States, being influenced by democratic, and 
pluralistic Ideas and conditions (Hiebuhr 1931b:272). This approximates to 
U.e 'denomination' of the Sacial Sourcga but is more sharply distinguished 
irom Calvinism which he now presents as a type on its own.
4.3.17. Niebuhr stresses these same themes in more detail i 
substantial article on 'Sects' in the 1931 ImcyciopMia (Niebuhr 1931d>. 
Niebuhr begins by noting that there are three uses of the terra 'sect':- as 
a term which identifies various factions within religion, as a derogatory 
terra used by the dominant or established group in a conflict situation, and 
a "religious conflict society which arises in opposition to an 
institutional church". (Niebuhr 19316:624), It is based on the commitment 
of adult individuals to definite principles as a 'contract society' as 
opposed to an institution.
Whereas the Church is inclusive tending to regard all ,«embers of
a parish, a community or a nation as its .wards, and serving as
n nis
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■4 . 3 . 1 8
. sects are products of 'Protestant
in ividualxsm'; they occured outside of Protestantism as a recurrent social
phenomena. Moreover they have led to a number of important results for 
-r.stianity. i-irstly, they have called back the church f r o m  its 
accommodation. Secondly, they have prepared the way for social reform, 
irdly, they have so emphasized Individual conviction in religion and 
e res so as to provide a necessary counter-balance to the ecclesiastical 
eys.em of collective dog.m and authority", (Hiebuhr 1 9 3 1 d : 6 3 0 ) ,
4.3.19, This article stands in contrast with Niebuhr's treatment of the 
sect-type in the There he is more concerned to describe
-.e ransitron of sect to denomination for the sake of exposing th.e class 
. entrficatron of different sects and their betrayal of the disinherited 
omongst whom they began. But in this later piece of -work Hiebuhr is much 
more concerned to describe the sect-type in itself, .and it is interesting 
to note that he makes no reference to the sect-cycle here, Hiebuhr': 
rsoussron retains heavily dependent upon Troeltsch; he locates the m.aln 
perrods ol sect development from the Middle Ages onwards, after Thomas',s 
-ynthesis or Christianity with Mediaeval cu]ture and ho restates 
iroeltsoh's distinction between pacifist and revolutionary sects as
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separatist and Millennial sects. Despite this, there are some significant 
differences between Niebuhr's and Troeltsch's accounts. Hiebuhr does take 
the ancient sects of Montanism and Donation far more seriously. He 
abandons Troeltsch's distinction between absolute and relative natural law, 
prefering to speak of vigorous and relaxed ethics. He makes a good deal 
less polemical use of the concept of compromise. His division of 
Mediaeval, Reformation, and modern sects into four periods in place of 
Troeltsch's two enables him to better describe the salient features of 
sects in a given period without forcing them into predetermined categories. 
Lastly, Hiebuhr . gives a less ideological view of sectarian groups, 
preferring Instead to emphasize their own contingent characteristics.
4.3.20. All in all, Niebuhr's article 'Sects' is a far better piece of
sociology than either Troeltsch's work on the sect type in the Social
leachings or his own work in the Social .'nfliicces. However he does not
entirely abandon all subjective evaluation and in the concluding paragraph
of the piece Niebuhr registers once more the profound sympathy which he
felt toward the sect-type. The contributions which he states that the
sect-type has made reflect his theological stance at this time. The sect's
cnallenge of the church's compromise is an echo of the withdrawal pole of
Niebuhr's wlthdrawal-engagement dialectic; its rejection of antiquated
forms as a prelude to reform also reflects the aggressive re-engagement
phase of that same dialectic. Lastly Niebuhr contends that the sect
provides a counter-balance to the church. This is a restatement of his
dialectical tension between the poles of withdrawal and engagement. The
one type needs the pull and pressure of the other to prevent it from 
becoming a malformation.
^.3.61. Niebuhr continues in this non-polemical vein in another 
encyclopedia article in 1945. He again defines his two types in terras of 
their own Internal structure, but on this occasion he puts this distinction 
to theological rather than sociological use. He follows once more I be 
pattern he established in the first of his 1931 articles in the 
 t Jl£ Socfaf Sciencrcj _
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Trie meaning of the term "church" varies between two poles, but j n 
every case some reference to both is involved; the first of these 
is a special community of men constituted by Jesus Christ or by 
God through Christ; the second is the idea of an institution
which carries on or witnesses to the work of Christ among the
"natural" communities of mankind. Each is subject to a variety 
of interpretations, hence three main sets of problems have been 
discussed in theology with reference to the church; the nature 
and function of the community, the nature and function of the
institutions and the relations of the institution to the 
community. (Niebuhr 1945:169).
4.3.22. The idea of the church as a community is predominant in the sub- 
apostolic peiiod. This community is conceived as the regenerated n e w
humanity, separated from the world but scattered through it geographically. 
The new community is bound by the new law of Jesus. This model of the 
church, Niebuhr observes, has been a constant source of inspiration to 
reform and sectarian movements throughout history. Howe ver the basic 
pioblem that constrains it is how the church, defined as a separated 
community, is to be related to the rest of the human community, and to the 
rest of the church.(Niebuhr 1945:169-170).
4.0.23. The institutional idea of the church came into its own with the 
Christianisation of the Roman Empire and the development of the priesthood, 
episcopate, and the sacramental system.
It is in part the consequence of the growing maturity of the 
Chiistian movement, in part the result of the accommodation of 
Christianity to prevailing social and religious 
practices.(Niebuhr 1945:170).
4.3.24. Clearly Niebuhr's concerns here are basically theological rather 
than sociological. However, the way in which he deals with the relation of 
church and sect, and institution and community in this wor Ir stands in 
continuity with his work in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 
Niebuhr defines these types not in terms of their orientation to culture 
but in terms of their own internal organisation. However this is not to 
say that the problem of church and culture does not figure-: i n i.hJs article 
it. is present as the basic problem that confronts the sect-type. 
Niebuhr's withdrawal and engagement dialectic is also present in the 
aLcommouation of the communal type to society and its basic orientation as
184
a servant of society, and in the separation of the sect from society 
Again the two types are part of the same polarity; they are opposites, but 
one cannot completely exclude the other. However, what is lacking is any 
polemical stance; Niebuhr does not indicate any preference for eithe:
church or sect types, or conmunal or institutional views of the church, but
sees both as necessary.
4.3.25. In as far as Niebuhr, during this period (1929-1945) bases his 
typology on Troeltschian premises he will face the saim sociological 
criticisms that were made of Troeltsch's categories. This is certainly the 
case with regard to the where Niebuhr uses Troeltsch's
theory of compromise to distinguish between church and sect. But even 
worse, from a sociological point of view, Niebuhr makes use of his typology 
to make evaluative Judgements of different Christian institutions. The
picture differs somewhat, however, because of Niebuhr's sect-cycle. For a 
while this was widely applauded and adopted by sociologists, but after the
work of Wilson and others it became clear that many sects did not undergo
uny process of upward mobility, or if they did, they retained their
sectarian organisation; they remained static as organisational types 
Secondly, sects are not the sole province of the lower classes as both
N.ebuhr Troeltsch held. Soxe groups, as the Freemasons,
unction as elitist, procultural sects which remain sects because of their 
exclusive membership and internal discipline.
4.3.26. .Sociologists would probably find themselves more at ease with the
position that Niebuhr takes in his writings after the Social .Gnurce. (,932 
onxurds,. Here he has shifted bis ground. Troeltsch's thenrv nf
compromise Is no longer the basis of distinguishing church from :eci 
Instead, Niebuhr separates them on the basis of the kind of organisational 
p.rtter„ that they follow, either being an institution or a community, 
■wrthei, in these later writings, the dispassionate historian seems to be 
nelm raLhe; than the passionate Christian ethicist and
e_u^_ni=t of the lUs contributions to the Encyclopedia nf
ni=;_£Qs.aah.._Scifiacaa at least reckon as pieces of creditable sociology 
However, as we have noted, his dialectic of withdraw,] and engagement still 
Insures in these articles, although in a restrained fashion, and the basic
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concepts of the church which lay behind, his organisational criteria are 
essentially theological in character - being concerned with different 
understandings of the church's election and mission in the world. This is 
clearly spelt out in his 1945 article. This leaves Niebuhr vulnerable on 
two counts. In the first place Niebuhr faces criticism from the
sociologists for once again having introduced non-sociological criteria 
into his definition of what claim to be sociological types. In the second 
place he lays himself open to the more serious theological charge that in 
basing his distinction between church and sect on different theological 
understandings of the church he is acknowledging that theological
differences are fundamental to the social differentiation of Christian 
institutions; the reverse of the argument in the Social..5.Q.y.r-Cgs.■
4.3.27. It is not-explicitly clear why Niebuhr moves from a typology based 
on compromise to one based on different conceptions of the church. But it 
seems certain that his growing dissatisfaction with Troeltsch's idea of 
'compromise' caused him to abandon it entirely as a method or as a
sociological criterion. Niebuhr might also have wished to move away from 
the positions of extreme withdrawal or accommodation of both church and
sect types. These types represented pathological stances both in
Troeltsch's analysis, and in his own dialectic of engagement and 
withdrawal, which he himself rejects during this time as a vicious cycle.
Niebuhr's discontent with both Troeltsch's concept of compromise, and his
own dialectic of engagement and withdrawal, which is reflected in this 
movement, lay in the fact that neither could transform the world, but only 
ever reacted to the world. Viewed in these te)'.ms both compi omise amd. his 
own withdrawal-engagement compromise must have appeared as failures to 
Niebuhr. It seems that in the next stage of Niebuhr's development of his 
typology of religious orientation, from 1945 onv/ards, he realises this 
failure znM faces up to it squarely, no longer disguising theological 
distinctions as sociology. Instead he analyses» the theological pos.» t.joir.v 
which lay behind the distinctions in the church's lire and existence and 
searched for a position which would enable the ciruroh to tr a nsr oi m tne 
world. Perhaps it is for this reason that after 1945 be never again wakes 
reference to church and sect as sociological types.
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THE TYPOLOGY OF CHRIST AND CULTURE
Jh-S— bPUrceS of the New Tvpnlngy
1.4.1.1. It would seem U m t  in the early 194 0's Niebuhr was becoming
Increasingly disillusioned with the .church-sect typology which he had
inherited from Troeltsch. However he did not abandon it since he felt It
contained theological distinctions which were Important. Instead he sought
to refine and modify these distinctions, as discussed above, in order to
adapt them to his theological purposes. Niebuhr continued to labour with
Troeltsch's typology a tool despite its Inadequacy simply because it was 
the only one he had.
4.4.1.2. This situation, though, changed in 1945, the same year Niebuhr's 
last article employing a variation of the church-sect typology appears. 
When discussing the concept of 'revelation' in a further encyclopedia 
article Niebuhr describes Gilson's classification of the positions taken in 
Christian history defining the relation between reason and revelation. 
Gilson defined four positions: 'Tertul 1ianism', which regards revelation as 
exclusively self-sufficient; ' Averroeism', which regards revelation as a 
confirmation of the truths of reason; ' Thomlsm', which regards reason as 
preparatory to revelation; and ' Augustlnlanism', which makes reason 
dependent on faith. (Niebuhr 1945: 663).
4.4.1.3. In the work from which these categories are drawn (Gilson 1939) 
Gilson states that it is his intention to give a more accurate description 
and classification of Mediaeval thought than that which usually persists. 
His first type which he describes as the 'Tertullian School', consists of 
those who maintain that revelation replaces reason and that therefore all 
philosophical speculation is futile. All that is needed in the minds of 
these men is simple obedience to the com,m«„ds of scripture. Among the 
representatives of this view Gilson places Tatlan, Saint Bernard, and the 
•Spiritual Franciscans', He notes that this group arises -whenever 
philosophy is taker, too seriously by the church and threatens to m,akc 
inroads into the domain of revelation. (Gilson 1939:3-15)
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4.4. 1.4. The next tendency that Gilson considers is that which he calls 
the 'Augustinian family' which does not replace reason with revelation but 
makes revelation the basis of reasoning. The Christian first accepts the 
truths of divine revelation by faith and then employs reason, represented 
by the highest philosophical and scientific developments of the day to 
understand them. Gilson includes in this family, along with Augustine, 
Anselm, Bacon, Raymond Lull, and Malebranche. The great strength of this 
school, he says, is that while all agree that reason must proceed from
faith and upon the orthodox content of such faith, they do not agree about
the content of reason and so use different intellectual methods from 
Platonic philosophy to strict logic and mathematics. This means that they 
can always adapt to new intellectual and cultural situations. The 
corresponding weakness of this position, though, is that it takes a 
creative genius to use reason and faith in this manner. The number of such 
geniuses are strictly limited, with the result that lesser minds work to 
obscure the use of reason with their interpretation of revelation. Th'e 
other difficulty with this school, says Gilson, is that it presumes faith 
and so has nothing to say to the philosophically minded pagans - the idea 
of purely philosophical Christian wisdom was left to others. (Gilson 
1939:15-33).
4.4.1.5. Gilson's third 'family' is that of the Spanish Islamic phi 1 sopher
Ibn-Rushd (latin: Averroes) who saw revelation as a for m of the abstjl u te
knowledge that was perceived by the philosphers. Averroes respected the 
moralising influence of revelation on the irrationally minded and the 
miraculous way in which it was given to them. However he 'would not allow 
that it contradicted reason; merely that it presented the wisdom of reason 
in an i magi native and popular form. He also created a subtle distinction 
between the necessary truths of philosophy, represented by Aristotle which 
had to be accepted by reason, and the truths of revelation which bad to be 
accepted by faith. Averroes developed this distinction to escape the 
criticisms of the theologians.
4.4.1.6. Gilson's fourth 'family' is that of Thomas Aquinas who, he says, 
rejected both the 'theologism' of Anselm, and I:he separation of faith and
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types. In Gilson these were defined by their own inherent content, rather
than Dy their e.xternal social relations. Two of these the ' Tertul ) ianlsl '
and the 'Averroelsf Niebuhr would have recognised as variants of his own
sect and church types and the 'Augustinian' stance would have echoed his
own conversationist position. The Thoniist position, however, would have
been new to him as a distinct type. It would see,, that these types formed
the basis for the expansion of his own typology in Christ and Culture
Ilebuhr never acknowledged(11) that Gilson influenced him in this change
of emphasis, but that Niebuhr took his point of departure from Gilson's
lead here is suggested by two points. Firstly, the similarities of
approach: both use theological rather than sociological .criteria to
classify their types. Secondly, the similarity between Niebuhr's and 
Gilson's types.
4.4.1.8. In Gilson, Niebuhr encounters a way of making a theological
classification of religious types in terras of their content and
convictions. This subsequently displaces the Troeltschian approach he had
hitherto adopted of classifying theological types by sociological criteria.
It is broadly Gilson's approach he uses in Christ and Culture and this
replaces the Troeltschian framework which he used in his earlier work on 
this topic.
CIlTj.^ tI— Cu 11urfi and the F.i vs Tyo q,s .
4.4.2.1. Like Niebuhr, Troeltsch was concerned with the relationship
between the church and the world. However he s,aw this as primarily
expressed as a problem of the relationship of different Institutions with,
society. Niebuhr in Christ.jjuLCliI±uie takes a different line. He seeks
to give a theological definition, which is informed by both l.lstory and
pnilosophy, of both Christ and Culture. Christ and Culture exist as
spiritual or valuational realities in history rather than sociological
lealitles (Hiebuhr 1952: 26-52). Here Hiebuhr approaches the same basic
p.-Qblera which Gilson addressed. He does so in the same way but on ,a much
broader canvas which draws in many other aspects of the same Christ-cu]ture 
problem.
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4.4.2.4. Niebuhr informs his readers that it v/ouid be possible to multiply 
the list of the representatives of this type and to show the resemblance 
between groups of different backgrounds. However he feels that this would 
be unnecessary as the similarity between them would soon be seen. Nor 
would it matter whether these groups are eschatologica] or mystical in 
orientation. what matters Is that they stress the nearness of the Kingdom 
in temporal or 'super-sensual ' terras. Thus despite the diversity between 
the groups which represent this type, they give a common answer to the 
question about Christ and culture.
4. 4.2.5. Having described the general orientation of this type and having 
given various heuristic examples of it Niebuhr turns to give a theological 
analysis of it. He notes that those occupying the 'Christ Against Culture' 
position have often brought great assets to society, although they never 
intended to do so. (In this connection Niebuhr mentions the monastic 
contribution to democracy). Moreover they require the mediation of others 
to communicate their contribution. Niebuhr sees the strategy of withdrawal 
embodied in the 'Christ Against Culture' position as necessary in order to 
affirm the distinct Lordship of Christ over the Christian and the church, 
and to act as a counterbalance against the easy compromise and loss of 
identity the church would suffer in the world without this witness. 
Niebuhr observes that the strategy of withdrawal has often led to reform in 
the church, although, again, this was never the intention of the radicals. 
A withdrawal from the world is necessary both for the individual and the 
church at some points in their history in order for the Lordship of Christ 
to be established over them, but an equally necessary re-engagement is 
required as he sends them out again. Niebuhr concedes that further 
withdrawals may be necessary in his own time. But despi i.e this ne 
concludes that this position is inadequate in that it does not, recognise 
that it is impossible to withdraw from a culture. Those who lepresent this 
position are all members of a culture, and so must think and communicate in 
the categories which their culture has established. What actually happens, 
Niebuhr argues, is the selection, conversion and acceptance of various 
lesser evils in the natural order. Thus the radical Christians cannot 
reject an entire culture as they propose. (Niebuhr 1952;76-36).
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4.4.2.6. Niebuhr again returns to his withdrawal and re-engagement
dialectic here; the radical type representing the withdrawal pole of this
. dialectal pair. He stresses the necessity of withdrawal for the sake of
the health and integrity of the church — especially, as he has emphasized 
before, as a counter-balance to the compromise which the church is prone to 
enter with culture. That the Christ Against Culture type should exist,
then, is essential since without it the reform of the church wouId be 
difficult to generate. However this response, by itself is never enough. 
It is only one part of the equation, which falls without the other - namely 
re engagement in culture. As a response it can never be complete since it 
is Impossible to withdraw completely from a culture.
4.4.2.I. Niebuhr proceeds to consider various theological objections to 
the position. He states that the issues which the Christ Against Culture 
Christians face aid not only ethical but religious. As Christians withdraw 
they beg many questions about God's relationship to human beings and their 
work. The fiist of these is that of revelation and reason. Reason, says 
tiebuhi, is taken to designate cultural knowledge and revelation is
divinely given knowledge of salvation. Revelation is defined as anti- 
lational and reason seen as inadequate — even as deceptive because it does
not, and and cannot lead to salvation. Tertullian, Tolstoy, the Protestant
sects, and the Quakers all took this view. However all found that 
leasoniug must take place within the circle of faith, albeit on a different 
basis, since revelation, by itself, is not enough.(Niebuhr 1952:86-38).
4.4..1..0. In their doctrine of sin the Radicals made society the chief 
medium of communication of sin and the source of all corruption. One of 
the chief reasons for separating from society Is to preserve the holiness 
of the church. The uncultured soul cannot be said to be evil, but must be 
good being created by God. Niebuhr feels that this doctrine of the soci al 
inheii tance of sin is an important contribution to theol.ogy, but observes 
that the Radicals cannot be wholly consistent in. They have to fight 
against sin in themselves, when separate from culture, and it is a
requirement that each person should acknowledge their sinfulness. Sin, 
theiefore, has to be fought by means other than mere withdrawal alone. 
(Niebuhr 1952: 88-89).
193
IM I
Pililil
uheoLihr 1952; 91-92).
characteristic of the Christ Against Culture
relatio"' f '"”'11''' '-'e'- in an antagonistic
•Ü cu „u,e which it sees as basically sinful and fro.,, which
194
4.4.2.12
■pill
W m M
195
civilisation to g'Ll!"
Christ is thus part of culture.
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cu u,e IS to recognise that the Spirit proceeds fro,,, the Father as v,ell 
as the Son. (Niebuhr 1952: 110-116).
em as a thieat, introducing a corrupting and weakening
, into their culture. Tbe culture Christians .Iso have a tendency t:
a s ract one aspect of Christ, which they feel is corapatihle with the 
ture they are engaging, and absolutise this .mking it the whole. Thus 
i ns IS only the. Logos, only the bringer of the message of universal 
ove, only the reformer, and so on. In its adoption of the Hew Testament 
canon and in later Councils, the Church rejected such a narrow view of
nati f T  ' this path much more than the
P i Of^radical Christianity. Hiebuhr states, however, that these extremes
:: r ~
-co.ogy, but for different reasons; they see it as obscurantist. They .see
, truth s«Ivatlon, and identify revelation
.nystic and an uncultured presentation of the same truths which
reason establishes. However, argues Hiebuhr, the culture-Christians cannot 
byentlrely independent of revelation and have, at the end of the day. to
rona, systems they devise about the aim of human life and its chief good
ran to the ground unless God has disclosed them in Christ. This is U,e
oasis Of the culture-Chrlstlaus reasoning and It Is one which reason cannot
..ab.t i.sh. (Niebuhr 1952: 116-120).
I t r r d v i s e s  Hiebuhr, also gives a cultural 
- crpre a.ion of sin identifying it with bad social 1 nstl iu t i cu.s and
that the individual's heart or 
=ou can contain a 'realm of si nl-essness', but like the sectarians, they
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are forced to acknowledge the inherent sinfulness of reason which corrupts 
all intentions. This brings theiD close to other believers.(Niebuhr 
1952:120-121). Like the radicals, Niebuhr continues, the culture- 
Christians incline to law, emphasizing the need for human effort in the 
cultural task. Grace is seen either as a distraction to this task, causing 
people to rely upon God rather than their ov/n effort, or as an adjunct to 
this task enabling and sustaining it. Culture Christianity has given birth 
to movements which stress both aspects. Niebuhr, in reflecting upon this, 
states that this might be part of the old paradox of Christians having to 
work out their salvation while God is also at work within them; the Kingdom 
is both gift and task, However irrational grace and law may be, they are 
both real. Culture-Chri stians also tend to deny the doctrine of the 
trinity by identifying Christ with the spirit present in culture. The 
question arises, however, says Niebuhr, about the relation of this spirit 
to the Creator of nature. This is especially important as natural forces 
threaten to overwhelm culture, and as science discovers that nature only 
makes sense within a rational ordering. On top of this, other questions 
arise as spirits emerge in culture which are contrary to the spirit of 
Christ. Niebuhr concludes:
It becomes more or less clear that it is not possible modestly to 
confess that Jesus is the Christ of culture unless one can 
confess more than this.(Niebuhr 1952:122).
4.4.2.20. Niebuhr's Christ of Culture type is the mirror image of his 
Christ against Culture type of which it is the logical counterpart. It 
stresses the continuity between reason and revelation, Christ and cullure 
while the radicals stress their incontinuity. Just as the radicals give 
priority to revelation the culture-Christi ans give priority to reason. 
Their view of Jesus is also different making him the great Champion and 
redeemer of culture in contrast to the radical's view of Jesus as its great 
enemy and judge. However, in their views of sin, grace and Law the 
culture-Christians and the radi cals find themselves on oddly ccunmon ground, 
until one remembers that extreme positions often meet each other nu some 
issues while going in different directions.
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theological appraisal of the Christ Above Culture
^ ^ -ulturc which It Identifies as particularly
rrst.an and then seeks to defend it thus making the relative infinite,
bsolu e and eternal. The only way to avoid this, argues Miebuhr, is to 
uners.and that any culture, and any synthesis is temporary. Cultures
C ange and need to be constantly re-converted. Further, the ministry of
-rts. and the grace of God, Hiebuhr believes, become identified with a
p a ^ o u l a r  institution within society which is as much the product of hu,mn
 ^ institution, Christ, and those who would be obedient
-  n.m, must then conform to the Institution. There is no free Lord, and 
ree obedience. Uiebuhr feels that all of these objections combine in 
one that peace and Integrity are sought on earth rather than hoped for as
pa. Of the eschaton so that what should be eternal is rn.de temporal and
-e. the synthesis were taken as a symbol of the eternal peace, jf
r
C .  tierces the synthetic view for the unhealthy hierarchical division it
.among men as if some are (or even could be) more holy and obedient
Klcbuhr states that the synthesists do not take 
I -n._ of eln in culture seriously enough.(Uiebuhr 1952:146-153).
""'ture in the synthetic position, are not opposed, 
but are placed in a hierarchical relationship to one another. As a result 
.ey are both continuous with each other in as far as culture prepares the
r "  discontinuous as
utc. rnunscends culture with supernatural grace and salvation which he
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>-;ulbuîe uGcause r.hey realise that they are part of it and cannot but live 
within it. The dualists understand that it is God's will for them to 
continue to live within culture. Thus dualist Christians are believers in 
paradoxes. They are both saints and sinners; Christ has made all things 
new, yet nothing has changed. The Christian lives under both law and 
grace, out the law comes as both judgement and as grace, being written on 
the heart by the Spirit, but as an impossible demand of love/ The dualists 
ais caught in an endless dialogue with law and grace. Lastly, they meet 
God as both Judge and Saviour in nature and religious experience. Thus 
culture has two sides: its darkness, which God judges; and those blessings 
through which the divine mercy is shown. ITie dualists must endeavour not 
to separate God's action as Judge from his work as Saviour. In this 
respect, Niebuhr notes, tl^ dualist is trinitarian, cn- at. least 
binitarian.(Niebuhr 1952:154-163). Niebuhr regards Paul, Marcion, Luther, 
Kierkegaard and Troel-tsch (13) as dualists. (Niebuhr 1952:163-87).
4.4.2.36. Niebuhr examines what he considers to be the theological virtues 
ai^ vices of tl^ dualist position. The dualists, Niebuhr says, have 
successfully stated what it læains Christians to be living 'between the 
times' in a sinful world, correctly Identifying the real tension that they 
experience. Moreover, whereas the radical's conception of the new life is
static, and the cultural and synthesist Christians' views of culture are
absolutist, the dualist Christian sees the new life and the demands of
culture as botn dynamic and relativist]c since they have affirmed both the 
religious life and cultural life. They have also set the one free from the 
other. However, the vices dualism parallel its virtues; it produces 
anti-nomian tendencies which find expression in argument that since
obedience or disobedience are equally as sinful, laws should be ignored as 
one relies on grace. This is a distortion but one wh ich dualists are 
unable, without the aid of the other types, to refute. Dualists also have 
tendency to cultural conservatism which is inevitable if the institutions 
of society are seen as fences against sin. In addition to tlris, they have 
a predilection for identifying tdæ creation wdth tl^ ]%ill and so associate 
sin with the material woi'ld as such. It is, Niebuhr claims, only a simple 
step finom this to Marcion's position. Niebuhr concludes again that the 
dualists need the other types, like the radicals, to assist them in making
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a contribution to cuUure, and in also providing a .ore positive view of 
tlie worId, < Niebuhr 1952:182-191).
4.4 2,37. Kiebuhr's dualist position, then, is one in which Christ and
culture are held together in tension. Christians are at the saite time to
involved in culture. Vhiie human culture is
stnful ft is GodCs will as Creator that Christians be i nvolved with it
ius both the Father and the Son are obeyed. Christians can, however
proceed with confidence relying upon the forgiveness of sins. Having said
thfs, the pressure Of the tension between law and grace will a: ways' bear 
upon them.
4.4.3.38. Biebuhr's Withdrawal-Engagement dialectic is present in this 
position as well. The dualists reach the same view about culture as the
ra reals and so, in one part of their lives, withdraw from its values in 
favour Of obedience to Christ. In another, however, as citizens they must 
"Iture. Withdrawal and engagement are thus held together in 
a dynamrc tension with the Christian responding to both imperatives at the
oame time, rely.ng on the forgiveness of sins and eternity to resolve the 
ambiguities which arise from the tension.
. Dua]i=m, ds a distinct type, is unknown to both Troeltsch ai^
Oilson. Troeltsch does, of course, discuss this stance in the 8o=jaj:
lencdlfhga in connection with Luther's social ethics but it is for him 
simply a variant of his church-type and he does not distinguish It from the
r' lonlst views which his type also cmiuucos
Dualism, as ,a type, i,s also foreign to Gilson, although h.e .does refer to it
-unnection with the desire to separate revelation from reason that was
represented in the 'German Theology' which so influenced lu, he,. Thi- 
IS u.np.ne to Niebuhr who, it seems, developed it out of the eva.mlL
furnished him by Luther and Troeltsch, He then f,o„„d siudi.n,- ideas i,. Lui
u..d Haroion and generalised it as a recurring type. This is his only 
addition to the classification that he received from Gilson.
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4.4 2.40 mebuhr apparently prefers this position to that of the 
oyn esists and, Indeed, to the radical and cultural positions. The reason 
or^thfs would seem to be that it is the first position to correctly, m  
le u r s mind, define the circumstances of the Christian life - of having 
o participate in sinful culture. It affirms both the authority of th!
C h r i T  Redeemer and Judge, but without placing
:f rrru;::
c o r L V T  contribution to culture to be imde, and to
correct its overpessimistic view of culture.(14)
4.4.2.41. The Christ Transforming Culture position is Niebuhr's fifth and 
final type and his third median position
■ ■ ■
4.4 2.42, Niebuhr notes that the conversionist position is closest to the
t]n= Zld- affinities with the other stances also. They share with
t k ^ distinction between God's work and humanity's but do not
Thus while they accept their position in 
ciety^ hey do not blunt Christ's judgement on culture. bike the
and the dualists they recognise Christ as Redeemer, not
primarily as lawgiver, who heals the deepest recesses of sinfui human 
nature through the incarnation, thus making the conversion of culture 
possible. They stress with the dualists the depth of sin, but also
emphasize God's rule over all of life. The conversionists are
IS inguished from all the positions in three respects; firstly, by the,, 
positive view of creation, to which they link their Christology _ making
of'th' TrL" redemption: secondly, by their view
e a.l in which they see the distortion of nature rather than its
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4.4.3.40 Niebuhr apparently prefers this position to that of the
synthesists and, Indeed, to the radical and cultural positions. The reason
for. this would seem to be that it is the first position to correctly, m
le uhr s mind, define the circumstances of the Christian life -  of having
to participate in sinful culture. It affirms both the authority of the
Father as Creator, and Christ as Redeemer and Judge, but without placing
: , -Iture in a hierarchical relationship. Rather they are held
oge ler in a dualistic tension. However even this type still needs the
ypes to enable its contribution to culture to be made, and to
correct its overpessimistic view of culture. (14)
4.4.2.41. The Christ Transforming Culture position is Niebuhr's fifth and 
final type and his third median position.
4.4.2 42. Niebuhr notes that the conversionist position is closest to the 
but nas affinities with tt^ other stances also. share wdth
radical .he distinction between God's ami humanity's twt (io not
take the path of withdrawal. Thus while they accept their position in 
society they do not blunt Christ's judgement on culture. Like the
synthesists and the dualists they recognise Christ as Redeemer, not 
primarily, as lawgiver, who heals the deepest recesses of sinful human
na m e  through the incarnation, thus making the conversion of culture 
possible. ihey stress with the dualists the depth of sin, but also 
emphasize God's rule over all of life. The conversionists are 
istinguished from all the positions in three respects; firstly, by their 
positive view of creation, to which they link their Christology - making 
Hist active in creation as well as redemption; secondly, by their view 
of the Fall in which they see the distortion of nature rather than its
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H " ' " t r "  °T Saint John, Augustine, Edwards
find Maui ice. (Niebuhr 1952:197-228).
4.4 .,43, This type Is unique, in Niebuhr's analysis, in that it posits 
Doth discontinuity and continuity between Christ and culture. With the 
radicals, the conversionists identify sin in culture, but they confront it 
sen m g  culture into crisis. However, rather than rejecting culture or 
seeking its precarious and conditional rapprochment with Christ through 
synthes s or dualism, it seeks the conversion of culture and its re- 
ori.n a ion around Christ. Thus Christ does not replace culture but 
e m e s  it so that a continuity exists both between Christ and a 
converted culture and between the old culture and the new.
4:4.2.44 It would appear that the dialectic of withdrawal and engagement
also transfer,ned in this type as both poles find unity in conversion.
pe.atives of the withdrawal pole for faithfulness and obedience, and
. engagement pole for affirmation and responsibility for the world
both find apparent fulfil,„e„t within this process. Thus as long as the
process of conversion continues, the dialectical tension between these two
po es IS at least temporarily resolved and the effective transformation 
and society achieved.
4.4 2.45. This type bears no resemblance to any of Troeltsch's types, 
a oug there is a very dim perception of it in his treatment of
Of IhT% r -  " - t  Troeltsch's understanding
Augustinmn approach to the problem of revelation and reason. The Christ 
Transforming Culture position recognises the sinfulness of culture but does 
O rejec it, preparing instead to re-orientate it on the basis of Christ, 
a son s Augustinlan position likewise recognises the limitation of reason 
es not reject it, preferring to use it once it has re-established its 
foundation on revelation and been ,„ade it dependent on faith
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4.4.2.46. The conversionist position Is Niebuhr's own preferred stance. 
It IS composed of those who represent the 'Great Tradition' which 
emphasizes God's sovereignty with which Niebuhr identifies himself, and he 
offers no theological objection to this position. Further, it is the only 
type Which is not dependent on the other positions since it
contains the balance of the Christian faith within itself having no 
tendencies, which Niebuhr perceives, to extremism or heresy. However he 
does imke it strategically dependent on the other types. This last stance, 
for Niebuhr, is the culmination of the argument.
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF NIEBUHR'S TYPOLOGIES OF RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION
4.5.1. Niebuhr's first typology of religious orientation which he offered 
in the in 1929 'was largely Troeltschian, with the exception
that he dropped the mystical type as irrelevant to the American situation. 
He also developed Troeltsch's idea of the Free Church into the type of the 
denomination to which he added the concept of 'the sect-cycle'. Niebuhr 
maintained this emphasis in his 1935 Encyclopedia articles. In both cases 
he has a strategic bias toward the sect-type since its stance of withdrawal 
seemed to him to be a necessary option for the times. Niebuhr developed 
Idea in the light of his withdrawal-engagement dialectic, -which
clearly influenced his early typology. However, with the shift in his
theology during the Second World War from a strategic to a tactical 
emphasis in his goal of transformation, he came to see both church and sect 
types as, by themselves, pathological. The result of this, it would 
appear, is found in 1945 when, in discussing conceptions of the church, he
prefers to speak in terms of institutional and communal understandings of
the Church. These categories clearly correspond to the old church and 
aect-types since the church-type, in the is characterised
by Its institutional form and the sect by its organisation as a voluntary 
community. However what separates these categories from the"earlier types 
is that Niebuhr abstracts, from the earlier types, those aspects .which form 
the self understanding of each type of its identity as the church. This 
resul„s 11, a shift from a typology based upon sociological criteria to a
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theological approach based upon the self-perception of those occupying the 
position that the type represents.
4.5.2. This approach was given further Impetus with Niebuhr's discovery of 
Gilson in the same year. In Gilson's work he found an alternative to
Troeltsch's soclologlsing approach. Gilson's approach was one of
historical exposition and representation from primary sources of actual 
rather than hypothetical positions, of the relation of reason and
revelation. Niebuhr, it appears, took Gilson's approach and broadened it, 
both in terms of historical scope and the breadth of the problems he
aisoussed. Niebuhr took the question of Christ and culture, rather than 
revelation and reason, and the whole of Christian history, rather than
merely the Middle Ages, to produce a wider and more inclusive picture of 
the probleradS), modifying and supplementing Gilson's types. The result 
was the five types. of Christ and Chltiira, The first two of these (the 
Christ Against Culture and Christ of Culture types) represented Troeltsch's 
sect and church types. They are, once again, presented as polar opposites 
in terms of Niebuhr's withdrawal and engagement dialectic. The other three 
types seek to bring Christ and culture into some kind of reconciling
relationship and in doing so express the withdrawal-engagement dialectic in
different ways. All with the exception of the conversionist stance which
seems to suspend it.
4.5.3. In as far as Niebuhr's early typology is based upon Troeltsch it is 
open to the same objections already made of Troeltsch's typology. However 
hie later Christ-culture typology is a new departure and has several 
advantages over Niebuhr's earlier approach and that of Troeltsch.
first place, Cnrlst and Cultyxa. takes a purely theological
approach by defining the different types within the context of'th»
theological problem by which they define themselves and by their doctrinal 
development in the light of this self-definition. This leads to a greater 
clarity of understanding and purpose than in Troeltsch's approach where 
theological and sociological criteria are confused.
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4.5.
In the second place, Niebuhr's shift from a sociological to a 
theological and historical emphasis, following Gilson, made possible a 
wider framework of discussion than Troeltsch could conceive of, even in the 
S o c i a l  Teachings. Consequently Niebuhr is able, despite the relative 
brevity of his work in comparison to that of Troeltsch, to consider the 
fundamental theological and philosophical problems that lay behind 
Troeltsch's simple church-soclety question - those of Christ and Culture, 
and so consider a far wider variety of responses to that problem,
4.5.6. This leads to the third advance that Niebuhr made upon Troeltsch
and his own early work. He is able to consider a far more subtle variety of
cultural responses than was Troeltsch and is able to present historical
examples in their own terms rather than as re-interpreted within the
the typology. Troeltsch's historical material, while at times
presented in a masterly fashion, is either squeezed into his typological
framework or fundamentally at odds with it. Niebuhr's more sensitive
approach allows him to be far more consistent with, and faithful to his 
sources.
4.5.7. Despite these improvements, Niebuhr's typology still suffers from 
serious difficulties. Niebuhr's typology serves to distort some options, 
and eliminates others. For example, he states that the Christ Against 
Culture position withdraws from culture and then argues that any such 
withdrawal is impossible and that, instead, the radicals really choose 
between different aspects of culture rather than reject it totally. If 
this is the case, why not restate the radical's position as Christ 
Discriminating CultureT<16, Niebuhr also cites the Gnostics and Hitachi as 
examples of the Christ of Culture position. He argues that both present 
Christ as something of a cultural hero. But this is Inconsistent. Christ 
for the Gnostics was simply a Saviour figure whom they aligned with 
Occidental and Oriental mysticism, while culture was basically 
irrelevant.(Ferguson 1980:126-132). Ritschl, on the other hand, who stood 
closer to culture and had a far higher regard for it than did the Gnostics 
orthodox view of Christ. Lastly, Niebuhr identifies 
Jfarcion, along with Paul and Luther, as dualists and argues that dualism is 
ever on the edge of Marcion's heresy of postulating the existence of two
ilO
Jds. ret this is to misrepresent the tension in which the dualist stands 
iney are all implacable monotheists who seek to bring the diverse aspects
“ 3 rule Of the One God, Without the premise of 
monotheism, the tension of the dualist position would not exist. Therefore 
for dualism to slide into a metaphysical or ontological dualism would be 
for It to contradict its own fundamental premise. Harcion, therefore, was 
not a dualist in this sense. His difficulties occurred over his anti- 
semiticism and his dilemmas over the. problem of evil in the canon Ho 
dualist after the mind of Paul or Luther could have taken up this position. 
13 uhr IS not consistent in his development of the type being restricted 
y lis own Ideal type criteria.(Niebuhr 1952:163-73, Ferguson 1980:137-40).
4.5.8. A further distorting factor is present in Niebuhr's dialectic of
engagement and withdrawal. The radical and cultural positions are clearly
formulated in its terms. The opposition between these two types seems to
e couched largely in terms of polarity. The other types, however, are
al.so influenced by this withdrawal-engagement dialectic, as has already
been shown. This dialectic distorts the presentation of the different
positions because they are formulated in terms of how they resolve this
dialectic, either in opting for one polarity or the other (total engagement
or total withdrawal) or in terms of how they reconcile these two poles. On
tne one hand, this leads to the representation of a position as being more
extreme than it actually is, or they are classified according to the way
they resolved a theological problem that has been set for them from
without, by Niebuhr, and not one which was posed either by their context or
by themselves. Christians before Troeltsch and Niebuhr were quite unaware
an unconcerned by any withdrawal and engagement dialectic. All they were
awaie of was being faced, as Christians, with a non-Christian culture with
w ich, either negatively or positively, they had to deal. They had no
conception of any withdrawal-engagement dialectic therefore to evaluate and
classify their position on these grounds, as Niebuhr does implicitly, is 
both anachronistic and unfair.
4.5.9. Niebuhr's obvious preference for the conversionist position is .a 
lurther distorting factor in Niebuhr's typology. All the other types stand 
in the snadow of the Christ Transforming Culture position with the
result
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4.0.lO, ihere are also serious problems with Niebuhr's conversionist 
position Itself. To begin with, Niebuhr never answers the question of just 
how cultures have been converted; it is only ever set out as a programme in 
his work. Niebuhr never gives any examples of that programme having ever 
been pursued with any success. John, he acknowledges, was not really 
interested in the conversion of culture. Augustine, Niebuhr also 
recognises, represented a conflicting spectrum of positions. Furthermore 
It would be difficult to argue that the culture of the Late Empire was 
'Christian' by conversion since who had been converted to what, by whom and 
how IS a matter of considerable debate. As far as Maurice, Niebuhr's 
other example, is concerned, he had only an Idealistic programme which he 
was never able to fully implement. The Christ Transforming Culture type, 
therefore, seems to be a totally hypothetical position. (17)
4.5.11. There is also some question as to whether or not the conversionist 
position is really an Independent type. It would seem to be, much more, a 
variety of the dualist type since, as Niebuhr himself states, all the 
■conversionist' thinkers that he quotes established some kind of dualism 
between time and eternity, or spirit and materiality, or regenerate and 
unregenerate. To seek to convert non-Christian culture to Christ is simply 
anther way of stating the same dualism that Luther or Troeltsch faced 
between the ethics of Christ and His Kingdom and those of the .world. Thus 
the conversionist type is not, and cannot be, independent type since it 
contains an implicit dualism at its very heart. This has, perhaps, two 
sources. Firstly the dualist manner in which Niebuhr, following Troeltsch, 
set up the Christ-culture problem both in terms of its basic components.’ 
Secondly the duality that must, necessarily, underlie all Christian 
ihought, between nature and grace, God and world, and fall and 
redemption. (18) A monism, such as Niebuhr seeks in his transformationist 
monotheism, is simply not possible in Christian theology because that 
destroys the basic framework in which it perceives itself. Christian faith 
lives between the times when the Kingdom has come but while the old order 
of the old Aeon still exists. Thus it is never possible to go beyond a 
dualism, and even Niebuhr is, in time, driven back to this.(19)
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4.5.12. Niebuhr's typologies, then, like Troeltsch's, fail to give a clear 
picture of the various options for Christian ethics, which was their 
intent. Further, as with Troeltsch, at least four of Niebuhr's types are 
pathological since, should any Christian groups conform to them, they are 
guaranteed to fail because of the inherent contradictions and weaknesses of 
each type. The fifth type, too, may be regarded as pathological as it is a 
non-position - being purely hypothetical so all who aim at it will remain 
forever in the realm of abstraction. They will be burdened down with 
theorising for eventualities which will never occur. It is a theological 
cul de-sac. Hence, while Niebuhr intends to open up and explore the 
different options in Christian ethics by his five—fold typology, he 
succeeds only in misrepresenting them and closing them off as so many 
failed causes.
4.5.13. In addition to this Niebuhr, also contradicts and frustrates his 
own existentialism of choice in Christ and Culture by his use of his 
typology. He argues that Christians have the responsibility for finding 
the appropriate resolution of the tension between Christ and Culture for 
their own day but he obstructs this free decision by advocating one stance 
above others and by placing the options that these types represent in a bad 
light. The only way in which Christians can respond to the problem of 
Christ and culture in the manner that Niebuhr recommends is by examining 
anev/ the issues that they face in this confrontation and finding answers 
that are appropiate to theii' needs and the temper of their times. However, 
a breadth of vision and imagination is needed which is only possible if 
their minds are uncluttered by restrictive and distorting typologies. 
Contemporary Christians must develop a new option of their own which will 
have its own unique strengths and weaknesses.
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CONCLUSION
4.6,1. The final outcome of Niebuhr's typological approach has some clear 
parallels with the results reached in other areas of his thought discussed 
in the last chapter. There it was noted, in connection with Niebuhr's
ethics, that during the Second World War Niebuhr made an important shift in
his ethical thought. He moved away from a strategic approach which saw a 
non resistant pacifism as the primary (human) action which would clear the 
way for God s generation of the Kingdom, to a tactical approach centring 
upon the idea of responsibility which leaves all questions of strategy to 
God. The role of humanity is simply to respond to God's action in the
world as they perceive it affecting them. This transition finds its
counterpart in Niebuhr's abandonment of the church-sect typology which he 
makes at about the same time. Prior to 1939 Niebuhr saw church and
denominational types* as pathological - leading to the accommodation of 
Christian ethics to culture. At the same time, he has a great sympathy, 
though not agreement with, the sect-type and the Christianity it
rep] esents. He calls for the strategic withdrawal of the Church from the 
vrarld on the sectarian model. By 1946, however, the isolationist church is 
condemned, along with the worldly church, as irresponsible. The sect-type 
is now numbered with church and denominational types as pathological. This 
has the result that none of the positions in Niebuhr's original typology 
can offer him a mode of action in the present. Consequently Niebuhr 
initiates a new search for a model of Christian existence in culture and 
society which will be more amenable to his responsibilist ethics. This 
search found expression in the five-fold typology of Christ and Culture.
It culminated in his conversionist stance with its monotheistic view of 
creation and history; the latter being understood as the 'acts of God' in a 
responsibilist fashion. Niebuhr's movement from the position he held in 
the Social .Sources, and 'The Church Against the World' to that of Christ 
dUd— Cy,l tvr.G. is thus part of the general movement in his ethics that 
occurred this time.
4.6.2. In this connection it is interesting to note the fate of the 
withdrawal-engagement dialectic. Some commentators have argued that there 
v/as at this time a change in priorities from withdrawal to engagement in
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Niebuhr's thought. They contend that he believed that the church had 
regained its strength and needed to face the world once more.(cf Kliever 
1977:46-54; Hoedemaker 1970:137-140; Irist 1973:7-9). This is a far too 
superficial reading of what occurred in this transition, for Niebuhr never, 
anywheiG, states that the church is ready for a new engagement with 
L^ultuie. Rather he is still suggesting that a v;i1,hdrav;al may be necessary 
as late as 19o2 in Cltrl.st— and— QuituFQ• Instead it would seem that Niebuhr 
had come to see that the cycle of strategies of withdrawal from and 
engagement in culture followed by a strategy of engagement within it was 
problematic. He still believed that it was historically given but now he 
tactically attempted to go beyond it in an immediacy of response to God's 
action within human culture. The essentially human strategies of 
withdrawal and engagement which arise from human success and failure 
actually hindei God's indefinable strategy in culture to which humanity 
must respond. This response will be tactical, being based on the meaning 
of God's action in the present. Niebuhr is seeking to transcend the human 
strategies of withdrawal and engagement in order to respond to the divine 
action. In Niebuhr s responsibilist ethics, and in his conversionist 
position, vhe appioach of Christ toward culture and society is determined 
by God's actions. The place of human beings is simply to tactically 
respond to God's strategy.
4.6.0. In the conclusion to Chapter Three it was also suggested that 
Niebuhr's typology of religious orientation would reflect his theology, as ' 
Troeltsch's did his, and that different positions would be evaluated 
according to how they measured up to radical monotheism and so fulfilled 
its aim of transformation. That Niebuhr does judge the various positions 
both in his eariier and later typologies against his programme of 
transformation has been established, but the manner in which they relate to 
radical monotheism has not. Niebuhr's three early types (church, sect and 
denomination) were all found wanting in the light of radical monotheism. 
The chuich and denominational types substi i.ui.ed the sovereignty of the 
woi Id for tne sovereignty of God, The sect limited that sovereignty to the 
Church denying that God was Lord over the creation and that Christ's 
redemption was universal. For Niebuhr these wou1d both have been different 
forms of henotheism - making God the god of the group ((Niebuhr 1960:24-31;
;i6
j6-b3). The synthesist position Is also rejected because of its absolutism 
and Its rejection of the relativity that radical monotheism entails 
(Uiebuhr 1941,1 5), The dualist position was proven to be inadequate by 
Its very structure since it became a form of polytheism by dividing God's 
authority or by having two gods (Niebuhr 1942:945), Only the conversionist 
position is consistent with radical monotheism and is therefore given full 
approval. Niebuhr's radical monotheism is thus a further implicit 
criterion in Niebuhr's typology which, as such, stands in complete 
continuity with his ethics and theology.
Tust as the development of Niebuhr's typology of religious 
orientation expresses the central themes of his theology and ethics it also 
encounters the same difficulties and problems as his theology and ethics. 
The question of how the transformation of culture is to be achieved is 
central to Niebuhr's n-esponsive/contextual ethics. The hypothetical nature 
of the Christ Transforming Culture position is a reflection of the 
indeterminacy of action in a responsibilist framework where it is 
impossible either to prescribe or predict what actions are, or will be, 
■fitting' in any given situation.(20) However, Niebuhr's failure both to 
give examples of what actions have been fitting in past situation, which 
will in no way prejudice future action, or of how cultures have been 
transformed, suggests that both approaches are purely hypothetical.
4.6.5. This problem of definition is directly related to the weakness that 
was indicated as being at the heart of Niebuhr's theology in the last 
chapter; that of his understanding of God. Only if God has a clear 
Identity would it be possible to indicate so,ne consistency and constancy in 
the divine actions in history, which, in turn, would require a flexible but 
consistent and constant response in the actions of human beings. In other 
words it would be possible to identify certain classes of action which 
would always be present in people's response to God because there would be 
certain permanent patterns in God's action in history. But because 
Nxebuhr's God is contentless, being simply the 'confluence of being', it is 
not possible to identify any reliable pattern of personal action which give 
so,ne continuing patterns of fitting response or models of transformation.
As it is, because of the anonymity of Niebuhr's God, it is only possible to
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point to tne arbitrary events that arise out of history's contingencies, 
and the inevitable events which arise out of Its necessities which are all, 
somehow, united in a single direction by the centre of 'Being'. It would 
seem, therefore, that Niebuhr gives no examples because there are none.
4.6.6. Niebuhr's typologies of religious orientation, then, are 
theologically loaded and were subtle apologies for his own theological and 
ethical positions. In this he followed Troeltsch. But, again in keeping 
with Troeltsch's example, Niebuhr's typologies foundered on the same rocks 
that brought his theology and ethics as a whole to grief.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1 Kliever sees Niebuhr's withdrawal-engagement dialectic as the result
of Niebuhr's prioritizing of the Church-God relation over the Church- 
Voi Id relation which leads to the requirement for a double movement 
from God to the world and to God from the world (Kliever 1977:7-9), 
To suggest that the dialectic Is the consequence of a combination of 
two of Niebuhr's other polarities (Church-God and Church-Vorld) only
complicates the Issue unnecessarily.
2 Both,typologies are based upon a polarity which arises out of the God-
Church-World triad which Is fundamental to Niebuhr's thinking about 
the church. They are also caught up In and expressions of, the basic 
dualism which characterize the church's existence In the world. This 
also demonstrates the continuity between Niebuhr's fragmentary 
eccleslology and his typologies of religious orientation which are so 
significant In his ethics.
 ^ 1935 stragey of non-resistance that Niebuhr advocated In
i In this regard the worldly Church Is similar to Bergson's 'closed
religion'.
» This Idea of the representative repentance is a difficult one and
vfould seem to Imply that people are responsible for the sins and 
actions of others over whom they have no control. To speak of 
repentance In this connection makes no sense, for one cannot turn from 
sins one has not committed or undo the consequences of such alien 
sins. The Idea of representative repentance only makes sense for an 
appointed mediator, such as the Temple Priesthood or Christ as the 
Mediator for the Church and the world. To suggest that the Church Is 
the mediator for the world In this regard Is problematic since In 
doing this It would seem to be encroaching upon the role of Christ In 
Christian theology, and Niebuhr has already argued that one of the 
Church's problems Is that It has sought to play Saviour. Is he • 
suggesting that It do so again?
However it Is possible to accept responsibility for the sins of others 
as part of the Church's mission towards them In which It proclaims 
God's judgement upon sins and calls society to repentance and works to 
overcome the fruits and conditions of sin. This, it would seem. Is 
what Jesus, Paul and Ezekiel all had In mind.
Yet having said all this It Is often the case that the Church Is so 
Implicated In the sins of society that it must first repent of Its own 
sins and overcome them In Its own life before It may address wider 
society. In this case the Church would be responsible for society's 
sin because It would be It.s own. It would seem that Niebuhr has 
confused these three senses of 'responsibility' In his concept of 
'representative responsibility'.
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6 The 'pioneering church' seems to combine the faithfulness of the sect
with the involvement of the church.
7 This development is parallel to the changes in Niebuhr's attitude 
toward war during the same period.
8 Niebuhr seems to have developed a tacit threefold typology of 'Worldly 
Church , 'Isolationist Church' and 'Responsible' or 'Pioneering 
Church' which roughly correspond to the Christ of Culture, Christ 
Against Culture, and Christ Transforming Culture types of Christ and 
Culture respectively.
9 Most of Niebuhr's commentators when discussing the Vlthdrawal- 
Engageraent dialectic fall to describe Its development correctly, 
arguing that Niebuhr advocated withdrawal In the late 1920s and early 
1930s but urged involvement In the Kingdom of God in America (1937) or
The Responsibility of the Church for the World'. The truth Is 
however, Niebuhr had become disillusioned with this as a general
approach and had subordinated It to his responsibilist ethics.
10 At this juncture the 'hidden church' seems to be a pure Christianity 
or community of Christians which stands behind both the sect type and 
the^ church-type and Is the perennial source of renewal for the 
Christian faith, overcoming the distortions of both types. It Is, 
however, manifestly closer to the sect type here.
11 In the preface to Christ and Culture. Niebuhr notes that he has gained
many Insights from others which he was 'unable' to acknowledge.
Gilson's contributions to the formation of this new typology would
seem to be one of these. No other scholars seem to have discovered 
this contribution.
12 This echoes Niebuhr's attack on 'apologetics'.
13 Niebuhr als# describes Troeltsch cus a dualist. His dualism found
expression In a double dilemma In the contrasts between the absolute 
claim of Christianity upon those to whom It comes and Its relativity
as a historical tradition. For Troeltsch It was an absolute within a
relative context. The second way this dualism expressed Itself was In 
the contrast between the ethics of personal conscience, which are 
directed toward the production and defence of free personalities and 
seek to control nature to that end, with the ethics of the cultural
values which seeks to preserve historical Institutions ai^ material
life. A synthesis Is only possible between the two as an Individual 
achievement. Troeltsch himself, Niebuhr states, must have experienced 
-Une acute tension between these poles iin his service of the Weimar 
Republic.(Niebuhr 1952:183-185).
It Is clear that his version of the claims of Christ was
more akin to the cultural Christian Interpretation of the
New Testament prevalent In his day than to a more literal 
and radical reading of the Gospels. Even so a tension 
between Christ and cultured remained, and could not be 
solved save in a life of continuous struggle. Rather than
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17
being a straight forward example of the dualist type 
Troeltsch seems to be more a combination of the dualist and 
synthesist positions. He is a dualist in the way he defines 
and sets the context of tlm Christ and Culture problem, but 
he IS a synthesist in the approach he takes to the solution 
of the problem of the cultural synthesis.(Niebuhr 1952:185)
s ; : ,
about culture a^ on^ of its strengths. Niebuhr appears to be looking 
or an approach which is both pessimistic about the past and present 
situation and content with culture as a human achievement, yet one 
optimistic about its worth, possibilities future.
He finds this in the conversionist or Christ Transforming Culture 
position which for him has become the measure of the whole problem.
The Christ-culture issue also seems to be the context of the Church-
society relationship or the 'social problem* which was Troeltsch's
main concern in the Social Teachings, and Niebuhr's in the Social 
Sources.
A 'Christ Discriminating Culture' type would in fact be a great deal 
closer to what actually happens with those groups which profess and 
practice separation and non-conformity in history. For example the 
Anabaptists rejected the cultural expressions of power, violence and 
economic exploration within their society while affirming its
: : : : : :  cieZtbiiTiZLr'""""' —
of 'conversions' in his writing of cultural 
geology in I"® describes how Christian values have been
difficult Lo say that culture had been 'converted' to these ideas, 
ather, the concepts of the Kingdom of God and of Covenant bad
penetrated culture and had influenced the development of its political 
and social life. Such penetration and influence can take place by a 
great variety of means and avenues that probably owe much more to the 
accidents (or providences) of history, and to the vigour of Christians 
-han to the re orientation of Culture to Christ. In addition to this, 
the very concept of the 'conversion' of a culture is a problematic 
one despite Niebuhr's optimism, since it would require a collective 
wi . . which somehow transcends and incorporates the wills of
individuals. It is not clear that such a will exists, or, if it"does 
exist, Imw It might converted, since societies always s^^tk their 
welfare in pragmatic and utilitarian fashion is unclear. Vben the 
Church addresses society culture it always addresses particular 
groups of responsible individuals and calls upon them to turn their
actions around. If there are any changes in culture it is an
expression of the conversion of these individuals.
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5,1.2. These four problems are Interrelated. They are linked to
Troeltsch's and Hiebuhr's typological approach on the one hand and their
theological definition of the context of ethics on the other. < m  the case
of Troeltsch his 'social problem' - the relation of the Church to other
sooxal institutions and values, or as in the case of Niebuhr's 'Christ and 
culture') .
THE LIMITATIONS OF TYPOLOGIES.
5.2.1. Both Troeltsch and Niebuhr use types which owe much to Weber's 
conception of ideal types (discussed in the Introduction to this thesis). 
Troeltsch learnt his sociology from Weber. Weber was Troeltsch's close,
friend during the period when he was writing the Social and so
Troeltsch's idea ind use of ideal types was built upon Weber's thinking. 
Niebuhr learnt his sociology largely from Troeltsch and began by first 
accepting, and then adapting Troeltsch's development of Weber's types.,
5.2.2. Troeltsch based his types of church, sect and mysticism on Weber's
earlier 'historical' version of the ideal type which Weber had articulated
in 1904. Each type was thus defined in terms of a peculiar historical case
and then 'logically developed and synthesised' to be compared and
contrasted with other historical cases. Thus the church type was defined
in terms of the Mediaeval Church, the sect in terms of the Anabaptists, and
the mystical type in terms of the sixteenth century "Spirituals". Once
defined in terms of those cases which Troeltsch considered to be their
foremost examples these types were then used to classify cases earlier and 
later in history.(1)
5.2.3. Since they were based on specific cases, Troeltsch's types were 
■objectively possible', but they prove to be far from casually adequate in 
explaining the patterns of social behaviour found In a wide number of 
cases.^ Instead of the one, version of a type being applicable to all cases, 
qualifications, subtypes, and even hybrid types had to be developed, 
Troeltsch's distinction between violent and pacifist anabaptist 
sects(Troeltsch 1912.802-7), his development of the hybrid of the "Free
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Church" (Troeltsch 1912:661-691 ;805-T) and his presentation of the Quakers 
between mystical and sectarian types (Troeltsch 1912:780-4) all 
serve as examples of this. Troeltsch's types being historically defined 
were simply not broad enough to be generally applied to the whole of 
Christian history. He had begun with historically specific types which he
ad then sought to apply to the rest of Christian history. This was
inadequate.
5.2.4. At this point Troeltsch also ran into a problem that was endemic to
Veber s early version of ideal types. Weber had based his first idea of
1 eal types on the accentuation of the extreme characteristics of a case
" -herent synthesis. This leads to the production of a
caricature rather than a useful model. Moreover, there is no way that the
Neuris ic utility or inutility of a caricature can be established or
undermined (Andrseki 1979: 462-55; 1984: 41-50). Troeltsch's types all
a 1 into this category. They are caricatures of the social realities that 
ey epict. As such they bear a strong resemblance to those realities but 
eir extreme features are too highly pronounced. On top of this there is
no way, and indeed Troeltsch offers none, in which the viability of these 
types iBay be measured.
5.2.5 For his early work, the Niebuhr simply adopted
rceltsch's types, -with the difference that his third type was the
denomination rather than mysticism. However in Niebuhr
eve ops types which approximate Weber's later 'pure' or 'general'types.
defines his five types in tern, of a much wider range of instances than 
td Troeltsch. Instead of defining his types in terms of one historical 
rns ance and then applying the type to the rest of history Niebuhr sought
O e m e  his types m  terms of a number of instances. I„ addition to this
e abandons the principle of accentuation which so encumbered Troeltsch.
“ ‘J "ore historically faithful portrayal of 
the cases which approximate his types.
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5.2.6.
victim
Despite this, however, Niebuhr's typology also fails, falling 
to the same problems of distorted presentation and exclusive 
ae action which bedevilled Troeltsch's theory. The reason for this was 
hat while Niebuhr improved on Troeltsch's methodology he still shared with 
him certain basic assumptions and approaches.
5^2.7. In the first place, both Troeltsch and Niebuhr began by formulating 
their two polar types and then categorised their other types with reference 
to these polar types. Thus both Troeltsch and Niebuhr fell to defining 
their types by reference to extremes. They also set up a dialectic between 
their polar types, which it seems is an inevitable consequence of such 
polarised typologies, which then became a further extraneous factor by 
W ich the types were defined. (Diesing 1972; 201-2).
5.2.8. Secondly, Troeltsch and Niebuhr built evaluative principles arising 
from their theologies into their typologies. This led to one of the types 
becoming the measure of all the others. For Troeltsch, this was the 
ciurcb-type in its ability to compromise. For Niebuhr it was the Christ 
ransforming Culture type with its power to reorientate a culture to 
radical monotheism. This was contrary to Weber's theory and usage. He saw 
Ideal types as being purely interpretive rather than evaluative. For 
Troeltsch and Niebuhr ideal types were tacit evaluative tools,
5.2.9. These difficulties in Troeltsch's and Niebuhr's typologies might 
tempt some to conclude that all typological approaches as such are flawed 
and ought to be abandoned. This would certainly be an overreaction since 
1 would lead to the casting away of a valuable conceptual tool which is 
nlmost as old as conceptual thought itself. Such typologies are essential 
O socology (Hek,mn 1983: 1-17; R.ex 1973: 192-211) and useful in other
3sc.pl.nes u,eluding theological ethics. They can be used to great effect 
us heuristic tools provided that their limitations are understood; that 
they are only suggestive, approximate and partial in their scope. They can 
provide overviews, but only in the most tentative manner. All extreme 
polarisations and hidden evaluative principles must be avoided. The first 
because it will present all options in terms of one extreme or another, and 
uot in their true colours, and the second, because all evaluation must be
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Mstorical performance of the Christian church and thirdly, the
eschatological dualism of Kingdom and World.
ypo ogres Of both Troeltsch and Niebuhr do give rise to such a dialectic - 
IS much has been made very plain, and Niebuhr also defines his
# *# # 1
being a heuristic aid to understanding the world in all its variety.
5.2.17 Troeltsch and Niebuhr also based their understanding of the 
^ ^ ^ « n t / w i t h d r a w . 1  dialectic upon their cbeervatien of the Church's
b haviour in history. The church has always had an ambivalent attitude to
2  the sort that historians should ever be wary.
3= ory. At most, then, the alternation of the church between involvement
had r  "  ' ^ "-kness in the church's life .which
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5.2.18. Thirdly, and lastly, the dialectic of engagement and withdrawal 
seems to be a distorted version of the tension between Kingdom and World 
restated in terms of a historical cycle. The dualism or duality between 
Kingdom and World is a necessary one in Christian theology (Yoder 1971:52- 
84; 1963:59-73)(8), however it is an eschatological rather than
sociological or historical dualism. The tension between Kingdom and World 
is a tension that occurs betwen two domains or orders that coexist. As 
such it is a constant tension and does not result in a dialectical 
progression. To attempt to reformulate this dualism in sociological or 
historical terras is thus to misrepresent it. It is an attempt into 
theoretical force into an abstract scheme realities which cannot be fully 
reconciled within history, but which will be reconciled at its 
consummation. To treat these two theological realities, then, purely as 
interacting historical or sociological forces which pull one way and then 
another, is to fail to comprehend them. This is especially so with regard 
to the Kingdom, which is a supra-historical reality. Rather, the dualism 
between Kingdom and World leads to their continual juxtaposition and a 
constant interaction of confirmation and confrontation between them.
A FINAL WORD
5.3.1. In this thesis it has been shown how Troeltsch and Niebuhr's
typologies are inherently linked to their theologies and ethics and how 
these typologies are flawed as a result, misrepresenting some options and 
excluding others. This analysis was necessary because Troeltsch's and
Niebuhr's classificatory schemes have been widely adopted in Christian
ethics and had become the means whereby the usefulness of different
approaches to Christian ethics have been evaluated. This led to a 
situation in v^hich the options for Christian ethics have thus been falsely 
delimited and misunderstood.
5.3.2. If Christian ethics is to address in a creative and imaginative 
manner,the difficult issues which confront it in the modern -world, then it 
needs to dispense with the dichotoraous typologies of Troeltsch and Niebuhr 
which have so overshadowed Christian ethics during the last fifty years.
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Instead, approaches which recognise and build on the duality of Christla 
theology and ethics should be pursued.(9)
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«artln would relate this to the idea of the incarnation:
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on the world. The judgement Includes active and 
passive suffering of crucifixion. The validation of 
the world in principle implies the category of the 
church, while the form of judgement implies both the 
active and the passive sect.(Martin 1965:10).
There is a good deal of truth in this observation but there is no 
reason why the dual emphasis here should develop into a dialectic 
which produces two different social institutions. If they are 
understood as being two sides of an eschatological tension: that the
Kingdom is already present, but its fullness is yet to come, then they 
can be held together in the same institution.
Niebuhr, as was noted in the previous chapter, did come to this view 
but did not totally break free of this dialectic since it dominated 
the very typology he produced which was intended to go beyond it.
One wonders if there is really any historical evidence for such a 
dialectic outside of certain sociological models.
Yoder defines as.heretical any attempt to define the Church's position 
in the world without eschatology:
The attitude which seeks peace without eschatology is 
that which would identify church and world or fuse the 
two aeons in the present life with the act of God 
whereby evil is removed from the scene. This means a 
confusion between the providential purpose of the 
state, that of achieving a "tolerable balance of
egoisms" ....  and the redemptive purpose of the
church, the rejection of all egoism in the commitment 
• to discipleship. This confusion leads to the
paganisation of the church and the deraonization of the 
state.(Yoder 1971:64).
It is interesting to note that both R. Gregor Smith and E.J. Sharpe in 
their encyclopaedia articles on Vorldliness and The Kingdom of God 
(Smith 1967:363-4; Sharpe 1983:317-8) describe similar dialectics to 
that discussed earlier in this chapter either between a this-worldly 
and an other-worldly ethic, or between an emphasis on the presence of 
the Kingdom in the world and its coming fulfilment in the future. If 
the Church is to get beyond these counter-productive swings of the 
pendulum it must develop a holistic approach. Such an approach
embraces the full meaning of both the Kingdom and the world and sees
both the positive and negative aspects of the world in tiie light of
the values of the Kingdom which are its starting point and one goal . 
The work of J.H. Yoder and S. Hauerv/as has made good progress in this 
direction (Yoder 1963, 197.1a, 1971b, 1972; Hauerwas 1984).
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